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FOREWORD
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:
ITERATING TOWARD PERFECTION, WHEN PERFECTION IS
UNATTAINABLE

Charles E. MacLean*

We look back now with haughty disdain and selfrighteous indignation at the law of capital punishment as it
existed in America just a very short time ago: regularly
executing convicts who were mentally ill1 or retarded,2 under
the age of eighteen,3 or found guilty of non-homicide
offenses.4 Not long ago in America, all-White juries and White
judges, after hearing racially charged arguments from White
prosecutors, took mere minutes to convict minority
defendants who had been represented by patently ineffective
*

Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School. Professor
MacLean was an Assistant Professor of Law at Lincoln Memorial
University-Duncan School of Law until May 2013. He was one of the
Faculty Advisors to the LMU Law Review and taught a Death
Penalty Seminar in the spring of 2013 at LMU.
1 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
2 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
3 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
4 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
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counsel.5 To many, this sounds horrific, and we may ask
ourselves, “How could it have been like that in America?”
That was the reality just a few short years ago. The
broken American capital punishment system of several
decades ago began to change only after courageous legal
researchers and scholars spoke up and confronted the hidden
and tragic realities on America’s death rows. In this volume, a
new group of young scholars and researchers pick up the
mantle from those who came before and stand on their
shoulders to confront the injustice and inequality played out
still in today’s American capital punishment system.
Tomorrow’s scholars will stand on the shoulders of the
scholars whose vision and creativity is captured on these
pages in the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review.
When a society chooses, through its criminal justice
system, to execute certain criminals who have violated the
law, that society must ensure that the system by which death
is imposed is just, accurate, race-neutral, and defensible. If a
society chooses to allow capital punishment to continue, the
system must ensure that only the “worst of the worst”6 are
executed, and that procedures are in place to compel the
system’s decision-makers – prosecutors, judges, jurors – to
E.g., Missouri v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313 (Mo. 1996). The White
presiding judge in Kinder, while campaigning for his seat during
pendency of the trial, had issued a press release stating in pertinent
part, “The [other] party places far too much emphasis on
representing minorities . . . people who dont’ [sic] want to work, and
people with a skin that’s any color but white.” Missouri v. Kinder,
Appellant’s Brief, No. 75082 (Mo. 1996) (excerpted at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-penalty-black-and-whitewho-lives-who-dies-who-decides#7). See also Peek v. Florida, 488 So.
2d 52, 56 (Fla. 1986) (wherein the White presiding judge, as the
penalty phase was set to begin, stated in court, “Since the nigger
mom and dad are here anyway, why don’t we go ahead and do the
penalty phase today instead of having to subpoena them back at cost
to the state”). See generally David Baldus, et al., Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 61 (1983).
6 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 206 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
5
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elevate law and reason over emotion and revenge. Of course,
as humans, we are incapable of creating a perfect and errorfree capital punishment system. One might then ask, if we
cannot create a perfect capital system, then why have one at
all? Conversely, since we cannot create a perfect capital
punishment system, how much injustice and error should
society accept before capital punishment becomes
fundamentally unjust? These questions tear at the fabric of the
death penalty system in America. They also, however, raise
more questions.
Why do we ask such searching questions only of our
capital punishment system? When a person is put to death by
a constitutionally infirm and discriminatory system, most of
us can perceive the need for change, and many of us call for
change, but injustice permeates more than just the capital
punishment system. Blacks are imprisoned today at twice the
rate of Whites in every FBI crime category except driving
under the influence of alcohol and other alcohol-related
offenses.7 In a 2007 study, seven states reported an
incarceration rate for Blacks that was ten times higher than
that for Whites.8 Thus, we should be intolerant of
discrimination no matter where it arises in the criminal justice
system, and not just in capital cases. Arguably, there is only
marginally less injustice when an unjustly convicted person is
sentenced to life imprisonment instead of death. Perhaps the
next steps to be taken by some of the researchers in this
volume will be to address unjust convictions with a depth and
breadth that spans the entire criminal justice system.
When society became uneasy with public executions,
we moved them indoors. When society confronted the fact
that execution by hanging, electrocution, or the firing squad

FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS: CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2012,
table 43A (2013).
8 Marc Mauer & Ryan S. King, UNEVEN JUSTICE: STATE RATES OF
INCARCERATION BY RACE & ETHNICITY, table 6 (The Sentencing Project
July 2007).
7
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was unnecessarily painful and cruel, we substituted death by
lethal injection. When a three-drug protocol occasionally led
the condemned to suffer extreme pain and suffering, some
states moved to a one-drug protocol. But these purported
solutions are proverbial pats on the head, because the flaws
and injustices reside at the core of the death penalty system.
Thus, we must ask whether our society, like so many across
the globe, should abolish the death penalty altogether.
Capital punishment as a research focus is a glum
endeavor. Tragedy abounds on all sides of death penalty
cases, and many would rather that the practice remain hidden
from plain view, “off our radar” in execution chambers, and in
the bowels of correctional facilities. This is precisely why the
courageous young researchers who penned the student notes
in this volume in conjunction with a 2013 Death Penalty
Seminar at Lincoln Memorial University’s Duncan School of
Law have contributed to the American capital punishment
debate in extraordinary ways. Their efforts give life to the late
Justice Thurgood Marshall’s concept that since “death is
different,”9 our procedures and the quantum of due process
must be of the highest order. Simply put, the research
presented here is of the highest order.
Sheena Foster probes the special challenges and
evidentiary dilemmas facing capital defendants suffering from
Autism and Asperger’s Syndrome and their variants. Foster
wisely concludes that evidence and expert testimony
regarding a defendant’s disabilities must be admissible
because otherwise, capital jurors may misinterpret visible
symptoms of these mental illnesses as evidence of disinterest,
lack of remorse, lack of empathy for the victim, or worse.
Foster calls for broader admissibility to ensure these special
defendants can truly have their cases heard by fully informed
jurors.
Paige Coleman argues that America is perilously close
to losing international credibility because we are so out-of-step
9

Ford, 477 U.S. at 411.
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with the rest of the industrialized world on how we approach
capital punishment. Most recently, America was the only
remaining death penalty nation, other than Somalia, that
continued to allow executions of criminals whose crimes were
committed when they were juveniles. As Coleman notes, it is
appropriate for us to consider other nations’ approaches to the
death penalty as we reconsider our own approaches.
Nick Davenport’s thought-provoking note illuminates
the links between Natural Law, the Declaration of
Independence, and the American death penalty system. He
posits, as Natural Law adherents explain, that by voluntarily
continuing to live in America, we at least impliedly adopt and
accept the criminal justice system’s strictures, including the
principle that the death penalty is an accepted penalty for the
“worst of the worst.” As Davenport argues, part of the price of
living in and benefiting from this ordered society is that each
of us tacitly accepts the risk that serious violations of criminal
law can yield very serious consequences.
Ivy Gardner’s thoughtful note demonstrates that costbenefit arguments, although they may play a reasonable role
in grander discussions of the capital punishment system as a
whole, have no rightful place in individual capital cases and
therefore should be suppressed. The issues in the penalty
phase of a capital case are properly about the nature of the
offense and the nature of the offender. There is no room in the
sentencing equation for an argument that the decision maker
should rule for or against execution because it is cheaper or
more expensive than life imprisonment. As Gardner notes,
such economic arguments, where a defendant’s life is at stake,
are at best unseemly, and at worst, unconstitutional.
Kendall Inglish’s note focuses on the Atkins v. Virginia
decision and the constitutionality of executing capital
defendants who suffer from developmental disabilities or
mental retardation. As Inglish concludes, the Atkins case has
left the door open for states to set their own standards for
determining which defendants are too mentally retarded to be

ITERATION TOWARD PERFECTION
constitutionally executed, and in so doing, the Court has
utterly failed to give the states any guidance on specific
standards that might pass constitutional muster.
Randall Noe, a career Tennessee law enforcement
officer, who has lost coworkers and friends through violent
crimes, presents a moving and insightful history of
Tennessee’s experience (some may call it Tennessee’s
experiments) with capital punishment. Noe’s insights into and
connections with the topic were not merely the product of
research at arm’s length. Rather, they were earned the oldfashioned way – up close and personal.
The Supreme Court’s struggle with capital
punishment, at least since 1976, has not been easy or always in
the same direction. In one case, all nine Supreme Court justices
issued separate written opinions.10 Nor has the Court’s
struggle been solely or even predominantly about
constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, the Court has engaged in
a practice that appears more like an exercise of judicial will
than a principled jurisprudential quest. At times, it seems like
the Court has arrived at a pre-ordained outcome while
struggling to find a constitutional hook to support its decision.
Shouldn’t it be the other way around? That is certainly not the
kind of constitutional analysis the Court should typically
perform.
In a very real sense, “death is different.” Perhaps it is
not enough to be an originalist and adhere only to the text and
intent of the Framers. Perhaps it is not enough to be a “living
Constitution” devotee and explain with a wave of the hand
that the Framers intended these concepts to be malleable and
adaptable over time as circumstances change. That makes the
Supreme Court—not the people—in charge of telling us what
the Constitution means now—and forever—in the death
penalty area.
Ultimately, one’s take on capital punishment is an
individualized and complex equation that incorporates
10

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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religious, ethical, and moral concepts within a legal context. It
is a personal matter, indeed. Perhaps there is no one right
answer, and perhaps our approach to terrestrial justice on
Earth is doomed, as a product of humans who err, to be
imperfect. But that does not moot the quest for perfection.
Perhaps the “safest” religious, ethical, moral, and even legal
path is to admit perfection is unattainable and simply abolish
capital punishment as an option. But once a society has
fervently decided to exact the most final retribution on its
“worst of the worst” offenders that society must just as firmly
bind itself to engage in that quest toward perfection, because
“death is different.”
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Sheena Foster*
A jury is an unpredictable group. Each of the twelve
jurors on a case could have a different and separate reason for
reaching a verdict. The jury in each criminal case is asked to
determine the guilt or innocence of a defendant, and in some
cases that guilty verdict could lead to a death sentence for the
accused. With a person’s life at stake, the criminal justice
system should take every possible precaution to make sure the
jury is properly informed (while not misled) to make this
decision. If a defendant suffers from mental deficiency or
diminished capacity, relevant evidence in that regard must be
presented to the jury for the twelve jurors to reach a properly
informed decision. Evidence of mental deficiency or disability
can be relevant to defendant’s mental culpability – mens rea –
for the crime, but these defects or disorders also explain a
Sheena Foster, B.A.-History (University of Tennessee), J.D. (Lincoln
Memorial University, Duncan School of Law). This article was
originally presented to Death Penalty Seminar Professor Charles
MacLean at Lincoln Memorial University, Duncan School of Law,
spring semester 2013.
*
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defendant’s mannerisms and responses, both outside of court,
and in full view of the judge and jury. For this reason, jurors
should always be allowed to view or hear evidence that relates
to a defendant’s mental defect, disorder, or disability.
Particularly in cases involving social disorders such as
Asperger’s Syndrome (“AS”) and High-Functioning Autism
(“HFA”), introducing the diagnosis to the jury could explain
why the Defendant had particular reactions to other witnesses
or victims before, during, or after the crime and why the
defendant seems to lack remorse or normal social functioning
in the courtroom. Without knowing and understanding a
defendant’s mental disorder, the jurors could misinterpret the
defendant’s social actions or lack of remorse as evidence of
guilt.

I. MENTAL/SOCIAL DISORDERS
A number of mental/social disorders are closely
related to and are parts of autistic spectrum disorders,
including autism, HFA, AS, Deficits in Attention Motor
Control and Perception (“DAMP”) syndrome, and other
disorders that are based purely on observable behaviors.1
These disorders are complex and new research regarding
these disorders is surfacing constantly. Many of these
disorders are related; one disorder could be mistaken for
another, or an individual could be suffering from more than
one of these or related disorders at the same time.2
Asperger’s Syndrome and HFA have been
characterized as milder forms of autism, but each disorder
varies widely in degree.3 Characteristics of AS include social
isolation, oddness, obsessive special interests, eccentric or
pedantic use of language, physical clumsiness, and sensory
Maria Rhode, Asperger’s Syndrome: A Mixed Picture, 31
PSYCHOANALYTIC INQUIRY 288, 288 (2011); Lotta Dellve, Lars
Cernerud, and Lillemor R.-M. Hallberg, Harmonizing Dilemmas:
Siblings of Children with DAMP and Asperger Syndrome’s Experiences of
Coping with Their Life Situations, 14 SCAND J CARING SCI 172, 172
(2000).
2 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288.
3 Id.
1
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hypersensitivity.4 For example, a coin collector who lives for
his hobby, has no close friends, feels overwhelmed by bright
lights and loud noises, has difficulties communicating with
people, and is bewildered by social cues would fit the typical
profile of a person suffering from AS or HFA.5
A problem arises in the court system when dealing
with defendants who suffer from AS. First, the disorder is
widely misunderstood by the general population and by most
jury members. The disorder also varies in degree from person
to person and there is no way to objectively measure such
degrees as this disorder is based purely on observable
behaviors.6 While low-functioning Autism will almost
undoubtedly qualify a defendant as intellectually disabled and
incompetent to stand trial, AS and HFA likely will not.7 The
overlap between autism and mental retardation seems
obvious, but courts in capital punishment states routinely hold
there is no such correlation.8 The Supreme Court of Florida has
held that while a diagnosis of AS serves purposes for
mitigation, AS is considered a mere “mental illness [and] does
not serve as a bar to execution.”9 The court’s decision was
rendered in a case involving a defendant with AS, who was
only eighteen years old and had the developmental and
emotional age of twelve to thirteen.10 Louisiana has even
included in its state law that a diagnosis of autism is not
equivalent to a finding of mental retardation.11 With courts
making blanket decisions about AS and whether or not it rises
to the level of mentally retarded, the need increases for the

Id.
Id.
6 Id.
7 Nita A. Farahany, Cruel and Unequal Punishments, 86 WASH. U. L.
REV. 859, 896-97 (2009) (citing Eric Fombonne, Epidemiology of Autistic
disorder and Other Pervasive Developmental Disorders, 66 J. CLIN.
PSYCHIATRY 3, 4 (Supp. 10) (2005)) (Almost 70% of persons suffering
from a disorder under the autistic spectrum meet the diagnostic
medical criteria to be classified as mentally retarded, and 30% do
not.).
8 Farahany, supra note 7, at 898.
9 Schoenwetter v. State, 46 So. 3d 535, 563 (Fla. 2010).
10 Id. at 543-44.
11 LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(H)(2)(a) (2008).
4
5
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public, especially jurors, to be aware of AS, its symptoms, and
how it affects behaviors and thoughts.

II. PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY
Many courts have excluded evidence of psychiatric
experts involving AS and HFA claiming any probative value
would be substantially outweighed by the danger of confusing
the jury causing members of the jury to speculate on how the
disorder affected the defendant.12 However, when the jury
does not have this information, the jurors are left to assume
the defendant has a normal brain which is socially functional.
This situation actually creates a higher danger of juror
confusion, because many social mannerisms exhibited by a
person suffering from AS or HFA are very similar to reactions
associated with a guilty mind.
If a defendant looks down at the table during the entire
trial, jurors could interpret it to mean the defendant is
ashamed and cannot bear to face the victims, witnesses,
attorneys, or judge. In reality, looking down at the table may
be something very common for persons with AS or HFA
because isolation is a characteristic of both disorders.13 A jury
lacking knowledge of the defendant’s mental conditions is
very dangerous for the accused, who could be unfairly viewed
in a different light just because of the mannerisms that are
symptoms of these mental conditions. There is no existing
danger, as prosecutors argue, in equipping the jury with
relevant facts about the defendant’s mental conditions. The
danger of prejudice lies with not introducing the evidence.
Reports have found persons suffering from AS or HFA
have a greater history of violent behaviors14 and a greater
tendency toward violent crime, including murder.15 Several
different hypotheses have been suggested to explain the
association of AS with violent crime, including “lack of
Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 235 (Minn. 2010).
Rhode, supra note 1, at 288.
14 M. R. Woodbury-Smith, High functioning autism spectrum disorders,
offending and other law-breaking: findings from a community sample, 17 J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHOL. 108 (2006).
15 D. M. Schwartz-Watts, Asperger’s disorder and murder, 33 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 390, 390 (2005).
12
13
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empathy, social naiveté, excessive interests getting out of
control,” and sexual preoccupations.16 However, this evidence
does not prove having AS or HFA equates to a lack of intent.
Expert psychiatric evidence would give the jury better insight
into how the individual’s mind operates on a daily basis. The
jury would still be free to determine, using the evidence
presented, whether the defendant acted with the requisite
intent. No expert can testify as to whether a person is guilty of
a crime. This determination has always been and will be left to
the jury.
Most states require the prosecution to prove intent to
kill as an element of a murder conviction, and the jury must
consider the defendant’s subjective state of mind to determine
beyond a reasonable doubt whether that requisite intent
existed at the time of the crime.17 In states that do not
recognize the doctrine of diminished capacity, the jurors are
left to speculate as to the mental state and brain functioning of
a defendant whose mental state falls just shy of qualifying for
an insanity defense. Minnesota courts, in particular, have held
that psychiatric testimony cannot be used to disprove a
defendant’s subjective state of mind – at the time of the crime
– during the guilt phase of trial.18 “Without the doctrine of
diminished capacity, an offender is either wholly sane or
wholly insane, and criminal liability cannot be based on the
degree of sanity an offender possesses.”19 However, as most
psychiatrists would agree, mental health is not a black or
white issue, but operates along a continuum,20 yet this black or
white/sane or insane decision is left up to a lay jury as it tries
Stewart S. Newman & Mohammad Ghaziuddin, Violent Crime in
Asperger Syndrome: The Role of Psychiatric Comorbidity, 38 J. AUTISM &
DEV. DISORDERS 1848, 1849 (Nov. 2008) (citing Y. Kohn, et. al.,
Aggression and sexual offense in Asperger’s syndrome, 35 ISRAEL J
PSYCHIATRY 293 (1998)).
17 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 140-41 (1997).
18 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010) (citing
Minnesota v. Peterson, 764 N.W.2d 816, 821-22 (Minn. 2009);
Minnesota v. Bird, 734 N.W.2d 664, 677-678 (Minn. 2007); State
Minnesota v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93, 104 (Minn. 1992); Minnesota v.
Brom, 463 N.W.2d 758, 763-64 (Minn. 1990); Minnesota v. Jackman,
396 N.W.2d 24, 29 (Minn. 1986).
19 Anderson, 789 N.W.2d at 237.
20 Minnesota v.Bouwman, 328 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Minn. 1982).
16

14

2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015)

to decide the mental state of a defendant without proper
expert evidence on the issue. Determining the subjective
mental state of the defendant without the aid of an expert
seems challenging at best. Add on the fact that the defendant
might be exhibiting unexplained, odd, and guilty-looking
mannerisms, and the task approaches impossibility.

III. THE M’NAGHTEN TEST FOR INSANITY
Most jurisdictions use some variation of the
M’Naghten test to determine whether a defendant is insane for
purposes of trial. This test comes from an English case in 1843
in which the House of Lords held that the defendant would be
able to assert an insanity defense if, “at the time of committing
the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, [he]
did not know he was doing what was wrong.”21 Therefore, if
the defendant failed to know that what he was doing was
either wrong or illegal or did not know the nature and quality
of his act, he should receive a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity. This M’Naghten Rule addresses awareness, an
essential component of mens rea or intent, but awareness alone
cannot suffice to fully explain a defendant’s mental state. The
human mind is a complex system of many mechanisms a lay
jury could not be expected to comprehend. What if the
mechanism that separates the knowing from the acting, the
feedback loop, is the mechanism impaired?22 Assessing a
defendant’s awareness is not enough to understand his mental
state.23
“For defendants whose mental illness manifests itself
by an inability to self-govern, it is unjust that their knowledge
of the act’s guilty nature denies them reprieve.”24 Schwarz
describes how intent formation, having the express purpose of
committing the crime, and awareness of the illegality of the
ROBINSON, supra note 18, at 512 (citing M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng.
Rep. 718, 722 (1843)).
22 Charlotte Schwarz, Irreconcilable Differences: Mens Rea and Mental
Illness, 20 WRITING IN & ABOUT MED. 41, 44 (Spring 2009).
23 Id.
24 Id.
21
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crime, work in a feedback loop, but each is neurologically
distinct.25 This creates a fundamental asymmetry between law
and medicine, as the law seeks to analyze guilt.26 Situations
that are more grey than black and white must be explained by
an expert before any layperson on a jury can begin to
understand the concepts at issue.
The underpinnings of such neurological and
psychiatric diagnoses as AS and HFA are complex neural
systems which remain at odds with M’Naghten’s onedimensional constraint to deliver an unequivocal verdict, and
the gradients of mental illness are overlooked, resulting in a
forced conformity.27 In a society where death is still a viable
punishment for crime, every level of mental illness must be
examined during trial. The jury can still weigh the facts before
them, but justice requires that the jury have all of the facts
relevant to guilt. State prosecutors will argue that introducing
evidence of mental illnesses that do not rise to the level of
insanity might cause the jury to associate the mental illness
with a lack of intent, but the jurors are left to weigh those facts.
If our justice system leaves any room for error, that error
should be on the side of life.

IV. IN MINNESOTA V. ANDERSON, A MINNESOTA COURT
SUPPRESSED EVIDENCE OF ASPERGER’S SYNDROME
In Minnesota v. Anderson, Minnesota courts denied
expert testimony which would have established that the
defendant was suffering from AS and suppression of this
testimony stripped Anderson of a fair trial.28 Minnesota state
courts have held that introduction of probative psychiatric
testimony is overshadowed by the risk of confusing juries as
to the legal elements of intent and premeditation, and that
legal definitions of each are outside of a psychiatrist’s
practice.29 However, in Anderson’s case, and likely many
Id.
Id.
27 Id.
28 Minnesota v. Anderson, 789 N.W.2d 227, 234 (Minn. 2010).
29 Brittany E. Bachman, CRIMINAL LAW: SUBJECTIVE INQUIRY INTO A
DEFENDANT’S STATE OF MIND: SHOULD PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT
TESTIMONY BE ALLOWED TO DISPROVE MENS REA?-- MINNESOTA V.
25
26
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other similar cases, defense attorneys sought to introduce
evidence of AS to help the jury understand how the disorder
affected many parts of Anderson’s life.30
The suppressed expert testimony would have
explained that AS impairs an individual’s ability to socialize,
communicate, empathize, or understand and respond
properly to social cues,31 and persons with AS lack an
understanding of what is socially acceptable.32 The court in
Anderson believed that this was lay evidence, and that the jury
could determine this type of general information without the
help of an expert.33 Both AS and HFA are rare, complex, and
misunderstood disorders. Expert testimony would be
absolutely necessary to avoid juror confusion, yet the state’s
attorney argued the evidence would lead to exactly that. As
the jurors viewed Anderson’s demeanor and facial
expressions, they had no way of knowing these reactions were
a result of his disorder. The judge even said to Anderson:
“You have shown no remorse, no empathy, and I have no
sympathy for you.”34 The jurors would have surely perceived
Anderson differently if they had known of his inability to
empathize and respond to social cues. Suppressing such
evidence was clear error and unfairly prejudiced Anderson
during his trial.
Persons affected by AS or HFA have an odd, pedantic
manner of speaking35 and poor nonverbal communication.36
As Anderson’s attorneys argued, although it fell upon deaf
ears, these symptom-driven actions and mannerisms, both in
the courtroom and in his behavior toward witnesses around
the time of the event, can and will look negatively upon the
defendant. Anderson’s appearance was described as odd and
ANDERSON, 789 N.W.2d 227 (Minn. 2010), 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
491, 503 (2011).
30 Anderson, at 227.
31 Id. at 235.
32 Id. at 233.
33 Id. at 233-34.
34 Bachman, supra note 30, at 510-11.
35 A. Klin, D. Pauls, R. Shultz & F. Volkmar, Three diagnostic
approaches to Asperger’s syndrome: Implications for research, 35 J. AUTISM
& DEV. DISORDERS 221, 223 (2005).
36 See L. Wing, Asperger’s Syndrome: A clinical account, 11 Psychol.
Med. 115 (1981).
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scary, and this was unfairly prejudicial against him all because
of his mental and social disorder. The expert testimony, if it
had been admitted, would have allowed the jury to
understand his appearance and actions.

V. A NON-TESTIFYING DEFENDANT IS STILL
EXPERT TESTIMONY IS SUPPRESSED

AT

RISK WHEN

The argument for introduction of expert testimony
remains even if the defendant does not take the witness stand
to testify. The defendant sits at counsel table and is visible to
the jury throughout the entire trial. Especially in cases where a
death sentence could be imposed, juries are likely to observe
the defendant closely in an attempt to find some type of
justification in his behavior for the verdict they will render.
Accordingly, first impressions are extremely important.
Just as a job applicant wants to put the best foot
forward in the initial interview, a defendant needs to be free
from a tainted first impression. The influences shaping a
juror’s thoughts and feelings about a particular case begin
long before trial.37 Indeed, “the decision-making process for a
juror in any particular case begins as soon as the juror enters
the courtroom and starts making assessments of the people
and information that are presented.”38 Therefore, the
defendant is being judged as soon as the jury members are
walking through the door. This assessment will occur whether
or not the defendant testifies.
Once the guilt phase of trial is completed, most states
have much more lenient evidence rules with regard to
mitigating factors. There is a lower burden of proof for
mitigating factors, and relevance, as a hurdle to admissibility,
in a capital case is lower in the sentencing phase than at any
other time or any other type of trial. However, even when
evidence of AS or related disorders is admitted during the
sentencing phase of trial for mitigation purposes, the attempt
to explain behavior is too little, too late. By the sentencing
phase of trial, the jurors have already sat through many hours
Richard C. Waites, Are Jurors Equipped to Decide the Outcome of
Complex Cases?, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 19, 29 (2005) (citing Richard
C. Waites, COURTROOM PSYCHOL. & TRIAL ADVOC. 535-37 (2003)).
38 Id.
37
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of trial, and they have already made up their minds as to the
defendant’s guilt. The picture of the defendant is firmly
situated inside the jurors’ minds, and any alternative
explanation for the defendants’ behavior is likely futile.
Another scholar of jury decision making conducted a
study of capital trial jurors and premature decision making.
What he found was quite telling. “One half of the capital
jurors take a stand on the defendant's punishment before they
even see the full inventory of evidence, of arguments, and of
instructions for making the punishment decision.”39
Furthermore, those jurors who do take an early stand “are
absolutely convinced of their early stands and stick with them
consistently thereafter.”40 The same scholar also noted that
even during the penalty phase deliberations, “the same
inability, or unwillingness, to keep the decisions separate
appears to allow jurors to justify a death sentence simply by
pointing to the evidence of the defendant's guilt.”41 Therefore,
not only is it too late by the sentencing phase to change jurors’
minds, but the jurors will also point back to the fact that he
was guilty in order to justify their sentencing decisions. Thus,
the defendant’s uphill battle only steepens as the trial
progresses. Opponents might argue juries are specifically told
not to decide on punishment before the sentencing phase and
are asked if they will keep an open mind throughout the trial,
but studies show that regardless of how the jurors answer that
question, one half have already made up their mind and will
stick with that conclusion until the end.
Danger also exists in the defense looking like they are
grasping at straws and trying to find any and every little thing
to excuse the defendant’s behavior. A juror might wonder
why mental condition is even being raised, because if it was an
important fact, then it would have been raised earlier during

William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys, & Benjamin D. Steiner, Foreclosed
Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial
Experience, and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1476,
1529 (1998).
40 Id. at 1529.
41 Ursula Bentele & William J. Bowers, How Jurors Decide on Death:
Guilt Is Overwhelming; Aggravation Requires Death; and Mitigation Is
No Excuse, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1019 (2001).
39
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the guilt phase. They may assume, therefore, mental condition
is unimportant.

VI. IN EDWARDS V. ROPER, THE DEFENDANT WAS
DIAGNOSED WITH ASPERGER’S SYNDROME ONLY AFTER
HIS TRIAL
For some, the diagnosis of AS or other developmental
disorders comes too late. That was the case for Kimber
Edwards, who is currently sitting on “death row.”42 Edwards
was convicted of the first-degree murder of his ex-wife, and
the trial court entered a death sentence in accordance with the
jury’s recommendation.43 Prior to trial, Edwards was
evaluated by three medical experts to determine whether he
was competent to stand trial, and whether he had a mental
disease or defect that could provide a defense or significant
mitigating evidence.44
All three experts determined Edwards was competent
to stand trial; however, one of the experts, Dr. Cross, alerted
the defense team that Edwards had a 25-point difference
between his verbal and performance IQ scales which was
indicative of a developmental disability.45 Another expert, Dr.
Stacy, diagnosed Edwards with a pervasive developmental
disorder (not otherwise specified).46 Yet, all three experts
reached the same conclusion; the defendant was competent to
stand trial and free from any mental disease or defect that
could provide a defense or mitigation evidence. The findings
of the experts and their conclusions seem to be at odds. No
complete social history was formed, nor was a specific
diagnosis given prior to trial.47 Edwards’ case continued with
no evidence introduced of AS in either the guilt or penalty
phase. He was convicted and received a sentence of death.48

Missouri v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511 (Mo. 2003).
Id. at 520.
44 Edwards v. Roper, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2009 WL 3164112, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 28, 2009).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id. at *1-3.
42
43
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The post-conviction team began investigations and
again three medical experts were retained. Dr. Cross had been
on the team of three that had examined Edwards prior to trial.
The team was finally able to compile a complete social history
of the defendant and diagnose him with AS.49 Dr. Logan, an
on-board expert, opined that evidence of AS could have been
offered to explain Edward’s abnormal demeanor and his
inability to reach an amicable agreement with his ex-wife
regarding child support and custody issues,50 yet this evidence
was not even offered during the penalty phase for purposes of
mitigation.
The defense attorneys for Edwards’ trial even noted
abnormal behaviors during their representation. The entire
defense team found it extremely difficult to communicate with
the defendant, and he demanded that his lawyers pursue
irrelevant, time-wasting inquiries.51 Edwards also threatened
to withhold exculpatory information from his attorneys unless
they satisfied his demands.52 His attorneys had to spend many
hours wasting time and going through boxes of irrelevant
material just to try to regain the defendant’s cooperation.53
Edwards even asked the court to remove his lawyers at
various times through his trial.54 These behaviors are similar to
characteristics of AS. Edwards’s special interest became the
trial, and he obsessed and needed to control it. This obsession
prejudiced his opportunity to receive a fair trial, and the jury
heard no mention of any mental or social disorder.
The need for introduction of AS evidence was clear in
Edwards’s case, but the appellate court was left with little
discretion to do anything about it. Edwards’s post-conviction
team tried to allege ineffective assistance of counsel, but to win
on such an argument they were required to prove the
attorney’s conduct fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and Edwards was prejudiced because of the
failure.55 To get past the first prong of this test the postId. at *4.
Id.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at *4 n.6.
54 Edwards, 2009 WL 3164112 at *4.
55 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
49
50
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conviction team would have to “show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.”56 This is a high
burden, and the post-conviction team’s argument for
ineffective assistance of counsel was unsuccessful.57
The defense team did a reasonable job with the facts
they were given and the medical records at hand, and it is
almost impossible to speculate how a diagnosis of AS would
have affected the outcome of the case. There are very few
capital punishment cases nationwide involving similar issues
and the medical studies surrounding AS are relatively new.
Thus it is of utmost importance juries be properly informed as
to the defendant’s medical condition so as to give an informed
and unprejudiced decision regarding the defendant’s guilt and
corresponding sentence.

VII. DEFENSE ATTORNEYS CAN CHOOSE NOT TO INTRODUCE
PSYCHIATRIC EVIDENCE AND THIS WILL BE DEEMED
PROPER TRIAL STRATEGY
With the growing complexity of scientific data to be
introduced during a capital trial, the need for expert
psychiatric testimony increases. However, some defense
attorneys have chosen either not to elicit an expert diagnosis
and analysis or completely leave out expert psychiatric
testimony altogether. The following cases illustrate how the
decision by the attorney can negatively affect the case, but the
courts are unwilling to classify such an attorney’s conduct as
ineffective assistance of counsel.

56
57

Id. at 694.
Edwards, 2009 WL 3164112 , at *12-13.
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A. JACKSON V. UNITED STATES

A potentially autistic North Carolina man was
convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1995.58 In
preparation for trial, the government issued written notice to
the defense that the government would only seek to introduce
mental health experts in rebuttal to those introduced by the
defense team.59 Upon review of the government’s potential
rebuttal evidence, the defense team decided to withdraw its
notice of intent to introduce mental health experts.60 The
defense team also failed to elicit any further mental health
evaluations
concerning
Jackson’s
childhood
and
61
development. This trial strategy was deemed proper and in
no way rising to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.62
In other words, if a defendant does not receive the proper
mental evaluations before trial, he is probably just out of
luck.63
However, denying expert testimony has not been the
only problem for defendants and their assistance of counsel.64
In some cases, the defense team introduces very damaging
expert testimony, and this is still proper trial strategy.
B. MORTON V. SECRETARY, FLORIDA DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS
In a Florida case, Alvin Morton received a sentence of
death for two 1992 murders.65 Upon appeal, Morton received a
new sentencing hearing.66 During his first trial, Morton had a
Jackson v. United States, No. 4:06-CV-1419, 2010 WL 2775402, at *1
(W.D.N.C. July 13, 2010).
59 Id. at 6.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Jackson v. United States, 638 F.Supp.2d 514, 599-600 (W.D.N.C.
2009).
63 See id.
64 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 665 (1984) (discussing
counsel’s lack of criminal trial experience, “Every experienced
criminal defense attorney once tried his first criminal case[,]. . . but it
does not justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. . . .”).
65 Morton v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr., 684 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th
Cir. 2012).
66 Id. at 1164.
58
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psychiatric expert testify for mitigation purposes.67 This expert
testified that Morton had a mixed personality disorder with
emotional instability.68 After giving the diagnosis, the expert
seemed to totally undermine Morton’s plea for mercy.69 The
expert said Morton’s “ability to develop into a more fully
functioning individual was extremely limited,”70 and that
“given the state of the art and what we know, I would have a
difficult time saying we could cure [Morton’s] disorder.”71
The expert went on to compare Morton’s situation with
that of a serial killer, which only made Morton look even
worse to the jury.72 During the new sentencing hearing,
Morton’s attorney decided that even though the expert
testimony did more harm than good, they would have the
expert testify again at the second sentencing hearing.73 Morton
was again sentenced to die.74 The appellate courts
subsequently held that offering damaging expert testimony as
to Morton’s mental condition was proper trial strategy.75
Again, these cases illustrate the importance of a correct
diagnosis and helpful expert testimony.76 Without these two
things, a defense attorney’s case is at a great disadvantage.77

VIII. IN PEOPLE
EVIDENCE
IRRELEVANT

V.

MACKLEM, PROSECUTORS REBUTTED
OF
ASPERGER’S SYNDROME WITH
BUT
PERSUASIVE
NEUROLOGICAL

EVIDENCE
In People v. Macklem, the State of California originally
sought the death penalty, but subsequently dropped the
Id. at 1163.
Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1164.
75 Id. at 1163.
76 See Morton v. Sec’y, Florida Dept. of Corr, 684 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir.
2012); Jackson v. United States, 2010 WL 2775402, at *1 (W.D.N.C.
2010).
77 Id.
67
68
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pursuit for a death sentence in the joinder motion to
consolidate the murder of Macklem’s ex-girlfriend and the
assault upon his prison cellmate.78 Macklem was diagnosed
with AS as a juvenile.79
At the age of 18, Macklem killed his ex-girlfriend,
Sarah Beagle.80 While awaiting trial, Macklem also attacked his
cellmate with a PVC pipe.81 Luckily for Macklem, the trial
court allowed expert testimony about AS in front of the jury.82
The expert was allowed to testify about Macklem’s mental
state and how AS affected a person’s thinking and behaviors.83
Unfortunately for Macklem, the prosecutors came up with a
way to rebut this evidence and convince the jury that the AS
evidence was, in essence, “hogwash.”84 The state offered
psychological evidence that there were no neurological,
structural, or functional abnormalities that would explain or
affect the defendant’s behavior.85
Yet AS and similar
disorders in the autistic spectrum are characterized and
diagnosed purely by observable behaviors.86 An absence of
visible deformities or damage to the brain does not equate to
the lack of mental disorder.
Medical scholar Charlotte Schwarz published an article
in 2009 attempting to explain how jurors respond to different
types of expert psychiatric testimony.87 She noted that use of
neuro-scientific data in courts is becoming more routine as
psychiatry has shifted toward biological models.88 New
medical technology has produced functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI), an increasingly accessible scanning
technique that measures changes in brain blood-oxygen levels

California v. Macklem, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 243 (2007).
Id. at 680.
80 Id. at 679-81.
81 Id. at 681.
82 Id. at 684.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 685.
85 Id.
86 Rhode, supra note 1, at 288.
87 Schwarz, supra note 22.
88 Id. at 42.
78
79

AUTISM IS NOT A TRAGEDY

25

to indirectly chart thought and behavior.89 Despite these
advances, Schwarz cautions, “the admissibility and
immediacy of this data create a misleading aura of scientific
infallibility,”90 because “there is not and will never be a brain
correlate for responsibility.”91 Schwarz’s article points out
what most people already know: a jury is an unpredictable
group who will make decision based on whatever they wish,
regardless of law or science.
Included in Schwarz’s article was Jessica Gurley and
David Marcus’s examination of 396 mock jurors and how they
responded to various categories of psychiatric and
psychological evidence.92 The subjects studied were
significantly more likely to declare a defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity when the mock attorneys presented neuroimages or brain injury testimony to the jury.93 The fMRI scans
give the jury a visual connection to testimony about brain
functions, but the scans are too variable from person to person
to serve as a means for identifying culpability; what one
would classify as normal brain features have yet to be
determined.94
There are certain brain deficiencies and mental
illnesses such as mood disorders caused by disease of the
basal ganglia that have detectable physiological traits;
however, they are the exception, not the rule.95 Observable
defects from neural images do not directly correspond to
severity of a condition, but their vividness has a
disproportionate effect on jurors who tend to discount less
tangible chemical imbalances.96 The mock jurors were four
Id. at 42 (citing Seiji Ogawa, Oxygenation-sensitive Contrast in
Magnetic Resonance Image of Rodent Brain at High Magnetic Fields, 14.1
MAGNETIC RESONANCE MED. 68-78 (1990).
90 Schwarz, supra note 22, at 42.
91 Id. at 42 (citing Eyal Aharoni, Can Neurological Evidence Help Courts
Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and Neuroscience,
1124.1 Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 145-160, 145
(2008)).
92 Jessica Gurley & David Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and
Brain Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26.1 BEHAV. SCI. & L., 85-97 (2008).
93 Schwarz, supra note 22, at 42.
94 Gurley & Marcus, supra note 92, at 86.
95 Schwarz, supra note 22, at 42.
96 Id.
89
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times more likely to convict a psychopath than a defendant
with visible damage from head trauma.97 There is no rational
explanation for this result. A psychopath’s condition could
render him or her insane, and the person with visible damage
from head trauma could reasonably have little or no mental
effect from the damage. It seems unjust that the lack of visible
damage or visible charting of blood-oxygen levels could keep
some defendants from receiving a fair trial.
The inherent problems of mixing the medical and legal
fields as described by Schwarz seem to be a big part of
Macklem’s problems. Even though the defense was able to
introduce the evidence of AS, the prosecution had no problem
rebutting the evidence by pointing out no neurological or
structural abnormalities existed.98 Macklem had a number of
circumstances working against him. He had no visible
damages or defects for the expert to show, his mental
condition exists purely through observable behaviors, and
there already exists a certain stigma around disorders in the
autistic spectrum. Autism and its milder forms are highly
complex and greatly misunderstood by most of society.
Hollywood movies feature characters with autism, and some
of these characters are extremely smart.99 Many people assume
that someone with AS or HFA is highly intelligent, has an
excellent memory, and is good with numbers. It is quite
difficult to fit this stereotype with any lesser form of
culpability. In general, people believe that intelligent persons
should be held responsible for their actions.
Macklem was found to have an average IQ even
though he tested below average in areas of memory, thought
processing, and academic skills.100 Luckily for him, the trial
judge allowed expert testimony of how AS affects persons
with the disorder. The expert was able to testify that AS is
demonstrated by “impaired social interaction, attention
problems, rigid behaviors, and fantasy thoughts.”101 The
expert also explained that persons with AS generally have few
Gurley & Marcus, supra note 92, at 93.
Macklem, 57 Cal.Rptr.3d 237 at 245.
99 See e.g., RAIN MAN (MGM 1988); TEMPLE GRANDIN (HBO Films
2010).
100 Id. at 684.
101 Id.
97
98
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friends, struggle with romantic relationships, go into rages
and act out, and cannot explain or understand their
behavior.102 He also noted that persons with AS are capable of
manipulating situations to get what they want and generally
do not care about how their behavior impacts or affects
others.103
This information was helpful considering that
Macklem, before the crime, had conversations with his exgirlfriend where she asked him to kill her to put her out of her
misery.104 Macklem often fantasized about killing her because
he thought he would be helping her.105 Sarah was also
depressed about the death of a family member, and Macklem
thought that by killing Sarah, she would be with that family
member again.106 The expert testimony likely helped connect
the dots and explain part of Macklem’s thought process and
also why Macklem would have lacked remorse or sympathy
for Sarah or her family.
Surely, the expert testimony did not fall upon deaf ears
because Macklem only received a sentence of 25 years to life.
He was eligible for the death penalty, and the state of
California is not shy about pursuing it, but after discovery had
begun, the prosecutors chose not to pursue it. The record does
not reflect the state’s reason for dropping pursuit of a death
sentence, but if prosecutors knew what the expert testimony
was going to entail, then it was a smart move on their part.
Macklem’s case stands for the proposition that evidence of AS
should be introduced in every criminal trial, especially when
death is a possible sentence. Competent psychiatric
testimony/evidence may have saved Macklem’s life.

IX. CONCLUSION
Being diagnosed with a disorder in the autism
spectrum does not equate to a lack of intent to commit a crime,
but it does have a direct effect on a person’s mind and how the

Id.
Id.
104 Id. at 679.
105 Id.
106 Id.
102
103
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mind perceives things. Not all persons with AS are
automatically incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by
reason of insanity. Evidence of AS is needed merely to help
the jury make an informed decision. Suppressing such
evidence denies the jury of highly relevant and crucial
information. By hearing/viewing evidence of how AS affects
persons, the jury is able to connect all the dots and properly
decide whether the defendant had the subjective intent to
commit the crime. Persons with AS do not deserve a “get out
of jail free card,” but they deserve to offer before the jury all
evidence relevant to culpability and mitigation.
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WHEN ONE LIVES IN A GLASS HOUSE, ONE
SHOULD NOT THROW STONES:
HOW CONTINUING TO ALLOW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
WHILE TRYING TO FOSTER HUMANITARIANISM ON A
GLOBAL SCALE CAN NO LONGER CO-EXIST

Paige Coleman*
The use of capital punishment has been a part of
America’s criminal justice system since the seventeenth
century when colonists brought the practice from Europe
where it was generally morally acceptable.1 Similarly, when
drafting the United States Constitution, specifically the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual
punishment,”2our discerning forefathers intimated that the
death penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment, because
the punishment, at least at the time, was neither cruel nor
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unusual.3 Ever consistent with our country’s long-standing
tradition of borrowing both law and policy from other nations,
it was not seen as a public policy issue or an illegality to
prescribe death for a host of crimes including, but not limited
to the following: adultery, witchcraft, sodomy, and, of course,
murder.4 Nevertheless, the United States of America has
evolved and what may not have been seen as cruel or unusual
in the eighteenth century very well may be in the twenty-first.
Abolition of capital punishment has subsequently
become a vogue issue and a popular debate topic.5 This
changing tide notwithstanding, the United States has failed to
wholeheartedly embrace an abolishment of the death penalty
and the Supreme Court has yet to completely rule against the
death penalty within the context of the Eighth Amendment.6
Because of this, the United States has pitted itself against many
international communities and, at least to some extent, this rift
has given way to a renewed debate among the Supreme Court
Justices concerning what impact, or lack thereof, international
pressure or law or sentiment should have on future decisions
relating to the death penalty.7
In Roper v. Simmons, an eighteen-year-old defendant
was convicted and sentenced to death for a murder he
committed as a juvenile.8 After successfully petitioning for a
writ of habeas corpus, the Missouri Supreme Court granted
relief and the Supreme Court of the United States ultimately
granted certiorari.9 The Court held that to execute a person
who was a minor at the time of the crime’s commission does
not fit within the parameters of the Eighth and Fourteenth

Koh, supra note 1, at 1091-92.
Id. at 1092.
5 Id. at 1093.
6 Franklin E. Zimring, Postscript: The Peculiar Present of American
Capital Punishment in, Beyond Repair?, AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY
212, 213 (Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
7 William A. Schabas, International Law and the Abolition of the Death
Penalty in, Beyond Repair? AMERICA'S DEATH PENALTY 178, 210
(Stephen P. Garvey ed., 2003).
8 543 U.S. 551, 558 (2005) (the defendant was only seventeen when he
committed the murder).
9 Id. at 559.
3
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Amendments, and is, therefore, cruel, unusual, and
unconstitutional.10
The Roper opinion is noteworthy for many reasons, but
within the context of this article, it signifies the Court’s
willingness to consider the “overwhelming weight of
international opinion” against use of the death penalty in
some situations11. Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion
and stated that while international sentiment was certainly not
controlling, it was a “respected and significant confirmation
for the Court’s determination . . . .”12 This case, if nothing else,
leaves the door open for future courts to not only consider
domestic sentiment for or against capital punishment, but also
to consider global sentiment when seeking to quantify
standards of decency.

I. INTRODUCTION
Not only does capital punishment fail in its
justification, but no punishment could be invented with so
many inherent defects. It is an unequal punishment in the way
it is applied to the rich and to the poor. The defendant of
wealth and position never goes to the electric chair or to the
gallows. Juries do not intentionally favour the rich, the law is
theoretically impartial, but the defendant with ample means is
able to have his case presented with every favourable aspect,
while the poor defendant often has a lawyer assigned by the
court. Sometimes such assignment is considered part of
political patronage; usually the lawyer assigned has had no
experience whatever in a capital case.13
Debates regarding the death penalty are naturally
predicated on both the content and the meaning of the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, and “[t]he basic
concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less
than the dignity of man.”14 The Eighth Amendment derives
“its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
Id.
Id. at 554.
12 Id.
13 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251 (1972) (quoting the Warden
of Sing Sing, James E. Lawes).
14 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
10
11
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mark the progress of a maturing society.”15 Much
jurisprudence regarding the death penalty within the
framework of an Eighth Amendment argument has been
centered around the ever elusive evolving standards of
decency concept. For many, the argument is such that only
the American evolving standards of decency are applicable.
Others argue the net should be cast wider such that it would,
at a minimum, consider evolving standards of decency for the
human race at large.
At least for the Supreme Court, evolving standards of
decency have been solely those held by the United States with
very little deference given to international law. The opinion in
Trop left little, if any, room for doubt on the subject holding
that only the “American [notions] of decency . . . are
dispositive and the sentencing practices of other countries are
[not] relevant.” 16 The Supreme Court opinion went further by
establishing that the practices of other democracies can be
relevant to whether the American people would view the
practice as tolerable.17 The definitiveness in Trop
notwithstanding, subsequent Supreme Court holdings
concerning the use of capital punishment have been less
definitive. This has at least left the door open, even if only
slightly, for the counterargument that favors an international,
human race based context when assessing the evolving
standards of decency.
For purposes of this article, I contend that the counter
argument must prevail. A global definition of these standards
must be considered because the death penalty, within the
context of the American system of justice, does not exist inside
a vacuum. To believe otherwise would be to disregard
variables such as: an ever shrinking global community,
international pressure, international treatises prohibiting use
of the death penalty, and rulings from International Courts
regarding the American death penalty. It seems illogical to
conclude that the United States, a country that profoundly
embraces diversity and multiculturalism and readily embarks
upon humanitarian missions in other countries when an
injustice is being done to the citizenry of those countries,
Id. at 101.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 405 (1989).
17 Id.
15
16
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continues to endorse such a narrow-minded view of what
embodies the evolving standards of decency. Despite the
apparent absurdity, this is indeed the case. International law,
policy, and procedure regarding the death penalty had
traditionally been given only tangential reference within the
American system of justice.
This article will seek to establish that the United States
cannot continue, without ever increasing difficulty, to both
encourage democracy on a global scale and participate in the
sanctioning of those countries that have, in the opinion of our
nation’s leaders, committed crimes against humanity, while at
the same time allowing capital punishment in its own
backyard. This article will seek to establish the practices of
encouraging democracy on a global scale and sanctioning
those countries that have, in the opinion of our nation’s
leaders, committed crimes against humanity. These practices
whether via humanitarian aid or military force, cannot
continue at all, or at least without immense difficulty, if the
United States continues to allow capital punishment. Then,
once it has been established that capital punishment in the
United States cannot continue, at least not while also seeking
to further humanitarianism, this article will look towards
justifying the abolishment of capital punishment via three
separate premises: One, borrowing that which is being done
or has been done by other like-minded nations or democracies
and appears successful, desirable, and achievable to the
United States is not a novel idea and it is logical to do the same
when assessing the evolving standards of decency. Two, the
death penalty cannot be sustained because it is
unconstitutional for reasons that span well beyond the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. Finally, from a textual standpoint, the mother of
the United States Constitution, that is the Declaration of
Independence, requires that the dignity of life for all men must
be protected.
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II. ENCOURAGING

DEMOCRACY ON A GLOBAL SCALE AND

SANCTIONING THOSE COUNTRIES THAT HAVE COMMITTED
CRIMES

AGAINST

HUMANITY

CANNOT

CONTINUE

WITHOUT IMMENSE DIFFICULTY, IF THE

UNITED STATES
CONTINUES TO ALLOW CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.
The United States is geographically and judicially
isolated from the international opinion of the death penalty as
a form of criminal punishment. A March 2012 survey revealed
that one hundred and forty-one countries (141) had
completely banned the use of capital punishment in both law
and practice, whereas only fifty-seven countries continued to
allow use of the death penalty.18 In addition to those countries
banning capital punishment outright, another thirty-six
countries have done so in practice despite having no formal
legislation renouncing their use of the death penalty.19 In sum,
as of 2012, the number of countries that do not execute
prisoners was nearly five times higher than the number of
countries that practice capital punishment.20 Suffice it to say
that the global trend has clearly been to extinguish capital
punishment as a practice and the United States has not kept
pace with the trend.21
Europe has prohibited use of the death penalty due to
pressure from the Council of Europe which requires
abolishment of the death penalty for any country wishing to
become or remain a member of the European Union.22 Asia
and the Middle East, like the United States, still practice
capital punishment.23 Specifically, in 2012, the United States,
China, Iran, North Korea and Yemen ranked as the top five

VICTOR STREIB, DEATH PENALTY IN A NUTSHELL 280-81 (4th Ed.
2013).
19 Id. at 281.
20 Simon Rogers & Mona Chalabi, Death Penalty Statistics, Country by
Country, THE GUARDIAN DATA BLOG (Dec. 13, 2013, 7:00 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2011/mar/29/deathpenalty-countries-world# (citing statistics from Amnesty
International).
21 STREIB, supra note 18, at 280.
22 Id. at 281.
23 Id.
18
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nations based on the number of executions performed.24
Excluding China, because government secrecy precludes an
accurate representation of the true number, at least six
hundred and eighty (680) executions occurred in 2012.25 Of
these, 314 occurred in Iran, 129 in Iraq, 79 in Saudi Arabia, and
43 in the United States.26
Two American idioms frame the issue at hand: those
that live in glass houses ought naught throw stones and if one
lies down with dogs, one is likely to get up with fleas. The
threshold question is: How can the United States continue to
police the world against what our nation collectively,
legislatively, or judicially views as immoral or illegal activity
(i.e., throw stones), subject the rest of the world to America’s
evolving standards of decency, and then contradict this same
practice (i.e., living in a glass house) in terms of the death
penalty? The second question is, if the United States continues
to be one of the top countries executing prisoners (lie down
with dogs), will we not, at some point, be viewed in the same
light from a human rights perspective as the other members of
the group (wake up with fleas)?
In short, the United States cannot live in a glass house
and then throw stones at all the evils in the world because
doing so will destroy our own house. The answer to the
threshold question is quite simple; continuing with capital
punishment in the United States cannot continue without
substantial change because such blatant hypocrisy will
continually lessen the credibility of our nation. When seeking
to further advance our values of freedom, democracy, and the
veneration of human rights in spite of the obvious
contradiction will only allow the reputation of the United
States as a world leader to continue to fall from grace. This is
obviously not an acceptable answer, but neither is the
converse, which is to continue our slumber with the dogs,
resulting in a flea infestation rendering the United States as a
nation to be avoided by those without fleas. Accordingly, the
only option available is to change the company we keep and
become a nation fully supportive of the policies that we preach

Id.
Id.
26 Id.
24
25
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by abolishing the use of capital punishment in the United
States.

III. BORROWING LEGAL PRINCIPLES

POLICIES USED BY
PRACTICE, AND IT IS

AND

OTHER COUNTRIES IS NOT A NEW

LOGICAL TO DO THE SAME WHEN ASSESSING STANDARDS
OF DECENCY.

The Court in Roper has proven to be very insightful as
this argument too is best begun by again quoting from the
opinion. “The [constitution] sets forth…innovative principles
original to the American experience…These doctrines and
guarantees…remain essential to our present-day selfdefinition and national identity.”27 However, we do not honor
the Constitution because “we know it to be our own. It does
not lessen our fidelity to [it] or our pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own
heritage freedom.”28
Both the Supreme Court and the Legislature have not
only given due deference to the international consciousness,
and even to the laws and policies of other nations when ruling
or enacting laws because, quite frankly, our Nation was
founded upon borrowed principles. In fact, the first ten
amendments to the United States Constitution came from the
English Bill of Rights.29 The Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution is nearly identical to that of the English Bill
of Rights which states, “excessive bail ought not to be
required, nor excessive fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”30 The English Bill of Rights reflected
the ideals surrounding the laws of Edward the Confessor who,
in turn, was influenced by France as he spent most of his
childhood in Normandy.31
27

Roper, 543 U.S. at 577-79.

Id.
Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 W. & M., c. 2 (Eng.).
30 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. at Large 267 440, 441 (1689).
31 Recent Cases, Constitutional Law--Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Provision of Eighth Amendment as Restriction Upon State Action Through
the Due Process Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135 (1950).
28
29
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In short, the United States is, and always has been, a
hodge-podge of different cultures spanning far beyond just
that of our English origins, which include the often forgotten
American Indian presence that was here long before the
Colonists and the Spanish conquistadors. Lastly, our Nation is
bordered by Canada and Mexico thereby making it a near
impossibility not to at least purport to listen to the
consciousness of those two countries specifically.
Even with the United States’ longstanding tradition of
borrowing jurisprudence from those countries that have
undeniably influenced us, there remain staunch holdouts
among the Supreme Court Justices that seem unwilling to give
the tradition proper deference. Justices Thomas and Scalia
joined Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting view in the
Atkins case where he said, “[w]hile it is true that some of our
prior opinions have looked to the climate of international
opinion to reinforce a conclusion regarding evolving
standards of decency; we have since explicitly rejected the idea
that the sentencing practices of other countries could serve to
establish the Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that [a] practice
is accepted among our people.”32 Justice Thomas stood strong
in this opinion, referencing it again in 2002 with a concurring
opinion in support of the Supreme Court of Florida’s denial of
a writ of certiorari.33 Similarly, in his dissenting view in a later
case that, while not specifically dealing with the death penalty,
did center around Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice
Scalia again downplayed the weight of consideration, if any,
that should be afforded to international law. His dissent
claimed that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring . . .
into existence . . . because foreign nations decriminalize
conduct” and [t]he Court's discussion of . . . foreign views . . .
is therefore meaningless dicta. Dangerous dicta, however,
since ‘this Court . . . should not impose foreign moods, fads, or
fashions on Americans.’”34
Not surprisingly, Justices
Rehnquist and Thomas both joined him in this dissenting view
as well.
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324-25 (2002) (quoting Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) which emphasized that “American
conceptions of decency ... are dispositive”).
33 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002).
34 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003).
32
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Conversely, and more attuned to the rich tradition
surrounding the practice, there are those that believe
international law has an important place in the jurisprudence
of the United States. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in an article
that she co-wrote in 1999, said that “[e]xperience in one nation
or region may inspire or inform other nations or regions . . . ,
as generally holds true for human rights initiatives.”35 She
went further by explaining how such countries as India,
Germany, and the European Court of Justice have all
referenced or borrowed decisions made by the Supreme Court
of the United States in one form or another.36 Yet, as Justice
Ginsburg pointed out, the United States is not as willing to
look “beyond one’s own shores.”37 In response to the mere
notion that the United States Supreme Court should look
further than our own shoreline, the Court said, “[w]e think
such comparative analysis inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution.”38
In Justice Ginsberg’s opinion, “comparative analysis
emphatically is relevant to the task of interpreting
constitutions and enforcing human rights.39 We are the losers
if we neglect what others can tell us about endeavors to
eradicate bias . . . . For irrational prejudice and rank
discrimination are infectious in our world. In this reality, as
well as the determination to counter it, we all share.”40
If abolishment of the death penalty in the United States
is the bull’s eye, which I contend in this article that it should
be, then recent Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding the
controversial topic is most certainly the dart, and the Court is
beginning to narrow in on the target. In fact, the Court’s
degradation of capital punishment began almost immediately
after reinstating the practice in 1976. For example, in 1977, the
Supreme Court held it unconstitutional to impose the death
sentence for the crime of rape where the victim was an adult
Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action:
An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 282
(1999).
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.
35
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and not killed during the commission of the crime.41 In 1982,
the Court held that without proof that a killing occurred, or an
attempt therein, regardless of whether the person intended to
take a life, the death penalty cannot be sustained.42 In 1986,
the Court disallowed further execution of any person declared
to be insane;43 in 2002, death as a consequence for a mentally
retarded individual was declared unconstitutional;44 and
finally, in the 2005 Roper v. Simmons case, the Supreme Court
held it violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel
and
unusual
punishment,
and
therefore
unconstitutional, to execute a person who was, at the time the
crime was committed, a juvenile.45
In Roper, Justice Kennedy wrote that both a recent state
trend toward abolition of capital punishment for juvenile
offenders and an international trend toward the same goal
played a role in the ultimate holding.46 Understanding how
domestic and international trends affect the United States’
Government or Jurisprudence requires little more than an
elementary level government or civics class; it is quite easy to
see.
Additionally, paying attention to our Nation’s
consciousness and ruling with it in mind, even slightly, is not
a new notion for the Supreme Court; nor is it unusual for the
Legislature to enact laws based on the pulse of our nation.
One specific example, as it relates to the Eighth Amendment’s
cruel and unusual punishment provision, was referenced
earlier but is equally as applicable to the argument at hand
particularly when the preceding words are included. In Trop,
writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren said, “[where]
the words of the Amendment are not precise, and…their scope
is not static[,] the Amendment must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”47
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (“We have concluded
that a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and excessive
punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the
Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment.”).
42 Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982).
43 Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1986).
44 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
41

45
46

47

Roper, 543 U.S. at 578-79.
Id. at 552-604.

Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
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But how is one to establish that which is ever evolving?
The opinion in Coker gives at least some insight into this
question. The Coker court held that evolving standards of
decency must be measured, wherever possible, using
“objective factors.48” The factors elucidated by the opinion
included: public attitudes regarding a particular punishment,
legislative attitudes, and jury trends as reflected in their
sentencing decisions.49 Yet, nowhere in the opinion does it
specifically say these criteria must be American notions or
ideas. Of course, jury trends would likely involve those trends
occurring within our own justice system, but even major
trends or shifts in other democratic societies with similar
justice systems would be, at the very least, relevant to a
discussion about the death penalty being within a human
rights context. Even if the jury trend argument is a stretch,
and I do not believe that it is, the remaining two factors given
by the Coker opinion, public attitudes and legislative attitudes
are equally more important on a global scale than they would
be if viewed only from the American perspective.

IV. THE DEATH PENALTY CANNOT BE SUSTAINED BECAUSE
IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR REASONS SPANNING WELL
BEYOND THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT.
According to the United States Constitution, it, along
with “the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”50 Further, redress
is statutorily available, generally in the form of a habeas
corpus petition, for any person “in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”51 Thus,

Coker, 499 U.S. at 592.
Id.
50 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (capitalization intentionally left as it
appears within the document).
51 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (West, WestlawNext current through P.L. 11349, 2013).
48
49
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it is unconstitutional to execute any individual in violation of
any treaty to which the United States is a party, and even for
textualists such as Justices Scalia and Thomas, who believe
that interpretation of the Constitution can be done only
through an understanding of its original public meaning, this
interpretation would be difficult to circumvent.
Such treaties do exist although they are very often
shrouded with administrative and interpretive hyperbole.
Particularly applicable to a current day argument against use
of the death penalty in violation of an international treaty is
that the death penalty is discriminatory which violates the
International Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD).52 The treaty, which called for
all ratifying nations to review their laws and policies in an
effort to identify any that have a discriminatory effect and
then to take appropriate remedial action was ratified by the
United States in 1994.53 In so doing, our nation was bound to
the terms just as a citizen would be bound to a constitutional
provision. Although a thorough and exhaustive discussion of
discrimination within the American death penalty scheme is
not possible within the confines of this paper, suffice it to say
that there is a great deal of evidence to support a finding that
it is rampant and very likely unavoidable. Allowing it to
continue is in violation of the Constitution.
Additionally, in 1948, battered from having recently
endured two World Wars and with a renewed sentiment
towards the globalization of human rights on their side, the
United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights.54 The Declaration, which was
drafted by a committee of nine members, including former
first-lady Eleanor Roosevelt as the committee’s chairperson,
proved to be the springboard for what is modern day human
rights jurisprudence. 55 One of the major objectives of the

52
53

See STREIB, supra note 18, at 287-88.
Id.

The United Nations, Website Regarding the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/history.shtml
(last visited March 12, 2013).
54

Id. (listing the other drafters as: Dr. Charles Malik (Lebanon),
Alexandre Bogomolov (USSR), Dr. Peng-Chang (China), Rene Cassin
(France), Charles Dukes (United Kingdom), William Hodgson
55
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document was an initiative to globally abolish capital
punishment.56
To this end, the drafters desired to
unequivocally set forth the idea that every human being,
regardless of nationality or race or gender, has a right to life
and must not be forced to endure torture or inhumane
treatment. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a
tangible representation of “the universal recognition that basic
rights and fundamental freedoms are inherent to all human
beings, inalienable and equally applicable to everyone, and
that every one of us is born free and equal in dignity and
rights.”57 As a result of this document and our nation’s
involvement in its development, it is not surprising that many
of the laws affecting the use of capital punishment are
generally derived from the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (“UDHR”).
Where the United States is concerned, the treaty was
ratified but only with conditions that were clearly included to
avoid any entanglement with the American death penalty.58
Adding further fuel to the fire, President Clinton, in 1998,
issued an executive order which stated that any treaty
enforcing human rights would be fully recognized and
implemented by the United States, including the larger treaty
of which the UDHR is a part, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). To date, both have been
little more than lip service, but the time may be ripe for a
constitutional challenge in this area.

V. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS SPECIFIC: ALL
MEN ARE CREATED EQUAL AND ALL MEN POSSESS
CERTAIN UNALIENABLE RIGHTS, INCLUDING THE RIGHT
TO LIFE. THIS RIGHT BELONGS TO ALL MEN, NOT ONLY
AMERICAN MEN.
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
(Australia), Hernan Santa Cruz (Chile), and John P. Humphrey
(Canada)).
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See STREIB, supra note 18, at 284.
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and the pursuit of Happiness. — That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men[.]”59
Admittedly, the Declaration of Independence does not
contain a provision regarding enforcement. Nonetheless, as
an important historical document, and the physical
representation of the birth of the United States, it “set forth the
constitutional obligation to protect life, liberty, and the pursuit
of happiness” as well as the requirement that these rights,
applicable to all men, be protected on an equal basis.60 Simply
stated, the Declaration of Independence elucidated that men
form governments in an effort to “secure their coequal
interests in ‘unalienable rights[.]”61 As such, the drafters of the
document necessarily meant that the rights are “innate, rather
than created by states or nations [and] the Declaration
recognize[d] that some dignity interests precede the
Constitution.”62
Any argument suggesting that there is a dignity
interest more important or deserving of protection than life is
doomed to fail. Without life, there is no reason to strive for
anything else because, quite obviously, there is nothing left.
The birth of the United States of America was predicated upon
the notion that all men are equal and deserving equally of
certain rights, one of which is life. The Declaration did not
specify that only Americans are created equally, that only
American life should be protected, and only American rights
protected. Quite the opposite, the Declaration was specific in
applying these rights, and the protection thereof, to all men.
Consequently, when pontificating about whether or not to
include international law in any dialogue about evolving
standards of decency, the United States Supreme Court must
remember that the mother of the Constitution, the Declaration
of Independence, applies the rights and protection of them to
all men and the Court should do the same.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
Alexander Tsesis, Self-Government and the Declaration of
Independence, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 693, 694-95 (2012).
61 Id.
62 Id. at 698.
59
60
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VI. CONCLUSION
As an adolescent, I could not fully appreciate that the
choices one makes today are the seeds of a flower called
consequence and, once planted, they bloom for one’s entire
life. As adults, we understand this because our seeds were
long ago planted and we live with the bloom of consequence,
be it good, bad, or indifferent, on a daily basis. Thus,
collectively, we give adolescents a chance to act in a way that
we would deem inappropriate, at least on certain issues,
because they are still maturing and experiencing and growing
and need the time to falter so that life’s lessons will be
impressionable ones. We offer advice, support, and even
punishment in an effort to fully develop the gardening skills
of our youth with the hope that, in the future, if allowed to
bloom, their gardens will be brilliant.
America is a young country and our garden is still growing.
We stand shoulder to shoulder with powerful,
exemplary nations, but we do so in spite of the fact that they,
as the adults, tolerate certain policies and practices from the
United States, those which stand in opposition to their own,
because we are still growing. This tolerance, much like that
which we give to the adolescent is short lived. The United
States must evolve and begin to act in a responsible and
civilized manner before too many of the seeds we have
planted in the past turn out to be bad consequences in the
future and we find ourselves left only with the company that
we did not mean to keep.
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“HE WHO WISHES TO PRESERVE HIS LIFE AT
OTHERS’ EXPENSE SHOULD ALSO BE READY TO
GIVE IT UP FOR THEIR SAKE:”1
HOW NATURAL LAW AND THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE JUSTIFY CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.

Nicholas Davenport, V*
I. INTRODUCTION
“What gives a state the right to imprison a person?”2
The simplest answer is that the person broke the law.3
Justifying punishment, however, is not, and should not, be so
simple. It is generally accepted that our government is allowed
to punish persons who commit crimes.4 Professor John
Bronsteen5 demands that a “developed theory”6 is needed to
justify punishment by society. The purpose of this article is to


J.D. Candidate 2013 at Lincoln Memorial University, Duncan School
of Law.
1 JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, AT 36 [1762]
(G.D.H. Cole trans., Barnes and Noble 2005).
2 John Bronsteen, Retribution's Role, 84 IND. L.J. 1129, 1129 (2009).
3 Id.
4 See id.; see also Kyron Huigens, The Jurisprudence of Punishment, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1793 (2007).
5 Assistant Professor, Loyola University Chicago School of Law. J.D.,
Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard University.
6 Bronsteen, supra note 2, at 1154-55 (suggesting theories such as neoKantian, Rawlsian social contract theory, and fair play).
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provide a justifying theory for capital punishment in the
United States.
Generally speaking, the death penalty debate focuses
on whether it is right or wrong, and whether the United States
should continue to punish by death. Some people advocate for
the death penalty because of concepts like retribution and
punishment. Others believe the death penalty serves no
legitimate purpose and risks executing innocent people; for
instance, one scholar states that
[T]he death penalty is discriminatory in
administration in a country rife with
background racial discrimination, that it cannot
be fairly and effectively administered when
used as sparingly as it is usually used, that
having a death penalty creates too great a gulf
between the United States and other democratic
nations, or that there is insufficient evidence
that the death penalty has greater deterrent
value than life in prison without parole.7
The focus on capital punishment involves whether we should
continue to have the death penalty. It is not surprising that
debates regarding capital punishment are generally focused
on whether the United States should continue to allow it as a
practice; but the far better debate would focus on whether, and
to what extent, there is a moral justification for the practice
that goes beyond the notions of “retribution” and
“punishment.”8 For instance, some death penalty advocates
“may believe that the death penalty is what some murderers,
i.e., the worst of the worst, deserve by dint of their
wrongdoing.”9 However, the “he deserves it” approach is
more difficult to justify; additionally, one must subscribe to a
Claire Finkelstein, A Contractarian Argument Against the Death
Penalty, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1283, 1284 (2006); see generally, Death
Penalty Focus website, http://www.deathpenalty.org/index.php.
8 See Finkelstein, supra note 7, at 1288 (analyzing the terms
“deterrence” and “retribution” as applied to the death penalty).
9 Dan Markel, State, Be Not Proud: A Retributivist Defense of the
Commutation of Death Row and the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 40
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 422 (2005).
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moral basis in order to support the fact that the person
“deserves” death.
This article seeks to clarify America’s relationship with
capital punishment through one of the country’s most
important documents. This article will distinguish America’s
philosophy on capital punishment from the rationales of other
countries that also have the death penalty. Unlike in the movie
“National Treasure,”10 the actual Declaration of Independence
does not contain a treasure map, but it does contain evidence
of a concept that reveals why America implements capital
punishment.

I. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, THE “RIGHT
LIFE,” AND ESTABLISHING AMERICAN MORALS.

TO

A. A RIGHT TO LIFE IS PROVIDED TO ALL AMERICANS.
The Declaration of Independence enshrines three basic
rights: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.11 “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness.”12
“The right to life is the only fundamental right, from
which all other rights are derived.”13 The Constitution,
specifically the Bill of Rights, provides all other American
rights. Why would the Founding Fathers not list the “right to
life” in the Bill of Rights, but list the “right to life” in the
Declaration?14
The authority of the Declaration of Independence is not
usually described as fundamental law; therefore, using the
NATIONAL TREASURE, Director Jon Turteltaub, Walt Disney
Pictures, Jerry Bruckheimer Films, Junction Entertainment, Saturn
Films (2004).
11 Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness, Principles of a Free Society
website, Ayn Rand Center for Individual Rights,
http://principlesofafreesociety.com/life-liberty-pursuit-ofhappiness/ last accessed Mar. 14, 2013.
12 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
13 Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit, supra note 11.
14 Compare U.S. CONST. amend. I- XXVII, with THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
10
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Declaration as a primary reference in legal argument rarely
occurs. Some might argue that the Declaration is only an
emancipation document that does not carry legal authority in
the common use of the term “law;” however, there are those
that disagree. Professor John Eidsmoe, who is an attorney, an
author, and a professor of constitutional law and legal history
at Faulkner University’s Thomas Goode Jones School of Law
in Montgomery, Alabama, describes it as “fundamental law:”
[t]he role of the Declaration of Independence in
American law is often misconstrued. Some
believe the Declaration is simply a statement of
ideas that has no legal force whatsoever today.
Nothing could be further from the truth. The
Declaration has been repeatedly cited by the
U.S. Supreme Court as part of the fundamental
law of the United States of America.15
If fundamental law is characterized as a base law from which
all other law extends, then the Declaration is perhaps
“fundamental law.” However, it is more accurate to
characterize the Declaration of Independence similar to the
Utah Supreme Court’s opinion regarding its Declaration of
Rights. Utah’s Supreme Court articulated that its Declaration
of Rights16 “was never meant to establish a comprehensive or
positive law but merely to reaffirm various natural rights that
exist independent of any constitution.”17 Nonetheless,
determining the role of the Declaration as it applies to capital
punishment is rather unique. At first glance, it appears that
capital punishment is in direct contradiction with a “right to
life.” To understand this dichotomy, one must analyze a

John Eidsmoe, Christianity and the Constitution: The Faith of Our
Founding Fathers, pp. 360-361 (1995); Earl Taylor, Jr., The Declaration
of Independence Part of American Law, Newsletter to National Center
for Constitutional Studies, June 1998,
http://www.nccs.net/newsletter/jun98nl.html.
16 UTAH CONST. ART. 1 § 1
17Am. Bush v. City of S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1283 (Utah 2006)
(citing Utah v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 636 (Utah 1997).
15
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concept that goes beyond fundamental law and into natural
rights.18
B. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IS A DOCUMENT
FROM WHICH AMERICAN MORALITY ORIGINATED.
Since a “right to life” is provided in the Declaration
and such right is a prerequisite to all other rights granted in
the Bill of Rights,19 it is important for Americans to analyze the
need and justifications for the death penalty with all American
principles, especially the Declaration. “The Declaration
matters, and it is important that we bring to it the same level
of critical analysis that we apply to the Constitution and to
other legal texts.”20
The Declaration is a document that reflects the moral
values of its authors, who were the founders of American
government. Principles stated in the Declaration are now the
roots of American moral code. “[T]he Declaration was an act
of all the American people, creating an entity, the United
States of America, which presented itself as one nation to the
world.”21 The “right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness”22 is a designation of morality. It is a moral
standard set forth by America at its inception to dictate what is
important. It is important to know that morality can be, and
often is, just a standard set forth by society. Morals can, but
need not be, universal concepts that are unchangeable. For
instance, “defenders of the death penalty continue to refer to
moral desert,” which is a condition in which one is deserving

One law review author does not agree with analyzing the
Declaration of Independence solely through a natural law
perspective. He states, “The importance of the Declaration of
Independence to American law has been obscured by dubious
associations with natural rights jurisprudence.” Carlton F.W. Larson,
The Declaration of Independence: A 225th Anniversary Re-Interpretation,
76 WASH. L. REV. 701 (2001).
19 See U.S. CONST. amend. I-XXVII.
20 Larson, supra note 19, at 702.
21 Id. at 723.
22 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
18
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of something, whether good or bad, “as…real, and not
infinitely subject to public manipulation” 23
The argument among Americans on whether the death
penalty is right or wrong should be discussed based on
perceived morals stated in the Declaration. However, how is
moral generally defined? Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines
“moral” as “of or relating to principles of right or wrong in
behavior.”24 Morals, therefore, according to this definition, are
merely a standard of action set by a group of people.
Generally, morality is not just a single universal code; rather,
there are several potential definitions of morality, for instance
[w]hen a person simply claims that morality
prohibits or requires a given action, then the
term “morality” is genuinely ambiguous. It is
not clear whether it refers to (1) a guide to
behavior that is put forward by a society, either
one's own or some other society; (2) a guide
that is put forward by a group, either one to
which the person belongs or another; or (3) a
guide that a person, perhaps himself, regards as
overriding and wants adopted by everyone in
his group, or (4) is a universal guide that all
rational persons would put forward for
governing the behavior of all moral agents.25
As Professor Gert noted, there are essentially two main types
of morality: normative morality and descriptive morality.26
Descriptive morality is a type of morality put forth by a
society, a group, a church, or an individual for her own
behavior.27 The set of people who subscribe to that moral code
R. George Wright, The Death Penalty and the Way We Think Now, 33
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 533, 537 (2000).
24 Merriam-Webster Dictionary, http://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/moral, last accessed Jan. 20th 2012 at
3:02p.m.
25 Bernard Gert, The Definition of Morality, THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, Fall 2012 Ed., Edward N. Zalta ed.,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2012/entries/moralitydefinition/.
26 Id.
27 Id.
23
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live by it, and adhere to those morals. 28 Normative morality,
on the other hand, is a universal concept.29 This type of
morality is a code of conduct that would be put forward by
any rational person under the same circumstances.30 An
example of normative morality in terms of the death penalty is
a statement that the death penalty is immoral because “the rest
of the civilized world knows better.”31 “Indeed, it is possible
that ‘morality’ in the normative sense has never been put
forward by any particular society, by any group at all, or even
by any individual who holds that moral rules should never be
violated for non-moral reasons.”32 Gert states, “the only
feature that the descriptive and normative senses of ‘morality’
have in common is that they refer to guides to behavior that
involve, at least in part, avoiding and preventing harm to
others.”33
There are two additional moral approaches that are
ancillary to Gert’s normative and descriptive classifications.
First, Deontology is one approach to morality; this is the best
approach, according to Professor Peter Brandon Bayer.34
Professor Bayer contends that the Founding Fathers were
deontologists.35 The Deontology theory asserts that
government is legitimate only if it governs according to
eternal moral precepts.36 Deontology requires a sacrifice to
abide by morality no matter the circumstances.37 Interestingly,
Professor Bayer offers that such a sacrifice is evident in the
Declaration:38
For the preservation of those moral principles,
the
Founders
pledged
their
“Lives,”
Id.
Id.
30 Id.
31 David McCord, Imagining A Retributivist Alternative to Capital
Punishment, 50 FLA. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998).
32 Gert, supra note 25, at § 2, sent. 2.
33 Gert, The Definition of Morality, supra note 25.
34 Peter Brandon Bayer, Sacrifice and Sacred Honor: Why the
Constitution is a Suicide Pact, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 287 (2011).
35 Id. at 288.
36 Id. at 287.
37 Id. at 292.
38 Id.
28
29
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“Fortunes,” and “sacred Honor,”39 meaning
that it is the duty of all Americans-their “sacred
Honor”-to sacrifice, if necessary, their lives and
property to defend legitimate government.40

A second moral theory is Consequentialism, which is a
moral philosophy that relies on the consequences of one’s
actions for determining morality.41 Therefore, if the
consequence for an act is a “good” result, then such an act is
moral. However, while Consequentialism applies to capital
punishment, its application does not offer in-depth insight.
The referents of both labels [deontology and
consequentialism] . . . are usually caricatures,
used to oversimplify philosophical positions for
the sake of convenience and less innocently to
provide people with a plausible pretext for
rejecting ideas they do not understand.42
Theories like Consequentialism and Deontology are overly
simplistic when justifying the death penalty and do not
provide a complete understanding of an all-encompassing
approach.43 As such, for the purposes of this article, a more
encompassing and less restrictive philosophical approach is
necessary to answer the capital punishment dilemma between
the death penalty and the right to life. Natural rights
embedded in the Declaration of Independence serve this
purpose.

II. AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW
BELIEFS.

IS

DICTATED

BY

MORAL

Morality in its various forms is so intertwined with law
that it is nearly impossible to evaluate each concept

Id. at 292 (citing DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S.
1776)).
40 Id.
41 Id. at 293.
42 Id. at 293 (citing Allen W. Wood, KANTIAN ETHICS at 259).
43 Id.
39

NATURAL LAW AND THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE

53

independently.44 One well known theorist, Immanuel Kant,
believed that laws lacking moral support are not law, rather
only commands.45 Law is one method by which society
demands certain action that corresponds with morality.
“When we credibly attempt to punish an offender who knows,
or reasonably should have known, that it was illegal to have
stolen, raped, or murdered, we are trying to tell him that his
actions matter to this community constituted by shared
laws.”46
Basically, American criminal law creates and enforces
written law in order to avoid or prevent harm. Punishment for
non-conformity in an attempt to prevent harm is generally
summed into four categories: incapacitation, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and retribution.47 However, these four
categories only penetrate so far when justifying punishment
for the death penalty; morality is the underlying theory that
provides authority for the notion that certain acts should
result in deterrence, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and
retribution.48 Since morality is the basis of the aforementioned
punishments, the moral debate49 is often the subject of

Id. at 369 (explaining that “Like morality, concepts of law ‘cannot
be understood in isolation from one another,’ although they can be
described discretely.”).
45Id. (citing Allen W. Wood, KANTIAN ETHICS 108-09 (2008) (quoting
Immanuel Kant, LECTURES ON ETHICS, in Cambridge Edition of the
Writings of Immanuel Kant 27:273 (1992)).
46 Markel, supra note 9, at 427-28.
47 Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence, and Guided Discretion in the
Supreme Court's Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1151, 1154 (2003).
48 See, Markel, supra note 9, at 426. “In the past, retribution theorists
asserted that “the fact that a person has committed a moral offence
provides a sufficient reason for his being made to suffer.” Id. This
understanding of retribution as a purely interpersonal moral
doctrine has waned over time.” Id.
49 The moral debate extends in a multitude of directions. For
example, two popular, but contrary, views for defining driving
forces behind moral actions are utilitarianism and deontology.
“Utilitarianism, holds that morality is defined by the consequences
of one's actions or that increasing overall welfare generally equates
to doing the right thing;” Bronsteen, supra note 2, at 1130.
“[However,] deontology, [which] defines morality independent of
44
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criminal law disputes, especially the death penalty, because it
is the ultimate punishment in criminal law. If the death
penalty changes, it will be due to a change in law, which, in
turn, indicates a change in societal morals.
Morality, when translated, becomes the law, which is
then written and enforced by a sovereign power. However, the
law operates by separation of powers through the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches. Morality’s ability to change
law can often be a lengthy process. This long process is
exemplified by the capital punishment debate through past
attempts to abolish the death penalty. The law can be slow to
evolve to meet social morals, especially in eradicating moral
concepts that are based on founding concepts of the United
States, like the “right to life.”
When law is or becomes contrary to moral beliefs,
social and political stability are undermined.50 It is important
to keep laws updated in accordance with society’s progressing
moral code lest instability ensue,51 otherwise the instability
results in unjust punishment of citizenry. However, there is
controversy as to what branch of government should adjust
the law to conform to moral preference. For instance, one
notion contends that the legislative branch should ensure that
laws reflect morality:
[t]raditional jurists contend that the positive
law is itself systemically moral and that judges
can and should decide all cases--including
those that present controversial moral issues of
liberty and equality--within the constraints of
the standards, rules, and precedents in the
positive law.52

consequences and suggests that moral acts are done for their own
sake rather than in order to achieve any particular end.” Id.
50 Alice Ristroph, Third Wave of Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1151
(2010).
51 Id.
52 Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions of Judicial Integrity: Traditional and
Perfectionist Approaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 233, 233 (2008).
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However, there is an alternative argument that the judicial
branch should ensure that laws reflect morality, which avers
that judges should, therefore, read the
Constitution ‘morally,’ i.e., they should
construe the principles of liberty and equality
in the Constitution in accordance with the
community's best construction of the moral
requirements of decency and fairness and
should implement the true democratic
conditions of liberty and equality.53
Adjusting criminal law based on changes in society’s moral
fabric generally occurs in one of two ways. First, the
legislature can make or amend the positive law. This type of
law-making process is said to be in accordance with public
opinion because political representatives are elected to act for
their constituents. Second, the judiciary may alter criminal law
in some instances, especially those issues that involve
interpretation of the law. For example, the Supreme Court has
abolished some execution methods as violating the Eighth
Amendment’s54 “cruel and unusual punishments” language.55
The Court has held: “To constitute cruel and unusual
punishment, an execution method must present a ‘substantial’
or ‘objectively intolerable’ risk of serious harm.”56 Of course,
the previous statement is subject to broad interpretation. It
could be assumed that the Supreme Court may one day
abolish the death penalty based on changing morals. Perhaps
the Court will use the “right to life” language in the
Declaration to justify such an opinion; however, considering
natural law theories from which this phrase originates, such a
decision from the Supreme Court is unlikely.

Id. at 234.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55 See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (declaring
“disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning
alive” are not allowed as execution techniques).
56 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 35-6 (2008).
53
54
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III. MURDER VIOLATES A PERSON’S “RIGHT TO LIFE,”
EXECUTION BY THE STATE DOES NOT VIOLATE
MORAL “RIGHT TO LIFE” CONCEPT.

BUT
THE

At common law, murder was defined as “the unlawful
killing of another human being with ‘malice aforethought.’”57
The intent to kill and the intent to commit a felony were subcategories of the single concept of “malice aforethought.”58 At
its most basic description, murder is one person taking the life
of another through some volitional act. This act violates the
victim’s “right to life.” One West Virginia Supreme Court
Justice, in dissent, has described murder as “an ordinary
natural law crime.”59
When a convicted murderer is put to death, there is no
violation of the right to life.60 This dichotomy seems
contradictory at first glance but, in fact, it is not contradictory
to the right to life language in the Declaration. A person’s
“right to life” under the Declaration is different from rights
granted in the Constitution. The Declaration, as previously
established, is not the same type of legal authority as the
Constitution. The Constitution limits government action or
conduct against citizens; it does not apply to non-state actor
wrongs against other private citizens. Moreover, the
Declaration was not intended to necessarily limit government;
rather, it attempts to create a moral structure within which
both society and its government will thrive.
The Declaration is much broader than the Constitution
and applies to capital punishment differently. It can be
inferred that the Declaration imposes a duty not to kill on both
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991); see 3 J. STEPHEN,
HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 21-22 (1883).
58 Id.
59 West Virginia v. Hobbs, 282 S.E.2d 258, 276 (W. Va. 1981) (Neely,
J., dissenting).
60 Not everyone agrees that a violation of the right to life occurs
when a convicted murder is sentenced to death: “Executions
undermine the very respect for life they purport to foster.” David
McCord, Imagining A Retributivist Alternative to Capital Punishment, 50
FLA. L. REV. 1, 13 (1998). While Americans subscribe to natural nights
by virtue of the Declaration of Independence, a person’s belief
system allows him or her to oppose such theories internally, while
society acts on an adjacent moral level.
57
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government and citizenry. The Constitution imposes a duty
only on the government not to kill unjustly -- unjustly
meaning through either deprivation of due process or cruel
and unusual methods of punishment.61 For example, a private
citizen can murder another private citizen and not violate that
particular victim’s constitutional rights; however, such a
victim’s right under the Declaration’s “right to life” language
is violated. Such a moral violation62 occurs under the
Declaration because of the natural rights theory known as the
social contract. From a natural law perspective, there is no
violation when the state seeks retaliation because according to
natural law that person’s right to life is voluntarily forfeited
based on the act of killing.63
Notwithstanding natural law, there are other theories
that can justify punishment but that do not necessarily flow
from the Declaration. First, Utilitarianism offers one such
approach:
[f]or utilitarians the good that can be done is
preventing the criminal, by incapacitation, from
committing future criminal acts, plus deterring
other potential criminals, and minus the harm
punishment does to the criminal; but what a
criminal supposedly “deserves” is merely
revenge and does no good.64
A second approach is retribution theory, which focuses
singularly on justice based on a theory of revenge. To put it in
Latin, lex talionis65 or “an eye for an eye”66 is the principle of
See generally, U.S. CONST. amends. V & VIII.
One commentator asserts that dignity is “the premier value
underlying the last two centuries of moral and political thought, an
essential ‘basis of human rights.” Leslie Meltzer Henry, The
Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 172 (2011).
63 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1.
64 Andrew Oldenquist, Retribution and the Death Penalty, 29 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 335 (2004).
65 “The principle or law of retaliation that a punishment inflicted
should correspond in degree and kind to the offense of the
wrongdoer, as an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth; retributive
justice.” Dictionary.com,
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/lex+talionis.
61
62
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retribution. Professor Oldenquist suggests that most people
are not well-informed when subscribing to the retribution
approach. “Most people's reasons for capital punishment are
retributivist; they talk about deterrence because it seems a
respectable kind of reason that relies on crime statistics and
they don't know what to say when told retribution is
revenge.”67

IV. AMERICAN SOCIETY CAN PUNISH INDIVIDUALS BY
DEATH, BECAUSE OF NATURAL LAW AND SOCIAL
CONTRACT THEORY.
Justifying capital punishment is difficult and rightly so.
One can use terms of art such as “retribution,” “deontology,”
“consequentialism,” and “deterrence.” However, these terms
are limited in application. They do not, for example, provide a
solution as to why America is in the minority of the world,
since most countries have abolished punishment by death.68
Countries such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United
States of America, Yemen, North Korea, Somalia, Taiwan, and
several others still retain the death penalty.69 However, there is
a distinguishing factor between the United States and the
other countries listed above. Unlike the other countries, the
United States still has the death penalty because of natural
law, the philosophical concept that embodies various theories
that are mostly encompassed in a general theory known as the
“social contract.”70

The phrase “eye for an eye” is generally used when referencing
Biblical scripture. See Exodus 22:24 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.).
67 Oldenquist, supra note 65, at 337.
68 Amnesty International, http://www.amnesty.org/en/deathpenalty, last accessed Jan. 20th 2015 at 6:30 p.m.
69 Id.
70 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13.
66
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A. PHILOSOPHERS WHO INFLUENCED THE FOUNDING FATHERS’
“RIGHT TO LIFE” LANGUAGE IN THE DECLARATION,
NATURAL RIGHTS, AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY THAT
OFFERED THE BASIS FOR AMERICA’S FOUNDING.
“[T]he Founders inspired and justified both the
Revolution and ensuing fundamental principles of American
law, especially due process, on the best applicable precepts of
enduring morality they knew.”71 Moral influence on the
Founding Fathers in large part likely came from theorists such
as Rousseau, Hobbes, Locke, and Mill, whose works offer
original and intelligent explanations into the American social
and political structure as well as America’s moral fabric. These
theorists believed in a concept known as natural law. “Natural
law theory is a label that has been applied to theories of ethics,
theories of politics, theories of civil law, and theories of
religious morality.”72 One can look to the plain language of the
Declaration to derive evidence to support natural law’s
influence in the document.
When, in the course of human events, it
becomes necessary for one people to dissolve
the political bands which have connected them
with another, and to assume, among the
powers of the earth, the separate and equal
station to which the laws of nature and of
nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to
the opinions of mankind requires that they
should declare the causes which impel them to
the separation.73
This aforementioned language and the natural rights concept
were successful in establishing a separation between America
and Britain. However, its meaning and impact established
more than just independence; it established a mindset, morals,
and a society. In order to fully understand the justification that
Bayer, supra note 35, at 328.
Mark Murphy, The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics, (Sept. 23, 2002),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/natural-law-ethics/ (last
substantive revision Sept. 27, 2011) (last accessed Mar. 23, 2012).
73 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
71
72
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natural law provides for the death penalty, one must become
further acquainted with the philosophical ideas from these
natural law theorists whose voices resonated in the minds of
the Founding Fathers.
B. ROUSSEAU’S “THE SOCIAL CONTRACT,” LOCKE’S “TWO
TREATISES ON GOVERNMENT,” MILL’S “ON LIBERTY,” AND
HOBBES’
“LEVIATHAN,”
OFFER
CLARITY
AND
UNDERSTANDING ON NATURAL RIGHTS JUSTIFICATIONS
FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT.
The social contract is exactly like it sounds – a
contract. On one side of the contract is the individual; on the
other side of the contract is a collective unit comprised of all
individuals.74 In his work, “The Social Contract,”75 Jean
Jacques Rousseau offered two basic concepts upon which he
builds his well-known theory. First, each man seeks to
preserve himself; man in his natural state has free will and acts
to protect himself because no one else will protect him.76
Rousseau’s second concept, the common good, offers a way
for each man to alter his method of self-preservation by
submitting through an exercise of free will to a civil body, but
in return he receives rights, and with those rights comes
protection.77
In
essence,
self-preservation
becomes
preservation of the civil state, and the civil state in return
offers to help preserve each individual through rights and
interests. “Each of us puts his person and all his power in
common under the supreme direction of the general will, and,
in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole.”78
The social contract takes man from a natural state of
anarchy and free will and provides a structured system where
free will impulses are tempered with human thought.79 The
ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13-14.
Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 14
79 Oldenquist, supra note 63 (suggesting that humans are innately
social, as opposed to being social through adoption of societal
conventions).
74
75
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social contract is mutually beneficial to all because the natural
state of man exploited the weaknesses of all men.80 Under the
social contract, weakness is counteracted by collective action
and thought. Rousseau articulates that “only[] when the voice
of duty takes the place of physical impulses and right of
appetite, does man, who so far had considered only himself,
find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to
conduct his reason before listening to his inclinations.”81 The
obligation of each participant under the contract is to conform
to the “civil state,” as compared to the natural state where
man only conformed to his own free will. “As nature gives
each man absolute power of his members, the social compact
gives the body politic absolute power over all its members
also[.]”82
After man leaves his natural free state and enters the
civil state, there are boundaries of action; however, each man
still has liberties. But liberty to act is no longer unfettered as it
was in the state of nature. Rousseau argues that punishment is
required to preserve the civil state when man goes outside the
boundaries set by the civil state (i.e., when man violates the
collective morals).83 Rousseau addresses the concept of the
death penalty directly in his work.
The death penalty is justified because the wrongdoer
has provided “consent” to be punished or perhaps die for his
breach of the contract. “He who wishes to preserve his life at
other’s expense should also, when it is necessary, be ready to
give it up for their sake.”84 As a result, if a person acts within

See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1.
Id. at 19.
82 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 31.
83 Other well-known theorist St. Thomas Aquinas agrees with
Rousseau declaring that “[t]herefore if a man is dangerous and
infectious to the [other members], on account of some sin, it is
praiseworthy and advantageous that he be killed in order to
safeguard the common good, since a little leaven corrupted the
whole lump.” Wright, supra note 24, at 554 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS,
SUMMA THEOLOGICA II (Fathers of the English Dominican Province
trans., 1929), reprinted in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA, REFLECTION ON
HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II q. 64, 240
(John P. Doyle trans., 1997).
84 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 36.
80
81
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his former state of nature85 (self-preserving) to the detriment
of another (for instance, through murder), then the civil state
must punish him, because the person harmed, and the person
harming had given up their right to act impulsively. The civil
state can act86 because “by the social compact we have given
the body politic existence and life; we have now by legislation
to give it movement and will.”87 In short, the act of
punishment is justified because the wrongdoer and victim
both consented to the civil state’s social contract for protection
and for punishment.88
i. JOHN LOCKE
John Locke also shared Rousseau’s principles of
justification for punishment in a civil society. In Two Treatises
of Government, Locke explained: Punishment is permitted to
correct transgressions not for oneself but for mutual security.89
More relevantly, “[e]ach [t]ransgression may be punished to
that degree, and with so much [s]everity as will suffice to make
it an ill bargain to the [o]ffender, give him cause to repent, and
terrifie others from doing the like.”90 The former statement is
what is, in modern terms, called deterrence. Of course,
deterrence91 is commonly used as justification for the death
penalty.
There is another perspective that believes detrimental human
action in the civil state is not a reversion to the previous state of
nature, but rather only a skewed action under the civil state. For
example, “To say that the defendant, at the time of the offense, was
operating at a sub-human, animalistic level and yet engaged in
premeditation and deliberation or malice aforethought is to indulge
in patent self-contradiction.” Wright, supra note 24, at 555.
86 Markel, supra note 9, at 432 (noting a more modern term for civil
state action and punishment is known as “democratic self defense”).
87 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 39.
88 See id.
89 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 312 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. 1960).
90 Id. at 315.
91 There are skeptics on whether the death penalty has deterrent
value. See e.g., Walter Berns et al., The Death Penalty: A Philosophical
and Theological Perspective, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 468 (1997)
(stating “If we make the admittedly unlikely assumption that the
85
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Locke also addressed retribution, insinuating that in
the state of nature, a type of vigilantism is necessary.
However, the right to punish a transgressor in a structured
civil state is turned over to the government. Locke explains the
civil state’s collective protection scheme: “[e]xecution of the
[l]aw of [n]ature is in that state, put into every [m]an’s hands,
whereby everyone has a right to punish the transgressors of
that [l]aw to such a [d]egree, as may hinder its [v]iolation.”92
The individual right of retribution that existed in the state of
nature no longer exists and is replaced with a right to punish
in the civil state. The right to punish becomes more complex in
the civil state, as compared to the state of nature. In the state of
nature, a wrongdoing was only an act against the person. In
comparison, a wrongdoing in the civil state is a crime both
against the person and the body politic, but the wrong can
only be righted by the body politic, which seeks punishment
on behalf of the victim and all others in society.93
ii. JOHN STUART MILL
In his work, On Liberty,94 John Stuart Mill also explored
the body politic. For instance, does man give up all rights to
the civil body to seek retribution? Mill articulated an answer
this way:
[e]veryone who receives the protection of
society owes a return for the benefit, and the
fact of living in society renders it indispensable
that each should be bound to observe a certain
line of conduct toward the rest. The conduct
consists, first, in not injuring the interest of
another; or rather certain interests, which either
by express legal provision or by tacit

number of murderers is equal to the number of murders, this means
that 99.9 percent of the murderers are not, or have not been,
executed, which is not much of a ‘message.’”).
92 LOCKE, supra note 90, at 312.
93
Id.
94 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY [1859] (Charles W. Elliot ed., 2004).
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understanding, ought to be considered as
rights.95

It appears that Mill agrees with Locke’s perspective that action
by individuals who injure others is not allowed; further, it
appears that Mill agrees with Locke’s perspective that the
benefit for exercising restraint of personal vigilante retribution
is “protection by society.”96
Mill avers that society will attempt to control human
action by either, or both, a written moral code (law) or a tacit
understanding.97 The most interesting aspect of Mill’s “tacit
understanding” language is that no collective body can judge
tacit understanding, but rather it is determined within each
individual with the expectation of consensus among all.
Unlike law, which is interpreted and enforced by the civil
state, tacit understanding is in each individual’s mind.
Therefore, two sets of moral code exist: one that is prescribed
by society, and another which is a moral code of the
individual. These sets of moral codes are similar to Bernard
Gertz’s descriptive and normative morality, discussed above.
If one, globally-adopted moral code (“macro morality”)
could govern all human action, then no crime would exist,
because all human action would follow the predetermined
morality, i.e., no one would breach the social contract. Man
cannot give up all of his state of nature impulses; such
impulses will often result in breaking the law, or in other
words, violating the civil body’s code of conduct. Therefore, in
regard to Mill’s issue, how much free will does man submit to
the sovereign? The answer is not enough to prevent breaches
of civil code (morals). Man’s state of nature still exists, and
reverting to the previous state of nature often violates the
social contract and must result in punishment. In other words,
breaching the social contract is immoral.
iii. THOMAS HOBBES
“The Founding Fathers were heavily influenced by
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes in establishing America’s
Id. at 75.
Id.
97 Id.
95
96
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first principles, most notably the recognition of unalienable
rights, the social compact, and limited government.”98 Hobbes
was a natural law theorist.99
The paradigmatic natural law view holds that
(1) the natural law is given by God; (2) it is
naturally authoritative over all human beings;
and (3) it is naturally knowable by all human
beings. Further, it holds that (4) the good is
prior to the right, that (5) right action is action
that responds nondefectively to the good, that
(6) there are a variety of ways in which action
can be defective with respect to the good, and
that (7) some of these ways can be captured and
formulated as general rules.100
In his work, Leviathan, Hobbes creates a metaphor for the civil
state in the form of an artificial man with arms, legs, and a
head.101 Each part of the artificial man, which Hobbes called
the “leviathan,” performs the functions of the state. 102 Every
part of the “leviathan” is made up of each person in that state,
and each person has desires and reason. The good of man
corresponds with the good of the state.
[T]he Hobbesian view what is good is what is
desired, Hobbes thinks that humans are
similarly constructed so that for each human
(when he or she is properly biologically
functioning) his or her central aim is the
avoidance of violent death.103 Thus Hobbes is

Michael Warren, America’s Survival Guide,
http://www.americassurvivalguide.com/thomas_hobbes.php
99 Murphy, supra note 73, at § 2.1.
100 Murphy, supra note 73 at § 1.4.
101 THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN PARTS I & II, (A.P. Martinich ed.
2005).
102 Id. at 9.
103 Similar to Hobbes’ “violent death” terminology, Nancy Bothne,
Midwest Director for Amnesty International, says that each person
has the “right to be free of fear.” Berns et al., supra note 90, at 471
(“To be free from fear is a concept that is a pretty incredible concept.
98
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able to build his entire natural law theory
around a single good, the good of selfpreservation, which is so important to human
life that exceptionlessly binding precepts can be
formulated with reference to its achievement.104

Similar to Rousseau, Hobbes takes the position that selfpreservation is the most important element of human action. It
is simple logic to connect between murder (the act of taking
another’s life) and the violation of natural law.
Robert Kraynak, a professor at Colgate University,
believes that Hobbes’ theory of natural law “gave citizens a
standard for determining if the written laws and customs of
their nation or any other nation were just or unjust, right or
wrong, human or inhumane.”105 Kraynak submits that
Hobbes’ theory of natural law has translated into what is now
called “liberties or rights.”106 Therefore, the notion of selfpreservation at the natural law level has now been converted
into a right or liberty to individual “life.”107 The Declaration of
Independence contains this right. “We hold these truths to be
self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed, by their Creator, with certain unalienable rights;
that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.”108
A violation of a person’s “right to life” is a breach of
the social contract and violates natural law. The United States
adopted natural law in the Declaration as a set of morals.
Consequently, capital punishment is morally justified through
natural law according to the previously discussed theorists.109

It deals not only with a relationship of the state to individuals, but
with individuals to individuals.”).
104 Murphy, supra note 73, at 2.1.
105 Robert P. Kraynak, Thomas Hobbes: From Classical Natural Law to
Modern Natural Rights; Natural Law, Natural Rights, and American
Constitution website, http://www.nlnrac.org/earlymodern/hobbes.
106 Id.
107 See id.
108 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
109 Contra Kleven Thomas, Is Capital Punishment Immoral Even If It
Deters Murder? 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 599 (2006) (concluding “…
capital punishment is immoral even if it does deter murder.”)
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The Founders did not make up the right to life. Rather,
the concept was borrowed from theorists such as Thomas
Hobbes. In short, the Founders did not create natural rights,
but adopted them. Quite the contrary, natural rights have
created and shaped the United States into its current form: one
that allows the death penalty.

V. THE CONTRACTARIAN VIEW VERSUS SOCIAL CONTRACT
THEORY–
MORAL
JUSTIFICATION
OF
CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT.
There is minimal authority for justification theories
regarding punishment outside the well-known death penalty
justifications.
The
absence
of
any
well-developed
contractarian theory of punishment seems all
the more puzzling in light of two salient facts:
First, there is a robust contractarian tradition
that emerged in seventeenth century political
philosophy, first with the writings of Thomas
Hobbes, later in the Enlightenment version of
this same tradition in the writings of Locke and
Rousseau . . . .”110
Perhaps the absence of the contractarian viewpoint in
American capital punishment discourse is most unusual
because of its origin and relation to beginning principles of the
United States.
A. MORAL JUSTIFICATION
Punishment under a contractarian theory is generally
easier to understand than other concepts that operate with
death penalty arguments, such as retribution theory111 or
religious theories. The act of punishment needs moral

Claire Finkelstein, Punishment as a Contract, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
319, 322 (2011).
111 See Markel, supra note 9, at 423.
110
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support.112 Contractarian theory provides support for
punishment in a different manner than other theories.113 The
basic nature of a contract is that the obligation is either
fulfilled or unfulfilled, and if it is unfulfilled, action may be
taken to rectify the breach.114 However, a source of morality
must be added to a basic contract viewpoint for there to be
moral support for punishment. Of course, in the case of
American capital punishment, this article establishes that the
Declaration of Independence offers a moral element to the
social contract view of punishment.
The contractarian view espoused by Claire Finkelstein
in the article Punishment as Contract is different from an
argument for social contract justification.115 Finkelstein says
that “it is unlikely that rational contractors would accept the
death penalty.”116 Essentially, a contractarian view presumes
voluntary entry into a contract.117 This article is unique from
Finkelstein’s assertion of punishment based on contract,
because pure contractarian view lacks moral justification
compared with social contract theory developed in the
Declaration of Independence. Finklestein is correct in her
assertion that “rational agents simply do not regard losing
their lives for the sake of protecting their property as a tradeoff worth making.”118 This would not make sense either for
Rousseau or Hobbes because it would preclude the basic
notions of “self preservation”119 and “avoidance of violent
death.120” The social contract is assumed by the fact one is
alive. Therefore, an American citizen does not enter the social
contract voluntarily; rather it is inherently part of being born
an American citizen. While Finkelstein’s contractarian view is
similar to social contract theory, there are important
differences that differentiate social contract theory under the
Finkelstein, supra note 108, at 324 (stating “[t]he practice of
punishment therefore stands in need of justification if the
background moral objections to it are to be overridden.”).
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 324-25.
116 Id. at 335.
117 See id. at 324.
118 Id. at 335.
119 ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 3, 5, 13.
120 HOBBES, supra note 97, at part 1, ch. 13.
112
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Declaration from pure contract theory flaws, such as lacking a
moral foundation or origin and lacking consent to enter the
contract because consent is assumed in social contract
theory.121
B. CASE EXAMPLES OF THE “RIGHT TO LIFE,” SOCIAL
CONTRACT THEORY, AND JUSTIFIED PUNISHMENT.
The effect of natural rights, specifically social contract
theory, on the “right to life” is that they transform the “right to
life” from a plain language interpretation to a term of art.
Basically, the “right to life” is conditional-- not unconditional.
For example, the defendant in Kansas v. Kleypas,122 who
appealed to the Kansas Supreme Court, argued that his “right
to life”123 under the Kansas Constitution would be violated by
the death penalty. In his argument, the defendant
distinguished his “right to life” from a right to due process
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.124 The defendant
further argued that “our [Kansas] state constitution simply
does not contemplate the taking of a life by the State under
any circumstances.”125 He contends that the Kansas
Constitution confers upon him an absolute “right to life.”126
However, the Court rejected his argument, stating that “[the]
argument, though somewhat novel, has been soundly rejected
by other state courts.”127 Most interestingly, the court noted
that the defendant’s absolute “right to life” argument
“stretches” the language of the Kansas Constitution outside of
its intended meaning, and such an argument is not within the
See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13.
Kansas v. Kleypas, 40 P.3d 139, 252-53 (Kan. 2001) (overruled as to
some conclusions of law but not the “right to life” conclusion stated
in this text) (overruling recognized by Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163
(2006)).
123 Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 252-53 (citing KAN. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 1
(“All men are possessed of equal and inalienable natural rights,
among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.”).
124 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
125 Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 253.
126 Id.
127 Id.; see, e.g., Ruiz v. Arkansas, 772 S.W.2d 297 (Ark. 1989);
Missouri v. Newlon, 627 S.W.2d 606, 612-13 (Mo. 1982); Slaughter v.
Oklahoma, 950 P.2d 839, 861-62 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997).
121
122
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spirit or letter of the language.128 This conclusion leads one to
infer that other Supreme Courts would conclude similarly
when presented with the same question.
One dissenting judge in Rhode Island v. Blood
mischaracterized natural law and its application to murder. In
this Rhode Island case, the defendant killed a family
member.129 The dissenting judge declared that killing a family
member is a “gross violation of the natural law.”130 This
characterization in the context of this article is inaccurate for
two reasons. First, a gross violation of natural law does not
exist; there is either a violation of natural law or no violation at
all. Secondly, under natural law and the “right to life,” there is
no difference between murdering a family member and
murdering any other person in society – everyone has a right
to live, even the murderer himself, until, of course, he or she
commits the murder and breaches the social contract.
The main purpose of the social contract is protection.
Everyone benefits from protection of the civil state. There are
two obvious instances that highlight the moral justification of
capital punishment through the context of natural rights. First,
capital punishment for murderers of law enforcement officials
is morally justified because police are necessary for selfpreservation under the civil state. The act of murdering a
police officer under Hobbes’ view is like severing the hand of
the Leviathan or the “artificial man.”131 Essentially, the police
provide the protection that a person would have provided on
his or her own under the state of nature. However, it is a better
exchange for everyone to defend each other through a civil
body rather than trying to preserve ourselves alone.
Another obvious example that justifies punishment by
death via the social contract would be killing a person who is
weaker, such as a child. A child enters the world and bargains
for safety, protection, or in the event that protection fails,
retribution, in exchange for his or her relinquishment of free
will under the state of nature discussed by Hobbes and
Rousseau.
Kleypas, 40 P.3d at 253.
Rhode Island v. Blood, 37 A.2d 452, 454 (R.I. 1944) (Condon, J.,
dissenting).
130 Id. at 465.
131 See HOBBES, supra note 99, at 9.
128
129
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An example of a capital execution is the tragic case
involving Ernest John Dobbert Jr. and his daughter, Kelly
Ann.132 Dobbert brutally abused Kelly Ann until she died.133
Both Dobbert and Kelly Ann had a right to life, but when
Dobbert decided to deny Kelly Ann her right to life, he also
forfeited his own right to life under the social contract.
Therefore, when examining the “right to life” language with
natural rights concepts, Dobbert relinquished his right, thus
prompting the civil state to act134 to both avenge the death of
Kelly Ann and preserve the civil state from further harm. The
Florida governor at the time of Dobbert’s execution
commented and described the connection between the state
and its citizens regarding such executions:
Ernest Dobbert has been executed because of
his brutal actions toward his own children. I
hope that this indication of the seriousness of
child abuse will be an example of the value
which the people of Florida place upon the lives
of infants and young people in our state, and a
measure of the lengths the people of Florida are
prepared to go to prevent and punish such
crimes.135
Consider Locke’s position on such crimes: “each transgression
may be punished to that degree and with so much severity as
will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him
cause to repent and terrify others from doing the like.”136 It
appears that Governor Graham is essentially describing the
same idea espoused by Locke.
Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 284 (1977).
Id. at 285.
134 The natural life, says Blackstone, “cannot legally be disposed of or
destroyed by any individual, neither by the person himself, nor by
any other of his fellow creatures, merely upon their own authority.”
New Jersey v. Kociolek, 129 A.2d 417, 420 (N.J. 1957) (citing 1
Blk.Com. 133).
135 Executedtoday.com,
http://www.executedtoday.com/2009/09/07/1984-ernest-dobbertchild-abuser/, last accessed Mar. 31 2013, quoting former Governor
of Florida, Bob Graham.
136 LOCKE, supra note 88, at 315.
132
133
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VI. THE CHRISTIAN INFLUENCE: CHRISTIAN FAITH AS AN
ALTERNATIVE MORAL THEORY IN THE CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT REALM.
This section offers one alternative moral influence to
the capital punishment debate. An in-depth analysis of the
Christian faith would encompass several works and require
extensive research and analysis. However, mentioning such an
alternative theory bolsters the natural rights argument as a
legitimate justification for capital punishment and it also
provides a more comprehensive understanding; further, and
more importantly, it provides a basis for another common
source of American morality to compare against natural
rights.
Throughout its history, the United States has
recognized a higher source of power – God; for example, the
Pledge of Allegiance contains the phrase “One nation under
God;”137“in God We Trust,” was first printed on U.S.

coins in 1864; the U.S. Supreme Court has, since the early
1820’s, opened session with “God save the United States
and this Honorable Court;” and ever since George
Washington, during his inaugural oath, first added “so
help me God,” so too has every President since then.138
Christianity has likely influenced the United States more than
any other religious faith.139 President Dwight D. Eisenhower
espoused a high regard for the Declaration but considered it
second to the Bible: “Fellow Americans, we venerate more
widely than any other document, except only the Bible, the
American Declaration of Independence.”140
When debating American capital punishment,
Christianity and its principles are almost always applicable.
4 U.S.C. § 4 (2013).
America Acknowledges God, Foundation For Moral Law,
available at, http://morallaw.org/resources/americaacknowledges-god/
139 See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
140 Bayer, supra note 35, at 336 (2011) (citing Dwight David
Eisenhower, Report by the President to the American People on His
European Trip (Sept. 10, 1959), in WILLIAM J. FEDERER, TREASURY OF
PRESIDENTIAL QUOTATIONS 322 (2004).
137

138
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Christian followers have a connection to capital punishment
because Jesus was executed. The story about Jesus’ short trial
and execution offers insight into societal desire to punish by
death and the political motivation which services that need.
The Book of Matthew, chapter 27, verses 11-26 describe Jesus’
sentencing:
[n]ow it was the governor’s custom each year
during the Passover celebration to release one
prisoner to the crowd – anyone they wanted.
This year there was a notorious prisoner, a man
named Barabbas. As the crowds gathered
before Pilates’ house that morning, he asked
them, “which one do you want me to release to
you – Barabbas, or Jesus who is called the
Messiah? The crowd shouted back, “Barabbas!”
Pilate responded, “Then what should I do with
Jesus who is called the messiah? They shouted
back, “Crucify him!”141
It can be said that Jesus’ sentencing and execution is the
antithesis of America’s ambition for a capital punishment
process. An innocent man (Jesus) dies. A killer (Barabbas) was
released into society. No appeal or due process occurred.
Lastly, execution by crucifixion is cruel and unusual.142
It would be difficult to argue that Christianity is not a
moral code. In large part, Christianity as a basis for morals is
more prevalent in the United States – at least, consciously than natural rights; it is certainly referenced more often.
However, Christianity is unclear about its position on whether
it is for or against the death penalty. Should we forgive or
punish according to Scripture? America’s uncomfortable
association with the death penalty in modern times is likely
attributable, at least in part, to Christianity and its principles.
Christianity fuels two differing sides of the death
penalty argument. Consider the following passages and their
apparent contradiction to one another. The first passage is
from Exodus, Chapter 22 verse 24: “an eye for an eye, tooth for

141
142

Matthew 27:11-26 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.).
See In Re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 446 (1890).
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a tooth, a hand for a hand, a foot for a foot.”143 Now compare
the previous pro-death penalty passage with one that endorses
forgiveness144 instead of retribution: “Get rid of all bitterness,
rage, anger, harsh words, and slander, as well as all types of
evil behavior.”145 “Instead, be kind to each other,
tenderhearted, forgiving one another, just as God through
Christ has forgiven you.”146 The natural rights position is clear
on capital punishment; it is not only allowed, but required.
Christianity is ambiguous on the topic of capital punishment,
as evidenced by the ambiguity of various Bible verses.
While Christianity is the basis of numerous moral
discussions about capital punishment, it is mutually exclusive
in text. The language of the Bible is subject to interpretation. It
is difficult for opponents to discern whether or not one
actually believes the scripture and is enforcing it, or whether
that person believes in or against the death penalty and is
using scripture to support his or her position. As such, natural
rights are not as ambiguous, nor as controversial, as
Christianity. Furthermore, natural rights are adopted by virtue
of being American. Christianity, on the other hand, is not
adopted by virtue of citizenship; rather, it is voluntarily
adopted. In other words, a person can, of course, be an
American but not a Christian; however, one cannot be an
American and not be subject to natural law, because of the
Declaration of Independence’s incorporation of natural rights
and its involuntary social contract.
An issue arises when participants in the death penalty
process are Christians who subscribe to the forgiveness text as
the most important tenet of the Bible.

Exodus 22:24 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.); see also Numbers 35:31;
Leviticus 24:16-17.
144 For an interesting account of execution and the Christian Faith, see
e.g., Jill Jones, The Christian Executioner: Reconciling "An Eye for an
Eye" with "Turn the Other Cheek", 27 PEPP. L. REV. 127, 127 (1999)
(What made the Texas execution (Karla Faye Tucker) so dramatic
was the fact that the “pickax killer” was a born-again Christian); see
also Michael Graczyk, Tucker Face to Face with Jesus, ARIZ. REP., Feb. 4,
1998, at A1.
145 Ephesians 4: 31-32 (New Living Trans. 2d ed.).
146 Id.
143
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In Florida, one criminal judge dramatically
highlighted the struggle that some practitioners
face regarding whether they can participate in
capital sentencing by writing a series of letters
to the public in the local newspaper. In one
such letter he declared, “[b]ecause God has
given me a new life in Jesus Christ, I choose not
to condone our use of capital punishment.”147
Punishment under a natural rights theory may not correspond
with religious moral principles, especially for those charged
with the task of carrying out the execution. As such, it is
possible that man’s moral codes can contradict one another.
The dilemma then becomes which path to follow; in other
words, which morals to adopt.

VII. CONCLUSION
Summing up the death penalty in few words is almost
impossible; however, the following passage is an admirable
attempt. “We pity him [subject of execution], but we also
appreciate the anger of his countrymen and the dramatic
necessity of his death. The dramatic necessity would appear to
rest on its moral necessity.”148 This passage draws on the social
contract theory to find the death penalty is a necessary evil.
Social contract theory, when supported by the moral nature of
the Declaration, offers Americans a developed and unique
argument to justify decisions and actions surrounding the
death penalty.
As established previously, every American has a right
to life when they enter the social contract pursuant to the
Declaration’s language. However, breach of this social contract
through murder violates another’s right to life, as inferred
from Rousseau, Locke, Mill, and Hobbes, and subjects the

Jones, supra note 143, at 134 (citing Talbot D'Alemberte, Searching
for the Limits of Judicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REV. 611, 639 n.154
(1987).
148 Berns et.al, supra note 92, at 469.
147
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murderer to morally justified punishment.149 Punishment is
necessary and consented to by the wrongdoer to accomplish
the key goal of self-preservation of all individuals in the state.
Therefore, the death penalty serves a purpose of “selfpreservation”150 under the social contract by offering the
bargained-for protection guaranteed by the civil state in
exchange that Man leaves his state of nature.
Considering the Founding Fathers’ sources of
philosophical influences, the “right to life” is not absolute; it is
subject to forfeiture by the act of murder under the social
contract. The death penalty serves a necessary function under
natural law theory that adheres to deep-rooted morals of
American society encompassed in the Declaration of
Independence. Therefore, given the origins of America’s
founding, it is not surprising that America still has the death
penalty.

See Wright, supra note 24, at 535 (concluding the death penalty is,
under our social circumstances, not morally justifiable, even in
principle).
150 See ROUSSEAU, supra note 1, at 13-6.
149
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TO LIVE OR TO DIE:
MONEY IS NOT AN OPTION- COST-BENEFIT EVIDENCE AND
ARGUMENTS SHOULD BE HELD INADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL
CASE SENTENCING

Ivy J. Gardner*
I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty has sparked heated debate for
centuries. The debate has centered on religious beliefs,
constitutional issues, moral values, and cost concerns. The
national economic crisis has put the costs of executions at the
forefront of the debate in recent years. Courts and juries have
begun to consider the cost of execution versus the cost of life
in prison without parole in the realm of capital sentencing.1
These new considerations have no place in death penalty
*

Ivy Gardner, B.B.A., M.B.A. (Cumberland University), J.D. 2013,
Lincoln Memorial University-Duncan School of Law.
1 See Judge: Execution, prison costs irrelevant, UPI, Oct. 15, 2010,
available at
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/10/15/JudgeExecution-prison-costs-irrelevant/UPI-37711287115415 (quoting
John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment); Tennessee v.
Cobbins, State’s Response to Motion to Permit Evidence at
Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs of the Death Penalty, Knox
County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009), available at
http://web.knoxnews.com/pdf/051309carjack.pdf.
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jurisprudence. One’s life, criminal or not, should never be
taken – or spared – based on dollars and cents.
Section II of this note presents a scenario in which a
defendant has been convicted of murder and is now entering
the sentencing phase of his trial. Section III evaluates the
available cost studies of executions around the country.
Section IV focuses on the actual language used in a recent trial
regarding the cost of the death penalty versus life
imprisonment.
Section V considers the various constitutional
arguments surrounding the consideration of execution costs in
the sentencing phase of capital cases. Section VI attempts to
balance the positive and negative aspects of considering
execution costs from both the prosecution and the defense
perspectives. Section VII concludes by evaluating ways to
allow the cost considerations while protecting both the
defendant’s and the state’s rights in a capital case.

II. DOES JOHN DESERVE LIFE
CHEAPER?2

IN

PRISON BECAUSE IT IS

Jane, a six-year-old girl, is outside playing on her
swing set in the backyard. John, a sixty- five-year-old man,
comes out of the woods and starts pushing her on the swing.
Jane is thrilled that John is pushing her because her father was
killed in a car accident when she was three, leaving her with
no father figure in her life. After five minutes on the swing,
John asks Jane if she would like to walk with him to see his
puppy, Izzy. Jane loves puppies and is excited to meet a new
one. Jane goes with John and is not seen again for ten years.
For those ten years, John keeps Jane in a storm cellar
on his property a little over ten miles from Jane’s childhood
home. He rapes Jane on the first day and continues to do so at
least twice a week, sometimes more. He keeps her handcuffed
to the floor of the cellar for the next several years, and feeds
her soup and crackers once a day. John tortures Jane, burning
her with his cigarette or making small slits in her tiny arms
with his hunting knife.

This story is fictional and describes a horrific crime the author
wants readers to consider throughout the note.
2

TO LIVE OR TO DIE
Jane screams for help for the first few days until John
binds her mouth with a dirty oil rag and threatens to kill her
“Mommy” if she is not quiet. Jane endlessly shakes with fear
every time she hears a noise at the cellar door. Jane is living
her own hell, at the age of six, with no end in sight.
One day, after ten years of being tortured and raped,
Jane decides that she has to find a way out of the cellar and
away from John. She waits until she hears John’s old truck
start up and back out of the driveway. She slowly comes out of
the cellar, which John stopped locking a few months before,
and smiles at the sight of daylight for the first time in ten
years. She begins to walk toward the road not knowing fully
what her plan is once she sees another person. Jane gets about
half a mile down the road when she hears John’s old truck
coming back. She tries to run but her legs are so fragile that
she has a hard time getting her footing. She falls down right as
John gets to her.
John gets out of the truck yelling, grabs Jane by her
matted hair, and slings her in the bed of his truck like a
ragdoll. A young woman, Julie, drives by and sees the
exchange between John and Jane and notices Jane is crying
hysterically. She does not stop but watches as John pulls into
his driveway and around the back of his house. Julie calls the
local police department and describes to them what she has
just witnessed and tells them the location of John’s home.
John takes Jane back to the cellar and is so angry he
begins to strike her with his belt. Jane is crying hysterically
which makes John even more upset and he begins to strike her
with his fists and kick her. When she does not stop crying,
John takes Jane’s head and bashes it up against the cellar wall
until she is no longer crying and her body goes limp.
John crawls out of the cellar, with a smile on his face,
and begins walking back to his house at the same time law
enforcement is pulling into his driveway. Law enforcement
sees that he is covered in blood, immediately places him under
arrest, and begins looking for the young girl described by
Julie. They find a gruesome bloody scene in the cellar with
Jane’s limp body lying on the floor. John has finally allowed
Jane to escape her hell. She is dead.
John eventually confesses to the kidnapping, torture,
rape, and murder of Jane. He gives law enforcement chilling
details of the last ten years and shows no remorse for his
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actions or for killing the sixteen-year-old Jane. After being
convicted of first degree murder, along with other crimes,
John sits in the courtroom for his sentencing.
The judge gives the jury its instructions and explains to
them the process of determining whether John should be
sentenced to death or life in prison. The defense has asked the
judge to include an instruction detailing the costs of executing
John and the costs of sentencing John to life in prison. This
instruction is important to the defense because the statistics
show that it is cheaper to allow John to live in prison for the
rest of his life than to execute him, and the defense believes
that the jury will spare John’s life because it is the cheaper
option for society during the tough economic times.
This story is a horrific description of the brutal murder
of a young sixteen-year-old girl, who was taken from her
childhood home at the age of six. A young girl, tortured and
raped repeatedly over ten years, and then brutally beaten
when she tried to escape. A man, who has no remorse for
taking the life of such an innocent child, and is going to live or
die based on, among other things, the jury’s feelings about
money and the cost-benefit of the death penalty versus life
imprisonment. Money should not be relevant when
determining whether John lives or dies.

III. STATISTICS SHOW EXECUTIONS ARE MORE EXPENSIVE
THAN LIFE IMPRISONMENT.
This note is not simply about the actual costs of
execution, the actual costs of life in prison or primary based on
statistics. This note is about whether these costs should be
allowed to be a deciding factor in determining when a person
should live or die. With that being said, it is still important to
evaluate the costs of each and assess the costs both nationally
and state by state.3
The following states have abolished the death penalty: Alaska,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New
York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-46a (West 2014); HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-656(1) (2013);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 902.1 (West 2013); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 1251
3
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There is no national consensus for the cost of capital
punishment.4 A number of states have never even evaluated
their costs associated with capital punishment.5 “Of the states
where reliable estimates are available, the differing
methodologies used, assumptions made, and applicable
statutes make generalizations difficult.”6 The 2009 Report
from the Death Penalty Information Center puts the numbers
in perspective:
The high costs to the state per execution reflect
the following reality: For a single death penalty
trial, the state may pay $1 million more than for
a non-death penalty trial. But only one in every
three capital trials may result in a death
sentence, so the true cost of that death sentence
is $3 million. Further down the road, only one
in ten of the death sentences handed down may

(2013); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-201(b) (West 2014); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.265, § 2 (West 2013) invalidated by
Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 470 N.E.2d 116 (Mass. 1984)
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 750.316(1) (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185(a)
(West 2013); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 31-18-14 (West 2013); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (McKinney
2013) invalidated by People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341 (N.Y. 2004)
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-32-01 (2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 2303 (West 2013); State v. Provost, 896 A.2d 55 (Vt. 2005)
(declaring death penalty statute unconstitutional); W. VA. CODE § 612-2 (2013); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 973.0135(1)(B), § 940.01(1) (West 2013).
See also NPR Staff and Wires, Illinois Abolishes the Death Penalty, NPR
(March 09, 2011), available at
http:www.npr.org/2011/03/09/134394946/Illinois-abolishes-deathpenalty.
4 Richard C. Dieter, Smart on Crime: Reconsidering the Death Penalty in
a Time of Economic Crisis – A Report from the Death Penalty Information
Center (2009) page 17, available at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/CostsRptFinal.pdf
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Dieter].
5 Id.
6 Id.
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result in an execution. Hence, the cost to the
state to reach that one execution is $30 million.7

All studies that have been conducted regarding the
cost of capital punishment have concluded that execution is
much more expensive than sentencing a person to life in
prison; a capital trial, due to many factors but most notably the
length of capital trials, is much more extensive and expensive,
and there is, generally, far more appellate and other postconviction review of death penalty cases than cases seeking
only life imprisonment.8 According to the Death Penalty
Information Center, there are several ways one can approach
how much capital punishment actually costs.9 First, the costs
of each individual step in a capital case could be calculated,
including the investigation, trial, and appeals; however, this
number would only include a minority of the cases that
actually go through the whole system.10 A second approach is
to “measure the extra cost to the state of arriving at one death
sentence or one execution.”11 Lastly, the total extra costs to the
state for maintaining a capital punishment system could be
assessed on a yearly basis.12
Each of the above approaches has its own pros and
cons. In the first approach, by evaluating each individual step
of a capital case, researchers would be able to break the
statistics down further to determine the most costly step in the
process. This further evaluation would allow legislatures to
target costly areas within the process and take steps to
facilitate lowering the costs of capital cases within their state.
However, as stated above, this evaluation method only
calculates cases that go through the entire process and not all
capital cases. The second approach would allow states to
evaluate capital cases on a case by case basis and determine
the exact price of one execution. This method, however, limits
the calculation to one death sentence when a state may have

Id. at 14 (internal citations omitted).
Id at 6.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
7
8
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numerous executions that cost the state a tremendous amount
of money.
The third approach allows a state to evaluate costs on a
yearly basis which would give the state the ability to budget
more efficiently. The problem with this method is that not
every state will have an execution every year. Rather, if a state
goes without an execution for several years and then has a
person sentenced to death, the extra money needed for that
sentence may not be available within the budget. The third
approach is also too broad in calculating all extra costs
associated with a capital case. Out of the three, the first
method seems to encompass the entire realm of capital case
expenses in its calculations and may be the best evaluation
method.
Several states have conducted research regarding the
cost of their executions. California spends $137 million per
year on the death penalty, system wide, while life in prison
costs only $11.5 million per year.13 Since 1977, California has
averaged less than one execution every two years making the
actual cost per execution over $250 million.14 New York had
no executions but spent $170 million over a nine-year period
of time prior to abolishing capital punishment.15 New Jersey
had no executions but spent $253 million over a twenty-five
year period of time prior to abolition.16 Between 1978 and
1999, Maryland spent $186 million on capital cases but only
had five executions, thus, each execution cost $37 million.17
Different features of a capital punishment system are
also telling of the exponential cost associated with having this
system over a system only offering life in prison as a
maximum punishment. Maryland sought, but did not impose,
the death penalty in 106 cases which cost the state $71

See California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice,
Report and Recommendations on the Administration of the Death Penalty
in California, at 10 (June 30, 2008), available at
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/reports/dp/official/FINAL%20
REPORT%20DEATH%20PENALTY.pdf [hereinafter California
Commission].
14 Id.
15 Dieter, supra note 4, at 14 n.40.
16 Id. at 14 n.41.
17 Id. at 15 n.42.
13
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million.18 “The average cost for the defense at trial in a federal
death case is $620,932, about eight times that of a non-capital
federal murder case.”19 In Kansas, the trial costs for capital
cases are about sixteen times greater than for non-capital
cases, while the appeal costs are twenty-one times higher.20
California spends over $60 million annually to house 670
inmates on death row.21
These staggering numbers reflect several things. First,
there are more people on death row than ever before and each
individual on death row costs an additional $90,000 above
what it would cost to house them for a life in prison
sentence.22 Second, despite the reinstatement of the death
penalty in 1976, since then, there have been fewer executions
per year.23 Third, correctional facilities now have higher
overall operating costs.24 All of these factors taken together
contribute to a higher cost per execution.25 Since capital
punishment was reinstated in 1976, “the country has spent
about $2.5 billion beyond the costs that would have been
incurred if life in prison was the most severe penalty.”26

IV. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR DEATH ELIGIBLE
DEFENDANTS OUTLINED BY THE SUPREME COURT
Over time, the Supreme Court has developed
numerous constitutional protections for death penalty eligible
Id. at 16 n.47.
J. Gould & L. Greenman, OFFICE OF DEFENDER SERVICES OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, Update on Cost, Quality,
and Availability of Defense Representation in Federal Death Penalty Cases
at 25 (2008), available at
http:www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/AppointmentOfCounsel/P
ublications/UpdateFederalDeathPenaltyCases.aspx.
20 Legislative Division of Post Audit State of Kansas, Performance
Audit Report - Costs Incurred for Death Penalty Cases: A K-GOAL Audit
of the Department of Corrections at 13 (2003), available at
http://www.kslpa.org/docs/reports/04pa03a.pdf.
21 California Commission, supra note 13, at 70.
22 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15.
23
Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id. at 17.
18
19
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defendants because death is different from any other
punishment that a criminal defendant may face. Capital
defendants are afforded protection against arbitrary and
capricious death sentences. Evidence considered during the
sentencing phase must be both relevant and reliable. The
sentencing phase of a capital trial is subject to the harmless
error doctrine and should all but guarantee a capital
defendant an errorless sentence of death. These constitutional
safeguards are critical to capital sentencing and do not leave
room for consideration of economic evaluations regarding the
cost of execution versus life imprisonment.
A. DEATH IS DIFFERENT
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized
that “death is different.”27 In 1972, the Supreme Court, for the
first time, emphasized that death is exceptional in terms of
punishment for crimes.28 In his concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan stated “death is … an unusually severe punishment,
unusual in its pain, in its finality, and in its enormity.”29 In
another concurring opinion, Justice Stewart stated that the
death penalty differed “from all other forms of criminal
punishment, not in degree but in kind. It is unique in its total
irrevocability.”30
The Supreme Court has also noted several times that
death is “qualitatively different.”31 In Woodson v. North
Carolina, the Court noted that “[d]eath, in its finality, differs
See, e.g., Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991); Clemons v.
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750 n.4 (1990); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 509 n.12 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 289 (1983);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982); Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980). See also, Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker,
Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional
Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 370, 397-401
nn.200-206 (1995) (collecting cases for the proposition that “death is
different”).
28 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 287 (1972) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
29 Id.
30 Id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
31 California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
27
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more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term
differs from one of only a year or two.”32 The Court summed
up why death is different in its opinion in Gardner v. Florida:
[F]ive Members of the Court have now
expressly recognized that death is a different
kind of punishment from any other which may
be imposed in this country. From the point of
view of the defendant, it is different in both its
severity and its finality. From the point of view
of society, the action of the sovereign in taking
the life of one of its citizens also differs
dramatically from any other legitimate state
action. It is of vital importance to the defendant
and to the community that any decision to
impose the death sentence be, and appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or
emotion.33
Death is deliberate. Death is final.
B. A SENTENCE OF DEATH CANNOT BE HANDED DOWN IN
AN ARBITRARY & CAPRICIOUS MANNER
Since “death is different,” the Supreme Court has
developed a “greater level of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination.”34 Courts must strive to make sure executions
are not handed out in an arbitrary or capricious fashion.35 A
sentence of death is to be reviewed by appellate courts to
avoid arbitrary or unfair application of the death penalty.36
The Supreme Court has developed two general
conditions to minimize the risk of arbitrary action in capital

Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357-58 (1977) (internal citations
omitted).
34 Ramos, 463 U.S. at 998-99.
35 Id.
36 See Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 611 (1982) (and cases cited
therein).
32
33
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sentencing.37 First, courts must set boundaries on the
sentencer’s judgment to “genuinely narrow the class of
persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably
justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.”38
Second, sentencers must be allowed “to consider any relevant
mitigating factor” that might prevent the sentencer from
imposing the death penalty.39
i. THE CLASS OF PERSONS DEATH ELIGIBLE MUST BE
NARROWED
States must adopt statutes and courts must implement
procedures that distinguish between those defendants who
deserve to be executed and those who do not.40 The statutes
and procedures should also guide juries in deciding on which
factors support a sentence of death and those factors which do
not.41
At the sentencing phase, narrowing occurs when the
sentencer is required to determine whether aggravating
circumstances justify imposing the death penalty.42 A
defendant cannot receive a death sentence unless the trier of
fact convicts the defendant of murder and finds at least one
aggravating circumstance at either the guilt or penalty phase.43
An aggravating circumstance must be narrowly tailored
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983); Abdul-Kabir v.
Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
38 Zant, 462 U.S. at 877; see also Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428
(1980) (plurality opinion).
39 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246.
40 Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 427 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)
(White, J., concurring))).
41 Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 173-74 (2006) (a state statute for
capital sentencing must: “(1) rationally narrow the class of deatheligible defendants; and (2) permit a jury to render a reasoned,
individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and the circumstances
of his crime.”)
42 Zant, 462 U.S. at 878 (statutory aggravating circumstances
“circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the death penalty”).
43 Brown v. Sanders, 546 U.S. 212, 216 (2006).
37
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enough that it does “not apply to every defendant convicted of
a murder. . . .”44
A statute can be effective in limiting the sentencer’s
discretion if the statute provides: (1) “clear and objective
standards”; (2) “specific and detailed guidance”; and (3) “an
opportunity for rational review of the process for imposing a
sentence of death.”45 The Court in Woodson noted procedures
that do not give credence to the character of an individual
defendant or the particular offense “treats all persons
convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely individual
human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass
to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”46
ii. JURIES MUST BE ALLOWED TO CONSIDER MITIGATING
EVIDENCE
As noted above, the Supreme Court has time and time
again stated that juries must be allowed to consider mitigating
evidence that may excuse the imposition of death on a
defendant.47 The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments give a
defendant the right to present mitigating evidence in capital
cases.48 In Lockett, the Court held a sentencer is obliged to
think about mitigating evidence the defendant offers
concerning “any aspect of a defendant’s character or record
and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”49
All relevant mitigating evidence must be allowed to be
presented to juries in capital cases and the defendant must be
afforded wide latitude to present the mitigating evidence.50
Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994).
Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 428 (quoting, respectively, Gregg, 428 U.S. at
198; Coley v. Georgia, 204 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1974); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976); and Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303
(opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, JJ.)).
46 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
47 Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S. at 246. See also Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S.
66, 81-82 (1987); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 111-12 (1982);
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 197.
48 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
49 Id.; see also Marsh, 548 U.S. at 173-74.
50 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). See also Abdul-Kabir,
550 U.S. at 264 (statutory requirement that jury consider only
44
45
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Sentencers in capital cases “must give independent weight” to
each mitigating circumstance.51 However, when evaluating
mitigating factors, the sentencer does not have free
discretion.52 In Brown, the Court upheld the trial court’s
instruction warning the jury to not be swayed by “mere
sympathy” when making the determination to give a death
sentence.53 The Brown Court concluded that a reasonable juror
would interpret the instruction to mean that he or she should
ignore emotional responses that are not rooted in the
aggravating and mitigating evidence and that states may
prohibit juries from basing their sentencing decisions on
factors not presented at the trial.54
It is imperative that capital sentencing juries avoid an
arbitrary and capricious application of the death sentence. If
the above statistics were to swing the other direction and show
that executions were less expensive than imprisoning a person
for life, juries allowed to consider these cost evaluations may
begin to arbitrarily put defendants to death because it is
cheaper for society to do so. By allowing these costs to be
considered, regardless of the side to which the pendulum
swings, courts open themselves up to a direct violation of the
Supreme Court’s rule against arbitrarily applying the death
penalty.
Allowing juries to consider the cost of execution versus
the cost of life in prison without parole does not meet the
Supreme Court requirement of narrowing the class of death
eligible persons. To consider the statistics as they are now,
juries would not sentence any defendants to death because it is
cheaper for society to keep them in prison for the rest of their
particular kinds of mitigating evidence was unconstitutional);
Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 289 (2007) (sentencer may not
be precluded from “giving meaningful effect to mitigating
evidence”); Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608 (plurality opinion) (sentencer
cannot be precluded from considering character or circumstance of
defendant’s record).
51 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (plurality opinion); Hitchcock v. Dugger,
481 U.S. 393, 398-99 (1987).
52 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1987).
53 Id.
54 Id. (The jury in Brown had been instructed not to be swayed by
“mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public
opinion or public feeling.”).
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lives. It is understandable why a defendant would want to
offer the statistics as mitigating evidence. However, the
purpose of aggravating and mitigating evidence is to allow the
jury to evaluate the individual defendant and the crime itself.
Even though the statistics would be an extremely powerful
mitigating argument to keep the defendant alive, the statistics
do not go toward the individual defendant or the murder itself
and should not be considered by a jury when determining
whether to impose a sentence of death.
C. SENTENCING EVIDENCE MUST BE RELEVANT AND
RELIABLE
The Eighth Amendment demands any part of a capital
case be analyzed under a higher level of scrutiny if that part of
the case affects the sentencing determination.55 A heightened
standard of reliability is required when determining whether
death is the most appropriate punishment.56 Constitutional
standards “require inquiry into the reliability, relevance,
value, and prejudicial effect of sentencing evidence to preserve
fundamental fairness and protect the rights of both the
defendant and the victim’s family.”57 Unless the evidence is
both relevant and reliable, it should not be considered during
the sentencing phase of a capital case.
The Federal Rules of Evidence demand that only
material that relates closely to the facts of a case be considered
by the trier of fact.58 Rule 402 clearly states that relevant
evidence is admissible while irrelevant evidence is not.59
Relevant evidence means “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence.”60 Trial judges are also
given the discretion to find relevant evidence inadmissible if
the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
New York v. Arthur, 673 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493-94 (N.Y. 1997).
Id. at 494.
57 Tennessee v. Sims, 45 S.W.3d 1, 14 (Tenn. 2001).
58 FED. R. EVID. 401, 402, & 403.
59 FED. R. EVID. 402.
60 FED. R. EVID. 401.
55
56
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misleading to the jury.61 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that mitigating evidence is admissible in capital cases
and only has to meet a low threshold test for relevance to be
admitted.62
Execution cost-benefit evidence does not meet the
relevance test under either the Federal Rules of Evidence or
precedent. This evidence is irrelevant because it does not have
a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence. Jurors can make the same sentence
determination with this evidence as they would without the
evidence. Also, this evidence does not relate to the “existence
of any fact that is of consequence” but only relates to how
much a state may pay for its capital punishment system to be
implemented.
Even if the cost-benefit evidence is found to be
relevant, courts should still find it inadmissible under Rule
403. By allowing parties to discuss the cost of executions
during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, juries may
confuse the issues involved in this phase. The issue in the
sentencing phase of a capital trial is to determine whether the
defendant receives the death penalty or a lesser punishment.
The issue is not one of how much an execution may cost and it
is critical that jurors not be allowed to confuse these two issues
at such a crucial part of a capital case.
The cost of an execution versus the costs of life
imprisonment has no relevance to a capital sentencing phase.
Only relevant aggravating and mitigating evidence that
reflects on the individual defendant or the crime itself should
be considered in the penalty phase of a capital case. A
Connecticut Superior Court Judge recently dealt with the
relevance of these costs evaluations and stated:
Economic arguments tailored to specific
individuals are not only irrelevant but perverse.
From an economic view, it will thus be more
expensive to incarcerate the younger defendant
FED. R. EVID. 403.
Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; see also Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 28488 (2004) (rejecting the Fifth Circuit’s test for “constitutional
relevance”).
61
62

92

2 LMU LAW REVIEW (2015)
for the remainder of his life and – in strict
economic terms – more cost-effective to execute
him. . . . This argument plainly makes no moral
sense.63

Overall, statistics tend to be an unreliable source of
information. “Statistics is as much an art as it is a science.”64
One author, Darrell Huff, has coined statistical manipulation
as “statisticulation,” or in other words the use of statistical
information to misinform society.65 Statistics are vulnerable to
various manipulations and distortions.66 “The secret language
of statistics, so appealing in a fact-minded culture, is
employed
to
sensationalize,
inflate,
confuse,
and
67
oversimplify.” “A well-wrapped statistic is better than
Hitler’s “big lie”[;] it misleads, yet it cannot be pinned on
you.”68
To illustrate how easy it is to manipulate the same
statistics to fit one’s agenda, Huff proposes the following
example:
You can, for instance, express exactly the same
fact by calling it a one percent return on sales, a
fifteen percent return on investment, a tenmillion-dollar profit, an increase in profits of
forty percent, or a decrease of sixty percent
from last year. The method is to choose the one
that sounds best for the purpose at hand and
Judge: Execution, prison costs irrelevant, UPI, Oct. 15, 2010, available at
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2010/10/15/JudgeExecution-prison-costs-irrelevant/UPI-37711287115415 (quoting
John C. Blue, a Connecticut Superior Court Judge, rejecting the
defendant’s request to allow testimony on the cost of the state of
execution compared to the cost of life imprisonment)(internal
quotations omitted).
64 Darrell Huff, HOW TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 120 (W.W. Norton &
Company 1954) available at http://www.horace.org/blog/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/How-to-Lie-With-Statistics-1954Huff.pdf.
65 Id. at 100.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 8.
68 Id. at 9.
63
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trust that few who read it will recognize how
imperfectly it reflects the situation.69
Going on this proposition, the statistics regarding the
cost of the death penalty and the cost of life in prison without
parole are fatally flawed. The statistics that are available are
based on a judicial system where the death penalty is the
ultimate penalty. If life in prison without parole was the
ultimate penalty, the statistics would show that penalty to be
much more expensive than the lesser penalty of life in prison
with the option for parole. These statistics are developed to
promote anti-death penalty arguments and can be skewed in a
variety of ways to lend credence to any proposition one may
want to propose. To allow a jury to consider statistics that can
fluctuate, as needed, while deciding whether or not a
defendant lives or dies is absurd.
The individual execution costs will vary depending on
the age of the defendant, the execution procedure used by the
state in which the execution is carried out, etc. This dynamic
shows that the statistical numbers can always be skewed and
used in ways that promote whatever policy argument or
reasoning one may want to promote. To determine whether
one lives or dies based on flawed, irrelevant, unreliable
statistics or statistics that can easily be altered should not be
allowed in capital cases.
D. AN ERROR IN CAPITAL SENTENCING MAY BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY HARMLESS BUT IT IS STILL AN ERROR
The harmless error doctrine was first developed by the
United States Supreme Court in 1967.70 In Chapman, the Court
decided that even though an error is constitutional, that does
not render that error resistant to the harmless error analysis.71
The Court also found that some constitutional errors were so
fundamental as to defy harmless error analysis and to thus be
automatically reversed.72 The Chapman Court established the
rule for determining whether an error was in fact a harmless
Id. at 82.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
71 Id. at 22.
72 Id. at 23.
69
70
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error: “before a federal constitutional error can be held
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”73
In 1988, the Court held that the Chapman test was
equally applicable in the penalty phase of a capital case.74 The
Court, in Satterwhite, held: “it is important to avoid error in
capital sentencing proceedings. Moreover, the evaluation of
the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a
capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion
given to the sentencer.”75 The only time the Court has found
automatic reversible error in a capital case is where a juror has
been found to be so pro-capital punishment that he is
effectively unable to not impose a death sentence.76
The purpose of the harmless error test “reflect[s] a
balancing of the defendant’s interests in an error-free
proceeding against the societal interest in finality and judicial
economy.”77 James Scoville has summed it up nicely: “any
error in capital sentencing implicates some constitutional
concerns…the
constitutionally
compelled
sentencing
discretion in capital punishment proceedings may be
undermined by error regardless of whether an independent
constitutional right is violated.”78
Allowing a jury to consider the cost of execution versus
the cost of life imprisonment should be deemed an error. One
can call it “harmless error” but it is still an error and it is an
error in a case that determines whether a person lives or dies.
We should strive for a perfect system and an error in death
sentencing is a permanent mistake and is greater than any
other mistake allowed in criminal jurisprudence.

Id. at 24.
Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249 (1988).
75 Id. at 258.
76 The term “Morgan Precept” comes from the case of Morgan v.
Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 729 (1992).
77James C. Scoville, Deadly Mistakes: Harmless Error in Capital
Sentencing, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 740, 744 (1987) (quoting United States v.
Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 502 (1983) (criticizing lower court for its failure
“to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one
hand, and the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the
interests of the victim on the other”)).
78 Id. at 757.
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V. SHOULD JURIES BE ALLOWED TO EVALUATE EXECUTION
COSTS IN CAPITAL CASE SENTENCING?
There are valid arguments on both sides regarding
these cost evaluations. A juror, as a taxpayer, has a vested
interest in the cost of all trials, especially costly capital murder
trials. The statistics available calculate the average cost of
executions and do not allow jurors to evaluate what the
individual trial they are sitting for will cost. There is no
national standard or national agency that calculates the cost of
executions on average around the nation so the statistics
provided are fundamentally flawed since they are not a
national average but only an average for a few states.
A. JURIES HAVE A VESTED INTEREST IN COSTS
As taxpayers, every juror in every trial has a vested
interest in the cost of that prosecution. The costs of a trial
include the prosecutor’s salary, court-appointed defense
counsel, the judge’s salary, law enforcement salaries, and
other various trial costs. These costs are high in a normal
criminal trial but, due to many factors such as the length of a
capital trial and the cost of mandatory expert witnesses, are
exponentially increased in a capital murder trial as shown in
the statistics above. As the expense of trials increase, local
taxes likely will be increased to cover the extra costs.
When calculated, the actual cost per execution per year
to individual taxpayers is actually quite minimal.79 The United
States has spent around $2.5 billion on capital cases since
1976.80 Taxpayers spent, on average, thirty-one cents per year
on capital cases from 1976 to 2010.81 Individual taxpayers pay
To determine the following calculations, the author used the
statistics included in Section II and divided them by the individual
state and national census figures, respectively. Note only population
of eighteen and over was used in these calculations since author
intends to calculate taxpayer expense. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE. UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 2010 Population
Estimates, available at http://www.census.gov.
80 Dieter, supra note 4, at 15.
81 $2.5 billion over 34 years (1976-2010) = $7,352,411 per
year/population of 234,564,071 = $.31 cents per year.
79
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around $4.90 a year for capital cases in California.82 Taxpayers
in New York and New Jersey paid less than $1.50 per year for
their capital punishment system prior to their states’ abolition
of the death penalty.83 Maryland taxpayers paid around $2.00
per year for their capital punishment system.84 These figures
show that the actual cost to individual jurors, as taxpayers, is
nominal and goes to show that jurors do not have the vested
interests that one might think when looking at the larger
overall state costs.
While the jurors may have a vested interest as
taxpayers, the “death penalty itself is not on trial” when it
comes to cost evaluations.85 The better venue to evaluate the
cost of execution compared to the cost of life in prison without
parole is within the legislature, whether it is on a federal or an
individual state level. Leland Price, Tennessee Assistant
District Attorney General, recently stated, “public debate
among our policy makers concerning the economic costs of the
death penalty is one thing, presenting such evidence to a
capital jury trying to make an individualized sentencing
decision is another.”86
By allowing jurors, as taxpayers, to evaluate the cost of
execution versus life in prison without parole, courts allow the
jurors’ personal finances to come into the sentencing equation.
A capital murder trial is not the place for personal finances to
have such a huge impact on whether or not the defendant
lives or dies. In times of economic hardship, the decision to
render the death penalty would shift in light of individual
jurors’ financial situations instead of being evaluated in terms
of the individual convicted of murder and the circumstances
surrounding the crime itself.
California Commission, supra note 13 ($137 million per
year/population of 27,958,916 = $4.90 per year).
83 Dieter, supra note 4 at, 15-16 (New Jersey: $252 million over 20
years = $10,080,000 per year/population of 6,726,680 = $1.50 per
year; New York: $170 million over 9 years = $18,888,888 per
year/population of 15,053,173 = $1.25 per year).
84 Id. at 17 ($186 million over 20 years = $9,300,000 per
year/population of 4,420,588 = $2.10 per year).
85 Tennessee v. Cobbins, 2009 WL 2115350, State’s Response to
Motion to Permit Evidence at Sentencing Relating to Economic Costs
of the Death Penalty, Knox County, Tenn. (May 12, 2009).
86 Id.
82
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B. NO CASE BY CASE STATISTICS ARE AVAILABLE
There are no individual death penalty trial cost
statistics available. Each case is different in facts, investigation
methods, trial strategy, appeals, and post-conviction
procedures. Therefore, the cost of each capital murder case
differs from the next and can differ tremendously.
In Lockett, the Supreme Court determined that the jury
in a capital murder trial is to make a decision appropriate for
the individual defendant in light of the crimes he has
committed.87 The Court reasoned “[g]iven that the imposition
of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all
other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an
individualized decision is essential in capital cases.”88
To allow non-individualized cost evaluations to play a
part in a jury’s decision to determine whether the defendant
lives or if the defendant is executed is contrary to Supreme
Court capital murder jurisprudence. The Court has made clear
that capital case sentencing determinations are to be made on
an individual defendant and individual crime basis. Since
individual case statistics are unavailable in the death penalty
arena, courts should not allow juries to consider the difference
in execution and life in prison without parole in terms of cost.
Juries should only be allowed to consider the characteristics of
the individual defendant and the circumstances of the
individual crime committed.
C. NO NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR EVALUATION OF COSTS
No national evaluation standard exists for evaluating
the cost of executions and life in prison without parole in each
state. With no national evaluation standard in place, all fifty
states could implement a different method of evaluation. If
different evaluation methods are used, the number of
variables considered during the statistical analysis can make
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605. See also Sims, 45 S.W.3d at 29 (holding that
evidence regarding the nature and circumstances of the crime or
relating to the defendant’s character and background is admissible in
order to meet the constitutional requirement that sentencing be
conducted in an individualized manner.).
88 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
87
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the eventual statistics inconsistent among the various states.
The different parts that would have to be pieced together to
gather a comprehensive economic picture on the costs of
execution will vary widely from jurisdiction to jurisdiction
depending on the evaluation method.
As mentioned above, not all death penalty states have
statistics available regarding the cost of execution or the cost
of life in prison without parole. If death penalty states want to
begin to allow juries to consider the costs of executions during
the sentencing phase of capital cases, they should develop a
national committee to determine how these costs are
calculated and the variables that must be considered when
making these calculations. These steps would make the
statistics more reliable and allow juries to make true
determinations regarding the actual costs involved instead of
relying on fluffed numbers as they stand now.

VI. HOW DO WE AVOID THE TROUBLES OF FLAWED
STATISTICS THAT MAY DETERMINE WHETHER ONE IS
SENTENCED TO LIFE OR TO DEATH?
Courts have three options in determining how costbenefit evidence is admitted into the sentencing phase of a
capital trial: (1) courts may allow only the capital defendant to
present the evidence; (2) once a defendant offers the statistical
evidence, the courts may choose to allow the prosecution to
respond to the argument; or (3) courts may choose to
completely exclude any cost-benefit evidence or arguments.
While each of these options have their benefits, ultimately
courts should follow the latter and not allow execution costbenefit evidence or arguments at the sentencing phase of
capital cases.
A. ONLY THE CAPITAL DEFENDANT CAN PRESENT
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE OF EXECUTION COST
Courts may decide to only allow the defense to admit
the information regarding cost of execution versus life
imprisonment. This information can be a valuable asset to a
capital defendant and potentially spare the defendant’s life.
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Defense attorneys owe a duty to each client to protect
their constitutional rights and freedoms. This duty does not
become less important when a client is charged with capital
murder. If anything, the duty becomes more important to
spare the life of the client. Defense counsel must attempt to
sway the jury to spare the life of his or her client and make
jurors aware of any information that may possibly sway their
sentencing decision in favor of life in prison. To this point, it
is imperative for defense counsel to take all avenues available
to avoid a sentence of death and offering this statistical
information for jury consideration is an avenue that must at
least be attempted.
A capital defendant has a valid argument that these
statistics are a form of mitigating evidence that should be
considered by the jury during the sentencing phase. As the
statistics stand now, the defendant can make a powerful
argument to the jury to sentence him to a term of life in prison
because that sentence would save the jurors, as taxpayers, a
tremendous amount of money. If a court finds this argument
to be persuasive and determines the information to be
mitigating, defendants around the country could be spared
from execution.
If one’s life is being determined by twelve people,
those people should be allowed to consider anything and
everything while making their determination to take the life of
another. Human nature and compassion seems to say that
courts should not deny a defendant the right to plea for his life
in any manner necessary. If this plea includes using statistical
data that may curtail a jury from sentencing a defendant to
death, then so be it.
B. ONCE THE DEFENDANT OPENS THE DOOR, THE
PROSECUTION CAN RUN THROUGH IT
Courts may decide to allow the defendant to admit the
information regarding the cost of execution first and then
allow the prosecution to counter the information with their
own arguments. It would only seem fair to allow the
prosecution to counter any arguments made by the defendant,
especially statistical arguments.
Since the statistics are in favor of the capital defendant,
the only avenue the prosecution has available is to tug at the
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emotions of the jury. They may remind the jury of how
heinous the defendant’s actions were. The prosecution may
also introduce the costs to the victim and the victim’s family.
They may agree the cost of executing the defendant is high;
however, that cost can in no way outweigh the cost of losing a
relative.
Why should the defendant be given the chance to live
based on the cost of executions when the defendant took the
life of an innocent person? How low do the costs have to drop
before you will deliver justice for the innocent life taken by the
defendant? The judicial system is supposed to seek justice; are
you going to allow money to alter what the system is designed
to do? These are all questions the prosecution may ask the jury
when trying to counter a capital defendant’s arguments
regarding the cost of execution.
A prosecutor may focus on the fact that the cost of a
punishment should never matter, especially when a person’s
life has been taken by another. Cost of punishment may be a
valid consideration in misdemeanor or lower felony cases
when the options are limited to incarceration or probation or
community service. However, the cost of execution versus the
cost of life imprisonment has no place in capital sentencing.
A prosecutor may explain to the jury that the majority
of these costs are sunk costs that, in reality, never affect the
individual jurors as taxpayers. The trial costs, including
prosecutorial salaries, law enforcement salaries, judge salaries,
are costs that are going to be paid whether those individuals
are working on a capital case or on a misdemeanor case. These
individuals do not receive overtime pay for the extra time put
into a capital trial. Therefore, the jurors should not put a
tremendous amount of faith into a defendant’s arguments
based on execution costs.
C. EXECUTION COST-BENEFIT EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS
SHOULD BE INADMISSIBLE IN CAPITAL CASES
Courts should not allow the information regarding the
cost of execution and life in prison without parole into the
realm of death penalty jurisprudence. The courts have juggled
the many constitutional safeguards surrounding the death
penalty along with the moral realms of the death penalty for

TO LIVE OR TO DIE

101

years. To allow economic evaluations to come into play is
opening death penalty jurisprudence up to further attack.
Death is different. The decision of whether or not to
take a person’s life is the ultimate decision a capital juror has
to make. This decision will forever weigh on a juror’s mind.
Allowing parties to present execution cost arguments
to a capital jury is arbitrary and capricious in and of itself.
Today, if used, the statistics could potentially allow all capital
defendants to escape execution. The statistics may drastically
change tomorrow and potentially allow all capital defendants
to receive a death sentence because it is cheaper for society to
execute. Depending on the statistics of the day, you live or you
die. This is the exact thing the Supreme Court has tried to
avoid in developing the protections afforded by defendants
from arbitrary and capricious actions by the courts.
By allowing cost-benefit evidence and arguments into
the sentencing phase of a capital case, courts will make the
decision a personal decision for the jurors to make instead of a
decision based on the circumstances surrounding the crime
and the individual defendant. The purpose of the sentencing
phase is to allow the jury to determine one’s punishment
based on aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Execution
statistics do not fit under either of those categories and should
not be admissible in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. The
punishment decision is not a personal decision; it is a decision
to be made based on the evidence submitted at trial regarding
the crime itself and the character of the defendant – nothing
more, nothing less.
One could go on for days about the relevance and
reliability of statistics. Suffice it to say, the statistics offered
above are neither relevant nor reliable and have absolutely no
business being admitted into a capital case. The cost statistics
are completely irrelevant to the crime of murder or any
circumstances that might surround the crime. The statistics are
also irrelevant to the character or background of a capital
defendant. These statistics can be twisted to promote one
public policy and twisted again to meet another. A famous
quote sums up the reliability of statistics nicely: “There are
three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics.”89 The cost
Former British Prime Minister Benjamin “Disraeli would often
apply with justice and force: ‘There are three kinds of lies: lies,
89
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of execution statistics are irrelevant and unreliable and should
not find their way into death penalty jurisprudence.
Since capital trial errors are evaluated under the
harmless error doctrine, it would likely be impossible for
appellate courts to properly evaluate the effects of allowing
this statistical information and determine if a harmful error
had actually occurred. With the cost-benefit evidence being
questionable, at best, trial courts should avoid putting
appellate courts in the predicament of trying to guess what
jurors are thinking as they make sentencing determinations.
As previously stated, the admittance of execution cost
evidence should be deemed an error. Harmless or harmful, an
error is still an error. The judicial system should strive to be a
perfect system even if that goal seems unattainable at times.
An error of this magnitude can easily be avoided by courts
holding that cost-benefit evidence and arguments regarding
executions are inadmissible.

VII. CONCLUSION
The death penalty has been under attack for many
years and the resulting debate has focused on various topics
that put people’s values into play. To allow an economic
element into the sentencing phase of capital cases will only
open the death penalty up for further criticism. Money should
not be an option when determining whether a person lives or
dies.

damned lies, and statistics.’” MARK TWAIN, CHAPTERS FROM MY
AUTOBIOGRAPHY- XX 471 (1907), available at
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/19987/19987-h/19987-h.htm.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In its decision in Atkins v. Virginia, the United States
Supreme Court ruled the execution of a mentally retarded
defendant who has committed a capital crime is
unconstitutional under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.1 The Court left to the individual states the
obligation to determine how to apply the holding of Atkins.2
Because of this, the states differ on the definition of mental
retardation, which party bears the burden of proof, the
standard of proof to be applied, and when the determination
of retardation should be made. Leaving the states to their own
Kendall Inglish, J.D. 2014, Lincoln Memorial University Duncan
School of Law; B.S., University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. The
author wishes to thank Professor Charles MacLean and the Lincoln
Memorial University Law Review for assistance in the publication of
this article.
1
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
2
Id.
*
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devices has denied some defendants full protection under the
Eighth Amendment. It is not necessary to enact a standard
mental retardation definition, because there are case-by-case
details that should be taken into consideration in proving the
existence of mental retardation of that individual defendant;
however, states should enact laws that uphold the Court’s
holding in Atkins by establishing that (1) the defendant bears
the burden of proof; (2) the standard of proof be
preponderance of the evidence, and (3) the determination of
mental retardation must be made prior to trial.

II. INTRODUCTION TO THE DEATH PENALTY AND HOW IT
APPLIES TO THE MENTALLY RETARDED
The United States Supreme Court has continuously
expressed that “death is different” when it comes to deciding
death penalty appeals.3 Since 1976, 1,350 people have been
executed in the United States.4 From 1976 to 2002, of those
executed, at least forty-four were defendants with mental
retardation.5 In fact, it was not until 2002 that the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged that mental retardation
limits a defendant’s culpability to a degree that renders the
death penalty cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.6
In its 2002 landmark, Atkins v. Virginia, the Supreme
Court ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute a mentally
retarded defendant.7 Unfortunately, in its decision, the
Supreme Court failed to advise the states which burden of
proof standard should be used in determining a defendant’s
3

Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976).
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Number of Executions by State And Region Since
1976, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited April 5, 2013),
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976.
5
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., List of Defendants With Mental Retardation
Executed In The United States, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/list-defendants-mental-retardationexecuted-united-states (last visited April 5, 2013).
6
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Atkins Aftermath:
Identifying Mentally Retarded Offenders And Excluding Them From
Execution, 30 J. LEGIS. 77, 82 (2003).
7
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
4
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alleged mental retardation.8 The Supreme Court’s failure to
define the standard of proof to apply and which party bears
the burden of proof, has denied mentally retarded capital
defendants equal protection and due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Chillingly, the failure by United
States Supreme Court to establish a standard of proof means
the difference between the defendant’s life and death.9
Therefore, states should enact laws treating allegations
of mental retardation as an affirmative defense, so like in other
affirmative defense cases, the defendant bears the burden of
proof. The states should further pass legislation standardizing
the proof required to be introduced by a capital defendant.
The standard of proof the states should adopt would be the
preponderance of the evidence standard. The preponderance
of the evidence standard would afford all capital defendants
alleging mental retardation protection under the United States
Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court also failed to set
forth in the Atkins decision when the determination as to a
defendant’s alleged mental retardation should be made,
causing inefficiency both in time and expense. Further, it
creates bias in the judicial system in some states. The states,
therefore, should uphold the United States Supreme Court
decision in Atkins and require that the determination as to a
defendant’s mental retardation be made prior to trial. Such a
procedure would be more likely to lead to a fair trial for
mentally retarded defendants and create an efficient judicial
process.
While the United States Supreme Court has righted the
wrong illustrated in the 1976 decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, it
did not provide practical recommendations to the states when
applying Atkins, and therefore the states should endorse the
Atkins holding to its fullest and intended effect so that
mentally retarded defendants convicted of a capital crime are
not denied their afforded protection under the United States
Constitution.
8

James Gerard Eftink, et al, Mental Retardation As A Bar To The Death
Penalty: Who Bears The Burden of Proof?, 75 MO. L. REV. 537, 568
(2010).
9
Id.
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III. THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED PRIOR TO THE
DECISION IN ATKINS V. VIRGINIA WAS BASED ON A
“NATIONAL CONSENSUS”
The Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment;
however, whether or not it was intended by its founders, the
amendment has been dynamic because its scope has been
manipulated based on society’s progression.10 When the
Supreme Court reviewed the case of Penry v. Lynaugh, one of
the factors the Court seriously considered in determining
whether the execution of a mentally retarded man was
unconstitutionally cruel and unusual was society’s evolving
standard of decency.11
John Paul Penry was charged with the 1979 brutal
rape, beating, and fatal stabbing with a pair of scissors of a
woman in Texas.12 Penry, who had been on parole for another
rape conviction at the time he committed the murder, was
found competent to stand trial even though he was found to
be “mildly to moderately retarded” and had “the mental age
of a six-and-a-half year old.”13 At his trial, doctors testified
that Penry suffered from organic brain damage likely caused
at birth and had an IQ at the time of trial of fifty-four.14 Penry,
who was twenty-two years old at the time he committed the
crime, had not only the mental age of a six-and-a-half year old
child, but also the social maturity of a nine or ten-year-old
child.15 Still, the jury found Penry competent to stand trial,
convicted him, and sentenced him to death.16

10

Donald E. d'Entremont, Constitutional Law-Defendant's Mental
Retardation Does Not Preclude Imposition of the Death Penalty As Long As
the Sentencer Considers All Relevant Mitigating Evidence-Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989), 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 221, 224 (1990)
[hereinafter d'Entremont].
11
Id. at 224.
12
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id. at 308.
16
Id.
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Penry’s
conviction and sentence on direct appeal, determining that the
death penalty was not prohibited due to Penry’s allegation of
being mentally retarded. 17 Penry took his case to the District
Court, which denied relief.18 Thus, Penry appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which affirmed the
District Court’s judgment.19
Penry’s case finally reached the United States Supreme
Court in 1989, to determine, inter alia, whether it was cruel and
unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded person.20
Here, Penry argued his mental retardation acted as a
mitigating factor, and therefore he should have been
sentenced to a penalty less than death.21 In a five-to-four
decision, the Supreme Court found mental retardation is a
factor that may lessen a defendant’s culpability for a capital
offense, but it could not be concluded in Penry’s case that the
Eighth Amendment precluded the execution of a mentally
retarded person of Penry’s ability.22
In support of its decision, the Supreme Court stated
while mental retardation could be considered and given effect
as a mitigating factor in sentencing, there was not enough
evidence in Penry’s specific case to establish a national
consensus against execution of the mentally retarded.23 The
Court examined federal and state laws prohibiting such
executions, public opinion surveys, and the position of the
American Association on Mental Retardation, and found no
consensus at the time against executing mentally retarded
defendants.24 Therefore, the Court reasoned the states could
continue to execute mentally retarded defendants until state
legislatures reached a consensus prohibiting such executions.25
17

Penry v. Texas, 691 S.W.2d 636, 654-55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
Penry, 492 U.S. at 312.
19
Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915, 926 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,
321 (2002).
20
Penry, 492 U.S. at 313.
21
Id. at 315.
22
Id. at 340.
23
Id.
24
d'Entremont, supra note 10, at 226.
25
Id.; Linda L. Hinton, Criminal Law-Imposing the Death Penalty on
Capital Defendants Who Are Mentally Retarded Is Not Prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment To The Constitution If Instructions To The Jury Allow
18
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While the state legislatures never did reach a consensus
prohibiting such executions, the Supreme Court came to that
decision thirteen years after Penry when it was asked to decide
the case of Atkins v. Virginia.

IV. THIRTEEN YEARS AFTER PENRY, THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT GOT IT RIGHT IN ATKINS BY BANNING
THE EXECUTION OF MENTALLY RETARDED DEFENDANTS
Thirteen years after the decision not to exclude the
mentally retarded from being sentenced to death was reached
in Penry, the Supreme Court decided that the death penalty
could no longer be used against the mentally retarded. In a
six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court reasoned in Atkins v.
Virginia, that executing a mentally retarded person violates the
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. 26
Daryl Renard Atkins was convicted in Circuit Court in
Virginia of abduction, armed robbery, and capital murder and
was facing the death penalty.27 In the penalty phase, the
defense relied on testimony from a forensic psychologist who
had evaluated Atkins and concluded that he was “mildly
mentally retarded” based on interviews with people who
knew Atkins, a review of school and court records, and by
conducting an intelligence test, which indicated that Atkins
had a full scale IQ of fifty-nine.28 The jury sentenced Atkins to
death anyway, but the Virginia Supreme Court ordered a
second sentencing hearing because the trial court had used a
misleading verdict form.29 At the resentencing, the forensic
psychologist testified again.30 However, the prosecution
presented an expert rebuttal witness who expressed the
opinion that Atkins was not mentally retarded, but rather was
of “average intelligence, at least,” and diagnosable as having

For The Consideration Of Mental Retardation As Mitigating Factor, 39
DRAKE L. REV. 921, 928-29 (1990).
26
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 308-09.
29
Id. at 309.
30
Id.
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antisocial personality disorder.31 The jury again sentenced
Atkins to death.32 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed
Atkins’ death sentence stating it was “not willing to commute
Atkins’ sentence of death to life imprisonment merely because
of his IQ score.”33 Because of the gravity of the concerns of the
dissenters to the Virginia Supreme Court’s decision, and due
to the dramatic shift of the state legislative landscape that
occurred since the Penry decision, the Supreme Court decided
to grant Atkins certiorari.34 Justice Stevens delivered the
opinion of the Court stating:
Those mentally retarded persons who meet
the law's requirements for criminal
responsibility should be tried and punished
when they commit crimes. Because of their
disabilities in areas of reasoning, judgment,
and control of their impulses, however, they
do not act with the level of moral culpability
that characterizes the most serious adult
criminal
conduct.
Moreover,
their
impairments can jeopardize the reliability and
fairness of capital proceedings against
mentally retarded defendants. Presumably for
these reasons, in the 13 years since we
decided Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109
S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the
American public, legislators, scholars, and
judges have deliberated over the question
whether the death penalty should ever be
imposed on a mentally retarded criminal. The
consensus reflected in those deliberations
informs our answer to the question presented
by this case: whether such executions are
“cruel and unusual punishments” prohibited
by the Eighth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.35
31

Id.
Id.
33
Id. at 310 (citing Atkins v. Com., 534 S.E.2d 312, 321 (Va. 2000).
34
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 310.
35
Id. at 306-07.
32
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V. INTERPRETATIONS POST-ATKINS BY THE STATES HAVE
RESULTED IN AN UNDERMINING OF THE ATKINS
HOLDING
After the decision was handed down in Atkins, the
individual states were left to decide how to apply the holding
to their own death penalty sentences.36 Each state has been left
to define mental retardation, to decide the necessary proof in
determining whether a defendant is mentally retarded, and to
determine whether or not a defendant could be sentenced to
the death penalty, because the United States Supreme Court
did not create a bright-line rule for any of those factors.37 As a
result, no uniform definition of mental retardation has been
established.38 Some states, such as Idaho, have applied a
definition of mental retardation that is viewed by some as so
limiting that it offends a defendant’s rights under the United
States Constitution.39 In Idaho, mental retardation is based on
a fixed IQ number, although experts agree that an IQ number
alone does not determine mental retardation.40 An Idaho
defendant with an IQ of 71 or above could be set to be
executed if convicted, even if that defendant could otherwise
qualify as being mentally retarded.41 Other states, such as
California, do not specify a certain IQ for determining mental
retardation.42 Rather, California defines mental retardation as
“significantly subaverage [sic] general intellectual functioning

36

Anna M. Hagstrom, Atkins v. Virginia: An Empty Holding Devoid of
Justice for the Mentally Retarded, 27 LAW & INEQ. 241, 241-42 (2009)
[hereinafter Hagstrom].
37
Id. at 242.
38
Id.
39
Am. Civil Liberties Union, Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty,
ACLU.ORG (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/mentalretardation-and-death-penalty (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter
Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty].
40
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.
41
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(1)(b) (West, WestlawNext current
through 2013); Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.
42
Sara Catania, Death Row’s IQ Divide, L.A. TIMES OPINION (May 8,
2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-oecatania8may08,0,1060490.story.
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existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and
manifested before the age of 18.”43
Inconsistencies also result, depending on when the
determination of mental retardation is made.44 In Louisiana
and Virginia, prosecutors have argued the determination
should always be made post-conviction by the same jury that
found the defendant guilty.45 In Louisiana, the determination
of mental retardation can be made pre-trial by a judge but
only if the prosecutor agrees the determination be made then,
otherwise it is left to sentencing by the jury.46 In Virginia, the
determination is made by the jury or the judge in non-jury
trials during the defendant’s sentencing.47
However,
efficiency in the administration of justice dictates that a pretrial determination on a defendant’s mental retardation would
save time and money associated with the prosecution of a
death penalty trial.48
Additionally, there have been irregularities among the
states in establishing the standard of proof necessary to
determine whether a defendant should be sentenced to
death.49 Currently sitting on death row in Georgia is Warren
Hill, an inmate with an IQ of 70, who was granted a stay of
execution on February 19, 2013, within thirty minutes of his
scheduled time to receive a lethal injection.50 In 1991, Hill was
43

CAL. PENAL CODE § 1376 (West, West, WestlawNext current with
urgency legislation through Ch. 526, except Ch. 352, of 2013 Reg.Sess.).
44
Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39; see also John
H. Blume et al., Of Atkins and Men, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 689,
693 (2009).
45
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.5.1(C)(1)-(2) (West, WestlawNext
current through 2013 Reg Session); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1
(West, WestlawNext current through 2013 Reg. Session); Mental
Retardation And The Death Penalty, supra note 39.
46
LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 905.5.1(C)(1) (West, WestlawNext
current through 2013 Reg. Session); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., States That
Have Changed Their Statutes To Comply With the Supreme Court’s
Decision in Atkins v. Virginia, DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG (last visited Mar. 3,
2013), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-have-changed-their-statutescomply-supreme-courts-decision-atkins-v-virginia.
47
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1.1 (West, WestlawNext current through
2013 Reg. Session).
48
Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, supra note 39.
49
Hagstrom, supra note 36, at 266.
50
Ed Pilkington, Georgia Inmate Warren Hill Granted Stay of Execution 30
Minutes Before Lethal Injection, GUARDIAN.CO.UK,
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sentenced to death after he killed his cellmate in prison.51 Hill
was incarcerated at the time for killing his eighteen-year-old
girlfriend.52 In Georgia, a defendant who alleges intellectual
disability for avoiding the death penalty must prove the
disability beyond a reasonable doubt.53 Hill was sentenced to
the death penalty after he was unable to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that he was mentally retarded.54 The beyond
a reasonable doubt standard is one in which experts say is
almost impossible to achieve when using that standard to
assess mental retardations.55
Even those doctors who
diagnosed Hill with an IQ of 70, which constitutes mild mental
retardation, found it impossible to meet this standard.56 All
three of the doctors who examined Hill have reversed their
opinion that Hill had not met the legal definition of “mentally
retarded” and that their original evaluation of the Hill was
“extremely and unusually rushed.”57 Georgia continues to
hold capital defendants to the strictest standard of proof to
show intellectual disability should preclude the death
penalty.58 Georgia is an outlier, as twenty-eight of the thirty-

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/20/warren-hill-stay-of-execution
(last visited Feb. 20, 2013); Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Georgia Disabilities
Expert Calls for Halt to Execution of Inmate With Mental Retardation,
DEATHPENALTYINFO.ORG, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/georgiadisabilities-expert-calls-halt-execution-inmate-mental-retardation (last
visited Mar. 3, 2013); Eric Jacobson, The Supreme Court Must Stop the
Execution of Warren Hill, HUFF POST CRIME,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eric-jacobson/warren-hillexecution_b_2665094.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
51
Huffington Post, Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row
Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, HUFF POST CRIME, (Feb. 19, 2013,
11:32 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/19/warren-hillexecution-stayed_n_2720700.html [hereinafter Warren Hill Execution
Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision].
52
Id.
53
GA. CODE ANN. § 17-7-131 (West 2015); Warren Hill Execution Stayed:
Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in Last Minute Decision, supra note 51.
54
Warren Hill Execution Stayed: Georgia Death Row Inmate Spared in
Last Minute Decision, supra note 51.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
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three states with the death penalty use a lower standard for
proving mental retardation.59
One of those states which require a lower standard of
proof for avoiding the death penalty based on mental
retardation is Arizona. On January 3, 2013, “after more than
13 years and two trials,” the Arizona Supreme Court ruled
that Shawn Grell could not be executed because he was
mentally retarded.60 Grell’s sentence was reduced to life in
prison without possibility of parole for the 1999 murder of his
two-year-old daughter by lighting her on fire after dousing
her with gasoline.61 At trial, Grell’s attorneys failed to prove
by Arizona’s clear and convincing evidence standard that he
was mentally retarded.62 But on appeal, the Arizona Supreme
Court ruled that Grell was mentally retarded using a lower
standard of preponderance of the evidence.63 The Arizona
Attorney General’s Office plans to appeal the Arizona
Supreme Court’s ruling based on the fact that Grell was not
found mentally retarded under the higher legal standard of
clear and convincing evidence required by state law, but
instead by a standard of preponderance of the evidence.64 The
Arizona Attorney General intends to seek legislation that
would clarify the standard for future cases involving
defendants who claim to be mentally retarded since Grell was
found mentally retarded by preponderance of the evidence
even though the statute in Arizona requires a defendant to
59

The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION
(Nov. 29, 2011), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/an-intolerable-burden-ofproof.html?_r=0 (last visited Aug. 8, 2012).
60
Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 357 (Ariz. 2013); Jim Walsh, Arizona
Court Reduces Shawn Grell’s Death Sentence to Life, AZCENTRAL.COM
(Jan. 9, 2013),
http://www.azcentral.com/community/mesa/articles/20130109arizonacourt-reduces-shawn-grell-death-sentence-life-brk.html (hereinafter Walsh).
61
Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60.
62
Grell, 291 P.3d at 351; Walsh, supra note 60; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-753(g) (West, WestlawNext legislation effective June 20, 2013 of the
First Regular Session of the Fifty-first Legislature).
63
Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra note 60 (“Teachers and school
officials were reluctant to label Grell as retarded for fear of angering his
mother, referring to behavioral disorders instead when assigning him to
special-education classes.”).
64
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra
note 60.
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prove mental retardation by a clear and convincing evidence
standard.65
Those defendants on death row prior to the decision in
Atkins have also met obstacles in appealing their sentences.
The Fifth Circuit denied Bruce Webster, an inmate on federal
death row for the 1994 kidnapping, rape, and murder of an
Arkansas teen, an appeal to prove he was mentally retarded,
because he had exhausted his appeals to the point where new
evidence to prove his intellectual disability was not allowed
unless that new evidence could show that Webster was
innocent.66 The allegedly weak weight of Webster’s new
evidence, including three doctors who diagnosed him as
mentally retarded, and the fact he had applied for Social
Security Disability benefits due to his mental retardation the
year prior to the murder he committed, was not the reason for
the denial by the Fifth Circuit and affirmation by the United
States Supreme Court.67 Rather, a 1996 federal criminal law
severely limiting the number of appeals an inmate can make
stopped Webster from possibly establishing his mental
retardation post-Atkins.68
Even inconsistencies in applying the bare bones ruling
of Atkins (no death penalty sentence for the mentally retarded)
have been felt since its decision was entered. In August 2012,
Marvin Wilson, a defendant with an IQ of 61, was executed in
Texas.69 Generally, an IQ of around 70 or as high as 75
65

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753; Grell, 291 P.3d at 357; Walsh, supra
note 60.
66
United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir. 2005); Scott
Goldstein, High Court Denies Appeal of Mentally Retarded Man Who
Helped Rape, Kill Arlington Teen, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Dec. 7,
2010, 6:54 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/communitynews/arlington/headlines/20101207-high-court-denies-appeal-of-mentallyretarded-man-who-helped-rape-kill-arlington-teen.ece [hereinafter
Goldstein].
67
United States v. Webster, 421 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 2005); Goldstein,
supra note 66.
68
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.104–
132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); Goldstein, supra note 66.
69
David R. Dow, Supreme Court Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded,
But Texas Does It Anyway, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawedexecuting-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Dow]; Kate Randall, Texas Executes Mentally
Disabled Death Row Prisoner, WORLD SOCIALIST WEBSITE (Aug. 8, 2012),
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indicates limited intellectual functioning.70 Texas allowed for
the execution of Wilson, convicted of murdering a police
informant in 1992, using precedent from the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals decision established in Ex parte Briseno.71 In
Ex parte Briseno, a mentally retarded defendant was executed
because his retardation was deemed to be mild.72 From this
2004 case, Texas uses a “Briseno factors” test to determine
mental retardation.73 These “Briseno factors” are arguably
subjective and stereotypical and without any scientific data to
back them up.74 These factors include but are not limited to
asking people who knew the defendant whether they thought
he was “mentally retarded” to whether the crime committed
required forethought.75
On February 29, 2012, Arizona executed Robert
Moorman, who was diagnosed as being mentally retarded and
having attended special education classes while in public
school.76 Moorman was sentenced to death for the 1984
murder of his adoptive mother who he killed while out on a
three-day furlough while serving a nine-year prison term for

http://www.wsws.org/Fen/articles/2012/08/wils-a08.html (last visited Aug.
19, 2013) [hereinafter Randall].
70
Am. Ass’n of Intellectual and Dev’l Disabilities, Definition of Intellectual
Disability, AIDD.ORG, http://www.aaidd.org/content_100.cfm?navID=21.
71
Ex parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Dustin Volz,
Court Also Rejects Appeal for Man Scheduled to Die Next Week, Tucson
Sentinen.com (Feb. 29, 2012, 11:31 AM),
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/022912_az_executions/manput-death-after-last-minute-appeals-fail/, David R. Dow, Supreme Court
Outlawed Executing Mentally Retarded, But Texas Does It Anyway,
U.S.NEWS (Aug. 14, 2012, 4:45 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/08/14/supreme-court-outlawedexecuting-mentally-retarded-but-texas-does-it-anyway.html.
72
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 18; Dow, supra note 68.
73
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68.
74
Briseno, 135 S.W.3d at 8; Randall, supra note 68.
75
John H. Blume et. al., Of Atkins and Men: Deviations from Clinical
Definitions of Mental Retardation in Death Penalty Cases, 18 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 689, 712 (2009).
76
Michael Kiefer, Execution to Conclude Shocking Arizona Murder Case,
NEWS (Feb. 25, 2012, 10:19 PM),
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/20120224arizona-murder-caseexecution-moormann.html [hereinafter Kiefer].
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the 1984 kidnapping and molesting of a nine-year-old girl.77 A
defendant in Arizona, by clear and convincing evidence, must
prove the criteria of being mentally retarded to avoid the
death penalty under Atkins.78 One doctor witness, who often
testifies against inmates, said Moorman was “absolutely”
mentally disabled, which would make it illegal for Arizona to
execute him because of Atkins.79 Other doctors said that
Moorman’s intellect was just above someone who is legally
considered mentally disabled.80
Ten years after the Atkins decision, Alabama reduced
the sentence of one of their longest serving death row inmates
because of the defendant’s intellectual disability. Bobby
Tarver, convicted in 1982 of murdering a taxi cab driver, had
his death sentence overturned by a federal judge because of
Tarver’s mental retardation.81 In 2003, Melanie Anderson’s
sentence to the death penalty for the 1994 beating and torture
death of her boyfriend’s three-year-old niece was reversed to
life in prison after she was deemed mentally retarded.82

VI. STATES SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT BEAR THE
BURDEN OF PROOF IN SHOWING MENTAL RETARDATION
AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Currently, only fourteen of the thirty-three states with
the death penalty have enacted statutes shifting the burden of

77

Arizona v. Moorman, 744 P.2d 679, 681-82 (Ariz. 1987); Kiefer, supra
note 76 (Moorman’s representatives said he killed his adoptive mother after
years of suffering sexual abuse from her).
78
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-753(G); Arizona v. Grell, 291 P.3d 350, 352
(Ariz. 2013).
79
Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76.
80
Moorman, 744 P.2d at 688; Kiefer, supra note 76.
81
Tarver v. Thomas, No. 07-00294-CG-B, 2012 WL 4461710, at *20 (S.D.
Ala. Sept. 24, 2012); Brendan Kirby, Judge Changes Sentence of Mobile
County’s Longest-Serving Death Row Inmate to Life, BLOG.AL.COM (Dec.
6, 2012, 3:53 PM),
http://blog.al.com/live/2012/12/judge_changes_sentence_of_mobi.html.
82
North Carolina v. Anderson, 94 CRS 5669, 95 CVR 887 (N.C. Gen. Ct.
Justice Superior Ct. Div. July, 29, 2003); Jerry Lankford, A Look at Capital
Punishment and Wilkes County Moratorium on Executions Possible, THE
RECORD (June 11, 2003),
http://www.therecordofwilkes.com/newsa.asp?edition_number=187&pg=F.
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proving mental retardation to the defendant.83 Since the
decision in Atkins, three states have not set a standard of proof
at all, but still require that the defendant prove his or her
mental retardation.84 Historically, the prosecution bears the
burden of proof in criminal cases; however, as to certain
defenses, various jurisdictions assign one or more of the
burdens to the defense.85 When it comes to proving an
affirmative defense, federal courts have upheld statutory law
requiring the defendant to bear the burden of proof.86 A
defendant uses an affirmative defense to admit that he has
acted in the way in which he has been accused, but that his
conduct was justifiable, excusable, or could be mitigated for a
particular reason, and therefore should reduce or negate the
crime which he has been charged with.87 Mental retardation
should, therefore, be considered an affirmative defense and
shift the burden of proof to the defendant because it is offered
by the defendant to excuse or mitigate his actions in an effort
to avoid being sentenced to death. In further support that the
burden should be borne by the defendant, it should be noted
that no state statute currently exists that places the burden on
the prosecution to prove that the defendant is not mentally
retarded.88 Once the states enact legislation placing the
burden of proof with the defendant, the question becomes
what that standard of proof should be.

83

Yamilka M. Rolon, Mental Retardation And The Death Penalty, J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. ONLINE (June 2008),
http://www.jaapl.org/content/36/2/250.full (hereinafter Rolon).
84
Pruitt v. Indiana, 834 N.E. 2d 90, 102 (Ind. 2005); Rolon, supra note 82.
85
1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 5:18 (7th ed. 2012).
86
Matthew S. Gray, Proof Issues, 84 GEO. L.J. 1248, 1252 (1996).
87
Scott R. Poe, Inconsistent Methods for the Adjudication of Alleged
Mentally Retarded Individuals: A Comparison of Ohio's and Georgia's
Post-Atkins Frameworks for Determining Mental Retardation, 54 CLEV. ST.
L. REV. 405, 421 (2006) [hereinafter Poe].
88
Missouri v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 (Mo. 2008).
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VII. STATE SHOULD REQUIRE THAT A DEFENDANT PROVE
MENTAL RETARDATION USING A PREPONDERANCE OF
THE EVIDENCE STANDARD TO AVOID UNDERMINING THE
HOLDING OF ATKINS
Because the United States Supreme Court did not set a
standard of proof to be applied by the states in Atkins, state
legislatures are permitted to enact any or no laws mandating
what standard their state will apply as long as it is
“appropriate.”89
The function of a standard of proof, as that
concept is embodied in the Due Process Clause
and in the realm of fact finding, is to “instruct
the factfinder concerning the degree of
confidence our society thinks he should have in
the correctness of factual conclusions for a
particular type of adjudication.”90
Since the Atkins decision, three states with the death penalty
have not set a standard of proof.91 Six states with the death
penalty have enacted statutes requiring a preponderance of
the evidence standard, with eighteen death penalty states
keeping their pre-Atkins preponderance of the evidence
standard.92 Four states with the death penalty require a clear
Ed Pilkington, Georgia Lawyers Rush To Save ‘Mentally Retarded’
Death Row Inmate, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 17, 2013, 9:56 AM),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/17/warren-hill-georgia-inmateexecution#cb=f39e0ebe6227d6&origin=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.guardian.c
o.uk%2Ff3928fdbf733eb8&domain=www.guardian.co.uk&relation=parent
&error=unknown_user.
90
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
91
Pruitt, 834 N.E. 2d at 102; Rolon, supra note 83.
92
Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute
References for Mental Retardation, JUDGES.ORG (last visited April 12,
2013),
http://www.judges.org/capitalcasesresources/bookpdf/appendices/Case%20
and%20Statute%20References%20for%20Mental%20Retardation.pdf; see
Smith v. Alabama, 2007 Ala. LEXIS 91, 32-33 (Ala. May 25, 2007) (citing
Morrow v. Alabama, 928 So. 2d 315, 323 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004); see also
Holladay v. Campbell, 463 F. Supp. 2d 1324, 1341 n.21 (N.D. Ala. 2006));
A.C.A. § 5-4-618(a)(2),(c) (2008); CAL. PEN. CODE. § 1376(b)(3) (2008);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-1102(2) (2008); see also Colorado v. Vasquez,
89
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and convincing evidence standard.93 Only one state with the
death penalty, Georgia, requires that a defendant prove
mental retardation beyond a reasonable doubt standard.94
First, we must look at the standards of proof that fail to
uphold the intention of Atkins to move toward the correct
standard of proof that should rest upon the defendant.
Placing a standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt
upon a defendant is unconstitutional because it makes it
almost impossible for those capital defendants with mental
retardation from proving their condition.95 For example, a
capital defendant who alleges mental retardation in Georgia
has to introduce more evidence than a capital defendant
alleging mental retardation in any other state and that proof
must show with “virtual certainty” that the defendant is
mentally retarded.96 Consequently, doubt can easily be

84 P.3d 1019 (Colo. 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(3); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2515A(3) (2008); 725 ILCS 5/114-15(b) (2009); Bowling
v. Kentucky, 163 S.W.3d 361, 382 (Ky. 2005); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. Art.
905.5.1(C)(1) (2008); MD. CODE ANN., Crim. Law § 2-202(b)(2)(ii); see
Chase v. Missouri, 873 So.2d 1013, 1029 (Miss. 2004); MO. REV. ST. §
565.030.4(1) (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-105.01(4) (2008); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 174.098.5(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2005(c), (f)
(2008) (standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence if determined by
a jury, clear and convincing evidence if determined by a court); Ohio v.
Lott, 779 N.E.2d 1011, 1015 (Ohio 2002); Murphy v. Oklahoma, 54 P.3d
556, 568 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002); Blonner v. Oklahoma, 2006 OK CR 1,
6-8 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006); see Franklin v. Maynard, 588 S.E.2d 604, 606
(S.C. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-26.3 (2009); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-13-203(c) (2008); Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-15a-104(11)(a); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-264.3:1.1(C); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (2008).
93
Rolon, supra note 83; The National Judicial College, Case and Statute
References for Mental Retardation, JUDGES.ORG (last visited April 12,
2013),
http://www.judges.org/capitalcasesresources/bookpdf/appendices/Case%20
and%20Statute%20References%20for%20Mental%20Retardation.pdf;
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-703.02(G) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.137(4)
(2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-9-4(b) (2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A2005(c), (f) (2008).
94
Rolon, supra note 83; O.C.G.A. § 17-7-131(c)(3) (2008)
95
Andrew Cohen, Executing The Mentally Retarded: The Night The Lights
Went Out In Georgia, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:54 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/02/executing-thementally-retarded-the-night-the-lights-went-out-in-georgia/273088/.
96
Poe, supra note 87, at 420.
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introduced by expert testimony and an effective opposing
expert can raise doubt enough to sentence a defendant to
death who would otherwise be considered mentally
retarded.97 The United States Supreme Court has never
“suggested much less held, that a burden of proof standard on
its own can so wholly burden an Eighth Amendment right as
to eviscerate or deny that right.”98 Because of their disabilities
in areas of reasoning, judgment, and control of their impulses,
the mentally retarded do not act with the level of moral
culpability that characterizes the most serious adult criminal
conduct.99 Requiring such a high standard of proof such as
Georgia’s standard denies a capital defendant protection and
due process and undermines the Atkins holding.
Clear and convincing evidence is “evidence indicating
that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably
certain.”100 At least one state has found that a clear and
convincing evidence standard placed on a defendant trying to
prove mental retardation is unconstitutional under Atkins.101
In Pruitt v. State, the Supreme Court of Indiana reasoned that
assigning the clear and convincing evidence standard to a
defendant to prove his allegation of mental retardation in
avoiding a sentence of death was a violation of the Eighth
Amendment because “the defendant’s right not to be executed
if mentally retarded outweighs the state’s interest as a matter
of federal constitutional law.”102 The Indiana Supreme Court
analogized the Pruitt case with Cooper v. Oklahoma, which
found that requiring a defendant to prove his competence to
stand trial by a clear and convincing evidence standard was a
violation of his right to due process.103
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, the United States Supreme Court
unanimously decided that a defendant did not have to prove
his competency to stand trial by a clear and convincing

97

The New York Times, An Intolerable Burden of Proof, THE OPINION
(Nov. 29, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/opinion/anintolerable-burden-of-proof.html?_r=0.
98
Id.
99
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 306.
100
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009).
101
Pruitt, 834 N.E.2d at 103.
102
Id.
103
Id. (citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 369 (1996)).
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standard because it was too high of a burden.104 The Court
reasoned that assigning a burden of clear and convincing
evidence to the defendant places a “significant risk of an
erroneous determination that the defendant is competent.”105
Further, the Court found that a clear and convincing evidence
standard allocates a large share of the risk to the defendant.106
The Court reasoned the clear and convincing evidence
standard was such a harsh standard that it violates a
defendant’s right to due process of law and that the standard
assigned should be a preponderance of the evidence
standard.107
While the Cooper case was to determine
competency to stand trial, it should still be looked to for
guidance in deciding the standard to assign a capital
defendant alleging mental retardation because the issues are
analogous.
The “more stringent the burden of proof a party must
bear, the more that party bears the risk of an erroneous
decision.”108 To avoid an erroneous decision being made in a
decision as important as life or death of a defendant, states
should require that at a maximum the standard of proof
assigned to a capital defendant alleging an affirmative defense
of mental retardation is the standard of preponderance of the
evidence. A standard of preponderance of the evidence means
“superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free
the mind wholly from all reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to
incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather
than the other.”109 Currently, the majority of states that have
enacted legislation requiring the capital defendant prove their
mental retardation by a certain burden of proof have chosen
that burden to be by a preponderance of the evidence.110
States should treat a determination of mental
retardation similar to the United States Supreme Court’s
104

Cooper, 517 U.S. at 369.
Id. at 363.
106
Id. at 366.
107
Id.
108
Cruzan by Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283
(1990).
109
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
110
Mary Hollingsworth, State v. Grell: Placing the Burden on Defendants
to Prove Mental Retardation in Capital Cases, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 775, 778
(2007).
105
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treatment of competency for trial and require that the standard
of proof that a capital defendant must prove be by a
preponderance of evidence.111
The argument for this
treatment is: the risk to a capital defendant who must meet a
burden higher than preponderance of the evidence is dire,
whereas the risk to the state is modest.112
When the burden of proof is at the lower standard of
preponderance of the evidence, success by capital defendants
claiming mental retardation is not frequent, which illustrates
that a preponderance of the evidence standard is not just a
“free pass” for a capital defendant alleging mental retardation
trying to avoid the death penalty.113 For example, in Virginia,
which requires a capital defendant prove mental retardation
by a preponderance of the evidence, the success rate is zero
percent for the six capital defendants who have alleged mental
retardation to avoid the death penalty.114 Similarly, Alabama,
which has a preponderance of the evidence standard, has only
a twelve percent success rate for the twenty-six capital
defendants who have alleged mental retardation to avoid the
death penalty.115
Therefore, subjecting a capital defendant to prove an
allegation of mental retardation at any standard higher than
preponderance of the evidence would shift the allocation of
risk, and would be dire for the defendant’s defense. All states
with the death penalty should refine their legislation by
joining the majority of states and mandate that the standard of
proof be preponderance of the evidence to avoid deflating the
Atkins holding.

111

Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355.
Id. at 364-65.
113
Kenneth Williams, Most Deserving Of Death? An Analysis Of The
Supreme Court’s Death Penalty Jurisprudence, (last visited April 5, 2013),
available at
http://books.google.com/books?id=nAxAOUWyacUC&pg=PA100&lpg=P
A100&dq=mentally+retarded+states+preponderance&source=bl&ots=WTE
vuCtXqP&sig=j4XANVEpcPCjQeVDvnOUuvLS7zk&hl=en&sa=X&ei=i
wBiUbiFJJHM9ATPyoDYBQ&ved=0CDwQ6AEwAg#v=onepage&q=me
ntally%20retarded%20states%20preponderance&f=false.
114
Id.
115
Id.
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VIII. STATES SHOULD ENACT STATUTORY LAW REQUIRING
THAT THE DETERMINATION OF A DEFENDANT’S
ALLEGED MENTAL RETARDATION BE DECIDED PRIOR
TO THE TRIAL COMMENCING
The determination of whether a capital defendant is
mentally retarded by the standard of preponderance of the
evidence should be made prior to trial. This would eliminate
any bias that may occur by the factfinder if the determination
was made after the guilt phase and to encourage efficiency of
resources, time, and expense.
Mental retardation is a
“threshold issue that determines whether a defendant is
eligible for capital punishment at all.”116 Currently, in many
states, the same jury that finds a defendant guilty during the
guilt phase of the trial decides whether to impose the death
penalty by considering any aggravating or mitigating
factors.117 Consideration of a capital defendant’s mental
retardation during the penalty phase, in addition to being
made by the same jury that found a defendant guilty during
the guilt phase, can cause a higher risk of wrongful execution,
because “[m]entally retarded defendant[s] may be less able to
give meaningful assistance to their counsel and are typically
poor witnesses, and their demeanor may create an
unwarranted impression of lack of remorse for their
crimes.”118 While the determination of a mental retardation
includes fact-finding, mental retardation itself “is not the
functional equivalent of an element of a crime;” therefore,
determination by a jury is not constitutionally required under
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
may be left to the judge to decide prior to trial.119
Proceeding as a noncapital case conserves significant
resources by reducing litigation expenses and expediting the

116

Howell v. Tennessee, 151 S.W.3d 450, 465 (Tenn. 2004).
Id.
118
Jessica Hudson, et al., Lightning but No Thunder: The Need for Clarity
in Military Courts Regarding the Definition of Mental Retardation in
Capital Cases and for Procedures in Implementing Atkins v. Virginia, 55
NAVAL L. REV. 359, 374 (2008) (citing Flores, 93 P.3d at 1269 (quoting
Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21)) [hereinafter Hudson].
119
Grell, 135 P.3d at 706.
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overall proceedings.120 Trying a capital defendant is more
time consuming, expensive, and leads to a greater use of state
legal resources because the government must avoid errors,
which could prove fatal, in trying a death penalty case.121
Allowing a trial judge to issue a pre-trial determination as to a
capital defendant’s mental retardation is “economical in terms
of the time and cost that might be saved by avoiding a capital
trial.”122 In light of that fact, “every effort must be made to
avoid a death-penalty trial, as early in the proceedings as
possible, where capital punishment is precluded as a matter of
law.”123 Additionally, should a determination of mental
retardation be made by the judge prior to trial, an otherwise
capital defendant could decide to plea, thus expediting the
judicial process.124
Therefore, to provide full constitutional protection to a
capital defendant and to encourage efficiency of the criminal
system in applying Atkins, the states should enact legislation

120

See New Mexico v. Flores, 93 P.3d 1264, 1269 (N.M. 2004)
(recognizing that a capital murder trial consumes significantly more
resources than a non-capital trial and that it would be beneficial to all
parties to resolve the question of whether the defendant is eligible for the
death penalty as early as possible);
Hudson, supra note 118, at 391.
121
Nicci Lovre-Laughlin, Lethal Decisions: Examining the Role of
Prosecutorial Discretion in Capital Cases in South Dakota and the Federal
Justice System, 50 S.D. L. REV. 550, 574 (2005).
122
Pennsylvania v. Sanchez, 36 A.3d 24, 80 (Pa. 2011) cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 122 (2012).
123
Id.; Flores, 93 P.3d at 1269; see Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320 (categorically
prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders). By placing the
mental retardation determination in the hands of the judge for a pretrial
decision, “significant resources [could be] saved in terms of trial
preparation, motion practice, voir dire, trial time, mitigation research, etc.,”
if the defendant is found to have mental retardation. United States v.
Nelson, 419 F.Supp.2d 891, 893 (E.D. La. 2006); see also Morrow v.
Alabama, 928 So.2d 315, 324 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004) (stating that pretrial
Atkins determination by the court spares the parties from “the onerous
burden of a futile bifurcated capital sentencing procedure”) (quoting
Louisiana v. Williams, 831 So.2d 835, 860 (La. 2002), superseded by
statute as stated in Louisiana v. Turner, 936 So.2d 89, 103 (La. 2006));
Hudson, supra note 118, at 390 (noting the economic benefits of having a
judge resolve Atkins claims pretrial).
124
Hudson, supra note 118, at 372.
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that leaves determination of a capital defendant’s alleged
mental retardation to the judge prior to the guilt phase.

IX. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court condemned the
execution of mentally retarded capital defendants in Atkins
because it studied the national consensus, which illustrated
that the goals of the criminal justice system cannot be met by a
person, who because of his mental limitations, cannot
understand the consequences or wrongfulness of his actions.
Because the Supreme Court left it to the states to apply the
Atkins holding, the states should enact certain laws to protect
the Court’s intention of not violating a capital defendant’s
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United
States Constitution. States should enact legislation that (1)
shifts the burden of proof to the defendant because an
allegation of mental retardation is an affirmative defense that
should be borne by the defense, (2) sets a standard of
preponderance of the evidence as the maximum standard of
proof a capital defendant must meet to prove mental
retardation because any higher standard of proof would
unfairly allocate an erroneous risk to the defense that could
mean death for someone who would otherwise be exempted
from the death penalty, and (3) requires the determination of
mental retardation be made prior to the penalty phase to
encourage efficiency in time and expenses and to discourage
bias. Justice requires no less.
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TODAY’S MERITED REPRIEVE FOR ITS DEATH PENALTY
Randall T. Noe
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of Tennessee’s capital
punishment history. It ends with the existence of the state’s death
penalty in a condition of reprieve due to its value for constitutional
justice when properly put to use against the worst-of-the-worst and as
a tool for plea bargainers. History shows that the state’s death penalty
resided at times of ebb on a “death row” of its own upon the pages of
the Tennessee Code Annotated. Despite a lengthy evolution process
spurred on by Tennessee’s legislatures, governors, and courts over
time, it is possible that the penalty is on “death row” because it is
controversial, dark, and ugly. The death penalty may never again
flow and may reach the day of ultimate ebb when its death warrant is
signed. However, the death penalty has weathered many efforts
toward reform, will likely never be considered “innocent,” and may
possibly be redeemed to provide for better future application.
Although the death penalty has never quite lived up to its potential as
a deterrent, today it remains a vital part of constitutional justice and
an effective tool that merits reprieve from its own “death row.”
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II. BRIEF HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS
Although the precise origins of capital punishment remain
unclear within the dark recesses of pre-history, “capital punishment
has been used to penalize various forms of conduct”1 since the dawn
of civilization. “Simply put, capital punishment penalizes those
convicted of certain crimes by killing them.”2
“The United States inherited the bulk of its criminal law,
including the tradition of capital punishment, primarily from England
but also from other European countries.”3 As the states were forming,
the newly created state sometimes adopted the law of the state from
which it parted. Tennessee gained statehood in 1796, and its body of
law derived from North Carolina of which it was originally a part.4 A
look at the history of the death penalty in Tennessee indicates the
intent of the state to utilize the death penalty as a means of
punishment and as a deterrent to specific criminal acts.5 “Until 1829,
the only penalty available for conviction of murder was death.”6 ”An
act passed in 1829 divided murder into first and second degree [and]
provided a mandatory death sentence for those convicted of first
degree murder.7 The death penalty was not allowed for second degree
murder, and a sentencing range of ten to twenty-one years was set
instead.8 Tennessee legislators enacted an important change in the
state’s homicide law in 1838 and the state became the first in the
nation to give juries the discretion to sentence defendants to death or
life for first degree murder.9 If the trial jury found mitigating
circumstances in the case, and stated so in its verdict, it became the

RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 3 (4th ed. 2012).
2 Id.
3 Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with
Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L.
REV. 613, 614 (1983).
4 Margaret Vandiver & Michael Coconis, “Sentenced to the Punishment of
Death”: Pre-Furman Capital Crimes and Executions in Shelby County, Tennessee,
31 U. MEM. L. REV. 861, 867 (2001).
5 Roy B. Morgan, Jr., Note, The Death Penalty in Tennessee—Recent
Developments, 8 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 107 (1977-1978).
6 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 870.
7 Id. at 870-71.
8 Id. at 871.
9 Id.
1
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statutory duty of the court to sentence the defendant to life.10 This
change lasted just twenty years. “By 1858, the punishment for first
degree murder was again mandatory death.”11
“Like other slave states, Tennessee had separate statutes for
crimes committed by whites and those committed by slaves, and,
often by free blacks.”12 The separate laws for black and whites show
how the state’s criminal justice system reflected the political and
economic systems of the time.13 In post-Civil War 1865, the Tennessee
legislature rewrote many of the old laws and omitted “reference[s] to
race . . . .”14
Punishment by death is not ultimately effective as a penalty
unless carried out or executed. The public nature of applying the
penalty and methods of death have changed over time. “All
executions in America were public until the 1830’s.”15 A decade
earlier, concerns began to be expressed about the propriety of such
public spectacles.16 “The crowds that gathered to witness public
executions were large and often unruly, disrespectful, drunken and
dangerous [attendees of] festivals of disorder [that] subverted morals,
increased crimes, excited sympathy with the criminal, and wasted
time.”17 The methods varied by state, but Tennessee chose public
hanging as its first method of execution.18 In response to an 1879
hanging in Morristown, Tennessee a local newspaper writer wrote:
[W]e would be glad indeed if we knew this was the last
public execution that would ever occur in Tennessee.
The whole scene here was demoralizing and in no
respect did it in our opinion bring any good result. We
favor hanging for deliberate murder, but we hope the
law making power will speedily pass a law to require
it done privately.19

Id.
Id. at 872.
12 Id. at 867.
13 Id. at 918.
14 Id. at 873-74.
15 Id. at 875.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 877.
19 Hamblen’s Only Hanging Took Place Sept. 26, 1879, DAILY GAZETTE & MAIL,
Nov. 13, 1955, at 14 (reprint from Oct. 1, 1879, on file with author).
10
11
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Pennsylvania, the first northeastern state to abolish public
executions, did so in 1834.20 “[T]he South and southern border states
maintain[ed] the old tradition of public executions longer than the
rest of the country.”21 As early as 1849, a resolution was introduced to
require the Tennessee Senate Judiciary Committee to look into
moving executions inside of prison walls, but it was rejected by that
committee.22 “[In] 1883, [Tennessee] executions were moved from
public spaces to the relative privacy of prison yards, [and] those who
could witness the execution were specified.”23 The 1883 legislation
that caused this change also contained an unfunded mandate that
required each county to construct a private area for executions.24 After
a proposal by Governor Patterson in 1909, the Tennessee legislature
moved executions from the county of conviction to the state prison.25
“Many states changed their methods of execution from
hanging to electrocution in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries in an attempt to provide a quicker and more reliable method
of imposing death.”26 In 1911, Governor Hooper expressed to the
legislature his desire to see Tennessee’s method of execution changed
from hanging to electrocution as a progression of decency and
humanity.27 In 1913, the Tennessee General Assembly passed a bill
changing the method of execution to the electric chair, and
appropriated $5,000 for the cost of the death chamber, apparatus,
machinery, and appliances necessary to conduct electrocutions.28 In
1916, the first electrocution in Tennessee took place.29 Electrocution
continued as the sole method of execution through 1960 when
Tennessee entered a forty-year-long, self-imposed, unofficial
moratorium.30
In 1999, Tennessee changed its method of execution from
electrocution to lethal injection, but maintained electrocution as a

Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 875.
Id.
22 Id. at 876.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 876-77.
26 Id. at 877.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 877-78.
29 Id. at 878, 894.
30 Id.
20
21
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choice for those sentenced before the end of 1998.31 In 2000, Tennessee
carried out its first execution by lethal injection.32 Since 2000,
Tennessee executed four death row inmates by lethal injection and
one who volunteered for electrocution.33
In 2011, Tennessee’s supply of sodium thiopental was seized
by the Drug Enforcement Agency because of improper import
procedures of the foreign-made drug.34 Sodium thiopental is used to
induce general anesthesia as part of the state’s multi-drug lethal
injection protocol.35
In 2012, death row inmates in Tennessee and two other states
sued the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and others “for
improperly allowing shipments of a misbranded and new drug
[sodium thiopental] to enter the United States for use in state lethal
injection protocols.”36 The district judge in the case agreed with the
inmates’ contention.37 In addition, the judge found the FDA had
acted contrary to law by not refusing such imports.38 The judge made
note that the FDA’s mission is to ensure that all drugs are safe and
effective, regardless of why the drug is being administered, and that
the law does not create an exception for drugs purchased by a state to
use in its lethal injection protocol.39 Moreover, the judge felt the FDA
“failed to provide a reasoned explanation for departing from [its] own
regulations . . . to ensure illegal, foreign shipments of [sodium]
thiopental were not admitted in to [sic] the United States.”40 Finally,
the judge found the FDA’s “seemingly callous indifference to the
health consequences of those imminently facing the executioner’s
needle . . . utterly disappointing.”41 Two years after Tennessee’s
Deborah Fins, Death Row U.S.A., 57 (Fall 2012), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/files/publications/DRUSA_Fall_2012.pdf.
32 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database at Robert Coe,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/robert-coe, (last visited Mar. 30, 2013); see
State v. Coe, 655 S.W.2d 903 (Tenn. 1983).
33 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org (last visited Feb. 24, 2013).
34 Bridgit Bowden, Arkansas, Tennessee have Lethal Injection Drug Taken by the
DEA, WPLN NEWS, July 25, 2011, http://wpln.org/?p=29072.
35 Beaty v. Food & Drug Admin., 853 F. Supp.2d 30, 34 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
36 Id. at 32.
37 Id. at 37.
38 Id.
39 Beaty, 853 F. Supp.2d at 43 n.9.
40 Id. at 43.
41 Id.
31
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supply of sodium thiopental was seized, the state experienced a lack
of pancuronium bromide, a strong muscle relaxant also used in the
multi-drug lethal injection protocol.42 Before revising the state’s choice
of drugs, the Tennessee Department of Corrections is “monitoring
steps taken by other states to carry out executions with other drugs.”43

III. ABOLITION?
Death penalty abolition efforts are a significant element of the
history of Tennessee’s death penalty. In 1807, Governor Sevier stated
“[h]umanity and policy call aloud for a revisal of . . . our laws . . . to
abolish the inhuman and prompt mode of punishing with death.”44
Similarly, in 1837, Governor Cannon proposed that the legislature
should “entirely [abolish] punishment by death in our state, and . . .
[substitute] in its stead confinement . . . during life.”45 In 1845,
Governor Brown also stated his position in favor of the abolition of
capital punishment to the legislature.46 He expressed that a just and
rational society should regard the ancient barbarities of the death
penalty with the deepest level of abhorrence and that relaxation of
such laws would not lead to increases in crime.47 Despite the
sentiments of these state executives, no immediate legislation was
advanced.
“In 1915, Tennessee did something no other southern state has
done before or since: it abolished the death penalty for murder by
legislative vote.”48 The bill excluded murder committed by a prisoner
serving a life term, and was vetoed by Governor Rye.49 A motion to
sustain the Governor’s veto passed the House despite its previous
vote in favor of the bill; however, the Governor had delayed his veto
past the five-day period provided by the Tennessee Constitution, and
the bill became law.50 Tennessee’s experiment with partial abolition of
the death penalty was short-lived.51 A week into his term in 1919,
Associated Press, Tennessee Searches for Lethal Injection Drugs, CITIZEN
TRIBUNE, Jan. 14, 2013 at A3 (on file with author).
43 Id.
44 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 888.
45 Id. at 889.
46 Id. at 890.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 878.
49 Id. at 880-81.
50 Id. at 881.
51 Id. at 881-83.
42
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Governor Roberts sent word to the legislature about his perceptions
for the potential of lawless vigilantism and lynch mob vengeance
taking the place of the state sanctioned death penalty for murderers.52
Governor Roberts stated that “[t]he assassin now knows that he will
not forfeit his life by commission of the most atrocious crime upon his
innocent victim.”53 He urged passage of a bill already introduced to
reinstate the death penalty for first degree murder and the legislature
responded quickly with majority votes from both bodies to pass the
bill.54
After an approximate forty-year lull in death penalty abolition
activity, in 1959, Governor Clement requested in an address to the
legislature that it give abolition of capital punishment serious
consideration.55 After a failed legislative attempt to abolish the death
penalty in 1961, a 1965 abolition bill with Governor Clement’s
endorsement overwhelmingly passed the Senate only to be defeated
by a single vote in the House.56
In 1972, as a result of the Supreme Court of the United States’
decision in Furman v. Georgia57 finding the imposition of the death
penalty as practiced nationwide violated the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, the punishment went
on hiatus across the board.58 In 1973, the Tennessee Legislature
enacted new first degree murder and death penalty statutes in an
attempt to remedy the former laws which Furman had rendered
unconstitutional.59 The new Tennessee death penalty statute60 added
aggravating and mitigating circumstances patterned after the Model
Penal Code.61 “After Furman, states sought to resuscitate their capital
statutes by revising them to address the concerns raised in Furman;
Id. at 881-82.
Id. at 882.
54 Id. at 882-83.
55 Id. at 892-93.
56 Id. at 893-94; S.B. 344/H.B. 293 84th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 1965).
57 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
58 Am. Bar Ass’n, Evaluating Fairness and Accuracy in State Death Penalty
Systems: The Tennessee Death Penalty Assessment Report; An Analysis of
Tennessee’s Death Penalty Laws, Procedures, and Practices, 8 (2007), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/as
sessmentproject/tennessee/finalreport. authcheckdam.pdf.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 9-10; Model Penal Code § 210.6(3)-(4)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
52
53
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many of the states turned to [Model Penal Code] § 210.6 as a template
for their revised statutes, hoping in part that the prestige of the
Institute would help to validate these new efforts.”62 The American
Law Institute’s current position statement is, “the Institute withdraws
Section 210.6 of the Model Penal Code in light of the current
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensuring a
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment.”63
In 1974, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the 1973 statutes
unconstitutional and the legislature responded with amendments.64 In
1977, the Tennessee Supreme Court declared the 1974 death penalty
statute unconstitutional and the legislature again responded with
amendments.65 The Tennessee murder and death penalty statutes
faced no further declarations of unconstitutionality, and, with other
changes discussed below, remain current.66
In 2007, the Tennessee Legislature created the Tennessee
Committee to Study the Administration of the Death Penalty.67 Its
work continued for fourteen months, and it yielded several proposals
to the legislature.68 The committee recommended “the creation of an
independent commission to oversee capital defense services in
Tennessee to ensure that attorneys representing those charged with
capital murder are competent, trained, monitored, and compensated
adequately.”69 The bill to enact this measure died in committee.70
Another recommendation would
The Am. Law Inst., Report of the Council to the Membership of The American
Law Institute on the Matter of the Death Penalty, Annex B, 2 (2009), available at
http://www.ali.org/doc/Capital%20Punishment_web.pdf; see also Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
63 The Am. Law Inst., Publications Catalog; Model Penal Code, available at
http://www.ali.org/index.cfm? fuseaction= publications.ppage&nodeid=92,
(last visited Feb. 24, 2013), (choosing to not endorse abolition of capital
punishment per se).
64 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 11; State v. Hailey, 505 S.W.2d 712 (Tenn.
1974).
65 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 12; Collins v. State, 550 S.W.2d 643 (Tenn.
1977).
66 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-13-202, 204 (2012).
67 Am. Civil Liberties Union, The Tennessee Death Penalty Study Committee
Considers Final Report: Committee Members Urge Action, (Feb. 18, 2009),
available at http://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/tennessee-deathpenalty-study-committee-considers-final-report-committee-members.
68 Id.
69 Id.
62
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[r]equire . . . the district attorney general to make
available to the defendant for inspection and copying
all relevant documents, tangible objects and
statements, together with complete files of all
investigative agencies, [and] [r]equire…the district
attorney general to give notice to the defendant of any
expert witnesses that the state reasonably expects to
call as a witness at trial, [and] specifies that the district
attorney general is not required to disclose written
materials drafted by the prosecuting attorneys or their
legal staff for their own use at trial.71
The bill to enact this measure also died in committee.72
A third recommendation would “require . . . all statements
made by a person during a custodial interrogation relating to a
homicide . . . be electronically recorded and preserved.”73 The bill to
enact this measure received much more attention, but was also sent to
die in committee.74 The only recommendation of the committee
enacted by the legislature “require[d] the administrative office of the
court to propose a realistic time within which post-conviction relief
petitions in capital cases are finally disposed of if it is determined the
one-year statutory time limit is not realistic.”75 The new law became
sub-parts (e)(1)-(3) of Tennessee’s Final Disposition of [PostConviction] Petitions statute and went into effect July 8, 2009.76 Two
other states with similar study committees “found their death penalty
Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB167
9 &ga=106.
71 Daniel Potter, Death Penalty Study Committee Issues Recommendations,
WLPN NEWS, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://wpln.org/?p=4849.
72 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB140
2 &ga=106.
73 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB026
1 &ga=106(follow “Summary for SB 0261/HB 0596” hyperlink).
74 Id.
75 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/Billinfo/default.aspx?BillNumber=SB0260
&ga=106 (follow Summary for SB 0260/HB 0597” hyperlink).
76 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-111(e)(1)-(3) (2012).
70
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systems so broken and rife with error that repeal of the death penalty
was recommended.”77 A recommendation to abolish the death
penalty was noticeably absent from the Tennessee committee’s
efforts.78
Regardless of the committee’s lack of an abolition
recommendation, legislation was proposed in 2010 that would
“remove . . . the death penalty as a possible punishment for first
degree murder.”79 This bill died in committee.80 Abolition was
revisited in 2011 with proposed legislation that would “remove…the
jury’s ability to sentence a defendant convicted of first degree murder
to death.”81 This bill also met its demise in committee.82
In reviewing these ancient or recent efforts, the possibility of
abolition of Tennessee’s death penalty has remained a constant topic
of concern. The drumbeat heartily stirring abolition efforts to a
fevered frenzy may again resound in Tennessee, but for now THE
status quo is maintained.

IV. OTHER TWEAKS IN DEATH PENALTY-RELATED LAW
Other tweaks in death penalty-related law from Tennessee’s
capital punishment history are important to note. In 1841, then
Governor James K. Polk suggested to the legislature “that a law was
needed to enable him to commute death sentences to life as well as to
grant pardons.”83 In 1842, the legislature responded to his request
with legislation allowing the governor to reduce a death sentence to
life when he thought a full pardon was not warranted.84 A law
enacted in 1858 granted the Tennessee Supreme Court the power to
recommend the commutation of death sentences to the governor

Am. Civil Liberties Union, supra note 67.
Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Tennessee; History of the Death Penalty; Milestones in
Abolition Efforts, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/tennessee-1#resources.
79 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB311
1 &ga=106.
80 Id.
81 Tenn. Gen. Assemb. Legis. Archives,
http://wapp.capitol.tn.gov/apps/BillInfo/Default.aspx?BillNumber=SB207
9 &ga=107.
82 Id.
83 Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 879.
84 Id.
77
78
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when in its opinion extenuating circumstances were found in
particular cases.85
Some amendments to Tennessee’s statutory scheme merit
attention:
In 1988, the Tennessee Legislature amended the first
degree murder statute by…classif[ying] as first degree
murder the killing of a child less than thirteen years
old if the child’s death result[ed] from one…or more
incidents of a protracted pattern or multiple incidents
of child abuse committed by the defendant against such
child or if such death result[ed] from the cumulative
effects of such pattern or incidents.86
This amendment was referred to as the Scotty Trexler law.87 Scotty
was a twenty-one month-old child murdered in Hawkins County in
1987 by protracted and severe child abuse inflicted upon him by his
mother’s live-in boyfriend who babysat him.88 Although initially
charged with first degree murder, Scotty’s abuser’s charges had to be
reduced because the statute required premeditation which could not
be proved.89 The presiding jurist, Judge James Beckner, impacted by
Scotty’s plight and the unavailability of harsher justice, stepped
outside of the usual neutral cloak of the robe and advocated for the
law’s change with testimony before the committee that drafted the
1988 amendment.90 Scotty’s murderer is due to be released in March
of 2015.91 In 1995, an amendment “deleted all reference to the
requisite age of a child abuse victim in order for the defendant to be
convicted of first degree murder.”92
Among other notable points, the Tennessee Legislature, in
1989, allowed a viable fetus to be considered a murder victim.93 In
1990, the Legislature enacted “a new statute prohibiting defendants
Id.
Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 15-16, (emphasis in original)(quoting 1988
Tenn. Pub. Acts 802, §1).
87 Bill Grubb, Who Was Scotty Trexler?, THE ROGERSVILLE REVIEW, Aug. 3,
2011, http://therogersvillereview.com/story/11904.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 16.
93 TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-210(a) (1989).
85
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with mental retardation from being subject to the death penalty.”94 A
1993 amendment added life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole as a sentencing option for first degree murder.95 In 2002, after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks on homeland targets, “the . . . Legislature
added ‘act[s] of terrorism’ to the list of offenses constituting first
degree murder.”96 In 2011, the Legislature amended the provision
related to a fetus as a victim to “include a human embryo or fetus at
any stage of gestation in utero.”97

V. RACE AS AN ISSUE
Equal justice under law is such a lofty goal that the phrase is
engraved on the west pediment of the United States Supreme Court
Building in Washington, D.C.98 The United States Constitution
provides “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”99 “[E]qual protection
applies to the federal government through judicial interpretation of
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and to state and local
governments through the Fourteenth Amendment.”100 Equal, as an
adjective, does not hold its ground in an imperfect world. In an ideal
state, equal numbers would be demonstrated in the racial
demographics of death row inmates. However, a look at statistics
readily shows racial disparity in demographic comparisons.
Nationwide, as of fall 2012, the death row population was 43.17%
white, 41.93% black, and 14.91% other.101 Overall estimated nationwide
prison population at the end of 2011 was 35.66 % white, 40.16% black,
and 24.17% other.102 Overall nationwide citizen population in 2010

Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 58, at 17; See also TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204
(1990).
95 Id. at 16.
96 Id. at 17 (quoting 2002 Tenn. Pub. Acts 849, §2(a)).
97 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts 408, § 2.
98 Office of the Curator, Supreme Court of the United States, The West
Pediment Information Sheet, (Updated: Aug. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/westpediment.pdf.
99 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
100 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 718 (3d ed. 2009).
101 Fins, supra note 31, at 1.
102 E. Ann Carson & William J. Sabol, Prisoners in 2011, 7 (Dec. 2012), available
at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p11.pdf.
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was 72.4% white, 12.6% black, and 15% other.103 Tennessee’s death
row population as of fall 2012 was 52% white, 43% black, and 5%
other.104 Tennessee’s overall prison population as of mid-2012 was
52.08% white, 45.49% black, and 2.4% other.105 Tennessee’s overall
citizen population in 2010 was 77.56% white, 16.66% black, and 5.78%
other.106 Even more disparate is the number of executions in
Tennessee for the period of July 1916, through December 2, 2009,
which show forty-five white individuals executed, or 34.35%, while
eighty-six black individuals were executed, or 65.65%.107
While statistical disparity is evinced above based on racial
classification, disparity does not mean inequity based on general
murder suspect demographics. Statistics from 2001 through 2011 for
national murder offenders based on crime occurrence data show
racial demographics of 32.5% white, 37% black, 1.7% other, and 28.9%
unknown.108 Tennessee’s encompassing murder arrest statistics from
2002 through 2011 show racial demographics of 39.1% white, 59.7%
black, and 1.2% other.109 Regarding statistics, some would say where
there is smoke, there are mirrors. Others would say, based on the
statistics regarding persons who actually commit murders in the
United States and Tennessee, that where there is smoke, there is fire;
and where there is fire, it should be fought. A defender of the death
penalty wrote:
[S]tatistics of overrepresentation fail to prove racial
bias. The relevant population for comparison is not the
general population, but rather the population of
murderers. If the death penalty is administered
Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones & Roberto R. Ramirez, Overview of
Race and Hispanic Origin, 4 (March, 2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf.
104 Fins, supra note 31, at 33.
105 Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2012 Statistical Abstract, 24 (Oct. 2012), available at
http://www.tn.gov/correction/pdf/StatisticalAbstract2012.pdf.
106 U.S. Census Bureau, 2010 Census Interactive Population Search-Tennessee,
http://www.census.gov/2010census/ popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=47.
107 Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., Tennessee Executions, available at
http://www.tn.gov/correction/media/tnexecutions.html.
108 See infra Table 1, Race of United States Murder Offenders Based on Crime
Report Data, 2001-2011, (unknown category due to race being unknown at
the time of the crime).
109 See infra Table 2, Race of Tennessee Murder Arrestees Based on Arrest
Data, 2002-2011.
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without regard to race, the percentage of African
American death row inmates found at the end of the
process should not exceed the percentage of African
American defendants charged with murder at the
beginning. The available statistics indicate that is
precisely what happens.110
In 1987, the Supreme Court of the United States, by a vote of
five-to-four, decided a case on point regarding the “question [of]
whether a complex statistical study that indicates a risk that racial
considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations proves
that [a defendant’s] capital sentence is unconstitutional under the
Eight or Fourteenth Amendment.”111 The Court stated a narrow and
necessary burden of proof:
[A] defendant who alleges an equal protection
violation has the burden of proving “the existence of
purposeful discrimination.” A corollary to this
principle is that a criminal defendant must prove that
the purposeful discrimination “had a discriminatory
effect” on him. Thus, to prevail under the Equal
Protection Clause, [the defendant] must prove that the
decisionmakers [sic] in his case acted with
discriminatory purpose.112
The Court was asked to rely on historical evidence, and Justice Lewis
Powell noted that “[a]lthough the history of racial discrimination in
this country is undeniable, we cannot accept official actions taken
long ago as evidence of current intent.”113 The Court found that a
statistical study was clearly insufficient to support an inference that
any of the decision-makers in the case acted with discriminatory
purpose, and that the State as a whole did not act with a
discriminatory purpose in selecting or reaffirming “a particular
course of action at least in part ‘because of’, not merely ‘in spite of’, its

Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of the Death Penalty, in DEBATING THE DEATH
PENALTY 183, 201 (Hugo Bedau & Paul Cassell eds., 2004).
111 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282-83 (1987).
112 Id. at 292 (emphasis in original) (citing Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545,
550 (1967); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985)).
113 Id. at 298 n.20.
110
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adverse effects upon an identifiable group.”114 For the defendant’s
claim to prevail, he “would have to prove that the Georgia Legislature
enacted or maintained the death penalty statute because of an
anticipated racially discriminatory effect,” and there was no evidence
that the Georgia Legislature enacted the capital punishment statute to
“further a racially discriminatory purpose.”115 The Court concluded
this part of the case by holding the defendant failed to demonstrate
the State maintained capital punishment because of its statistically
suggested disproportionate impact, and, as there were legitimate
reasons for the Georgia Legislature to adopt and maintain capital
punishment, it would not infer a discriminatory purpose on the part
of the State of Georgia; the Court thus rejected the equal protection
claims.116 The Court also held, “[t]he Constitution does not require
that a State eliminate any demonstrable disparity that correlates with
a potentially irrelevant factor in order to operate a criminal justice
system that includes capital punishment.”117
Along similar lines, a gender disparity claim by a male
defendant would likely be seen as frivolous, yet grossly
disproportionate statistics are available. The gender percentages for
those on death row in the United States as of October 1, 2012, were
98% male and 2% female.118 Those numbers for Tennessee were
98.88% male and 1.12% female.119 The estimated gender percentages
for those incarcerated for all crimes in the United States as of
December 31, 2011, were 93.26% male and 6.74% female.120 The
gender percentages for those suspected of murder from 2001-2011
were 65.1% male, 7.2% female, and 27.7% unknown.121 The gender
percentages for those arrested for murder in Tennessee from 2002
through 2011 were 88.9% male and 11.1% female.122 The overall
citizen population gender demographics as of 2010 for the United

Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 298 (emphasis in original).
116 Id. at 298-99.
117 Id. at 319.
118 Fins, supra note 31, at 1.
119 Id. at 57.
120 Carson & Sabol, supra note 102, at 7.
121 See infra Table 3, Sex of United States Murder Offenders Based on Crime
Report Data, 2001-2011, (unknown category due to gender being unknown at
the time of the crime).
122 See infra Table 4, Sex of Tennessee Murder Arrestees Based on Arrest Data,
2002-2011.
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States were 49.2% male and 50.8% female.123 The overall citizen
population gender demographics as of 2010 for Tennessee were
48.75% male and 51.25% female.124
No one would consider doing away with the death penalty
because males are disproportionately represented on death row. This
is because males disproportionately commit more murders in general
as the statistics above show. Likewise, abolition, mitigation, or
leniency should not be based on race if its members are
disproportionately responsible for originating the crimes for which
they are arrested, convicted, and imprisoned. Similarly, no one
fathoms trying to narrow statutory language, sentencing guidelines,
and aggravating factors to be more inclusive of females. Such
language is gender neutral. Yet, the number of women in prison in
general is growing at an alarming rate.125 “The female prison
population grew by 832% from 1977 to 2007, [while] the male prison
population grew 416% during the same time period.”126 Nevertheless,
as the statistics above demonstrate, females remain grossly
underrepresented on death row and in prisons in comparison to
males. This, like with race, is not inequity or discrimination, as fire is
being fought where it burns.

VI. TENNESSEE CAPITAL CASES REACH THE NATION’S CAPITAL
A few death penalty issue cases that merited the attention of
the Supreme Court of the United States originated in Tennessee. In
Payne v. Tennessee, the Court reconsidered whether the Eighth
Amendment barred the admission of victim impact evidence during
the penalty or sentencing phase of a capital trial.127 Previous Court
opinions had held “the harm . . . a capital defendant causes a victim’s
Lindsay M. Howden & Julie A. Myer, Age and Sex Composition: 2010, 2
(May, 2011), available at
http://www.census.gov/2010census/popmap/ipmtext.php?fl=47.
124 Id. at 7.
125 Women’s Prison Ass’n Inst. on Women & Crim. Justice,
http://www.wpaonline.org/institute/index.htm (last visited March 27,
2013).
126 Women’s Prison Ass’n Inst. on Women & Crim. Justice, Quick Facts:
Women & Criminal Justice-2009, 1 (2009), available at
http://wpaonline.org/pdf/Quick%20Facts%20Women%20and%20CJ%2020
09.pdf.
127 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 811 (1991).
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family do[es] not in general reflect on the defendant’s
‘blameworthiness,’
and
that
only
evidence
relating
to
‘blameworthiness’ is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.”128
The Court held, “[w]e are now of the view that a State may properly
conclude that for the jury to assess meaningfully the defendant’s
moral culpability and blameworthiness, it should have before it at the
sentencing phase evidence of the specific harm caused by the
defendant.”129 The Court rationalized that it wanted to return
individualism back to victim families, give them a “face,” allow the
State the full moral force of its evidence, and allow the jury necessary
information used to determine proper punishment.130 The Court
opined, “there is nothing unfair about allowing the jury to bear in
mind harm [caused by the defendant to a victim’s family] at the same
time as it considers mitigating evidence introduced by the
defendant.”131 The Court further held:
Under the aegis of the Eighth Amendment, we have
given the broadest latitude to the defendant to
introduce relevant mitigating evidence reflecting on his
individual personality, and the defendant’s attorney
may argue that evidence to the jury . . . . [W]e now
reject the view [of prior precedent] that a State may not
permit the prosecutor to similarly argue to the jury the
human cost of the crime of which the defendant stands
convicted . . . . “[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is
due to the accuser also . . . .” We thus hold that if the
State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact
evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject,
the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.132
Another Tennessee case later reached the Supreme Court of
the United States and was decided in 2006. Paul Gregory House
(House) was convicted of a 1985 murder and sentenced to death, but
new revelations raised doubts about his guilt.133 The Court found
Id. at 819.
Id. at 825.
130 Id.
131 Payne, 501 U.S. at 826.
132 Id. at 826-27 (emphasis in original) (citing Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 122 (1934)).
133 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 521 (2006).
128
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House presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate actual innocence
so as to allow “access to a federal court to pursue habeas corpus relief
based on constitutional claims that are procedurally barred under
state law.”134 As a result of evidence developed by House’s lawyers
subsequent to his trial, the Court remanded the case for further
proceedings with the federal district court ordering Tennessee to retry
or release him.135 After a stint on bail awaiting retrial, the State, in
2009, dropped all charges.136
A third case of interest of Tennessee origin was decided by the
United States Supreme Court in 2009. The issue raised by Gary Cone
(Cone) was whether his right to due process was violated when the
State of Tennessee suppressed evidence supporting his claim of drug
addiction that included witness statements and police reports which
potentially corroborated his defense at trial and should have bolstered
mitigation of the death penalty he then received.137 “Cone asserted an
insanity defense, contending that he had killed [an elderly couple in
their home] while suffering from acute amphetamine psychosis, a
disorder caused by drug addiction.”138 The Court found that Cone
had not procedurally defaulted his Brady claim, that it had been fully
considered by the state courts, and that it was ripe for federal
adjudication.139 While the Court agreed that the withheld documents
in violation of Brady were not material to Cone’s alleged insane
mental state, it found the trial court failed to adequately consider
whether that same evidence was material to mitigation efforts during
sentencing.140 The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals
and remanded the case to the District Court to determine in the first
instance whether there was a reasonable probability that the withheld
evidence would have altered at least one juror’s assessment of the
appropriate penalty for Cone’s crimes.141 Currently, Mr. Cone remains
a resident of Tennessee’s Death Row.142

Id. at 521-22; See also COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 41.
COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 41.
136 Id. at 42.
137 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 451 (2009); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
138 Id.
139 Id. at 452-69.
140 Id. at 452.
141 Id.
142 Fins, supra note 31, at 57.
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VII. THE REALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT TODAY
Within Tennessee’s capital punishment history, not unlike the
rest of the United States, one can observe the influences on death
penalty jurisprudence through what Chief Justice Warren described
as the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society.”143 The ebb and flow of change regarding capital
punishment in Tennessee was highlighted in previous sections of this
paper. Reiterated from above, Tennessee did not execute anyone from
1960 through 2000.144 From 2000 through 2012, Tennessee executed six
people.145 Eighty-nine people remain under the care of the Tennessee
Department of Correction on Death Row.146 I agree with what Justice
Stewart opined over forty years ago that “the [death] penalty is so
infrequently imposed that the threat of execution is too attenuated to
be of substantial service to criminal justice.”147 However, “capital
punishment, under contemporary standards, is not to be viewed as
disproportionate to the severity of the crime of murder.”148
Accordingly, I disagree with Justice Stewart’s statement “that [death]
sentences are ‘unusual’ in the sense that the penalty of death is
infrequently imposed for murder . . . .”149
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell, a wise jurist in his sunset
eighties, while elaborating on his then-held opinions about capital
punishment, made statements that closely parallel my own beliefs on
the subject. Justice Powell voted in favor of the death penalty during
his term on the Court.150 After his retirement in 1987, Justice Powell
expressed concern about the problem of excessively repetitious
litigation in capital cases, and felt that if death sentences could not be
enforced even where innocence of the defendant and fairness of his or
her trial was not seriously in doubt, then perhaps legislative bodies
should reconsider whether it was in the public’s interest to retain a

Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
Vandiver & Coconis, supra note 4, at 887, 894.
145 Death Penalty Info. Ctr. Searchable Execution Database,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/views-executions (last visited Feb. 24,
2013).
146 Fins, supra note 31, at 57.
147 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972).
148 Morgan, supra note 5, at 108-09.
149 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309.
150 COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 216.
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punishment enforced so haphazardly.151 He stated, “Capital
punishment, though constitutional, is not being enforced, [and] . . . it
reflects discredit on the law to have a major component . . . that is
simply not enforced.”152 Justice Powell later unequivocally related he
had come to think capital punishment should be abolished, not
because it was intrinsically wrong, but because it could not be fairly
and expeditiously enforced.153 His sense of dignity and his conception
of the majesty of the law were offended by the endless waiting,
perpetual litigation, last-minute stays, and midnight executions.154
Justice Powell felt the spectacle of non-enforcement bred cynicism
about the law’s announced purposes and contempt for courts that
could not or would not carry those purposes to fruition.155 He felt it
better to bar the whole ugly mess rather than continue an indecent,
embarrassing, and wasteful charade.156 The totality of Justice Powell’s
views describe the perceived reality about capital punishment now,
two decades later.
Furthermore, our country’s think tank for model law utopia,
The American Law Institute, recognized the dystopia of “the current
intractable institutional and structural obstacles to ensur[e] a
minimally adequate system for administering capital punishment,”157
and withdrew the death penalty section of the Model Penal Code
without unequivocally endorsing opposition to such penalties.158

VIII. PLEA BARGAINING
While Justice Powell’s sentiments, in total, are spot on for the
current state of capital punishment jurisprudence, I disagree with the
ideas that the death penalty is of no use at all or that it is completely
unworkable. The threat of a death sentence is a great plea bargaining
tool. When a defendant’s life is “saved” by a plea bargained sentence
Lewis Powell, Commentary: Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1046
(1989) reprinted in COYNE & ENZEROTH, supra note 1, at 216.
152 Don J. DeBenedictis, The Reasonable Man, A.B.A J., Oct. 1990, at 68-9
reprinted in COYNE & ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 216.
153 JOHN C. JEFFERIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS POWELL, JR., (1994) reprinted in COYNE
& ENTZEROTH, supra note 1, at 217.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 The Am. Law Inst., supra note 63.
158 Id.
151
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of life without the chance of parole or “death by imprisonment,” both
sides can argue a win. My experience with the death penalty as a
bargaining tool was influenced in particular by two cases that
impacted the Tennessee judicial district where I have spent my career
in law enforcement.
The first case involved the carjacking and execution style
murder of three of the four members of the Lillelid family in Greene
County in 1997.159 The parents along with their six-year-old daughter
and two-year-old son were carjacked by a group of six young
Kentuckians at an Interstate 81 rest area, transported to a nearby rural
road, and each of the family members were then shot.160 The bodies of
the children were ritualistically placed in an inverted-cross fashion
atop the bodies of their parents before the Lillelids were run over with
their own van.161 The family was left for dead as the murderers fled;
however, the two-year-old boy survived his injuries. Unfortunately,
he was blinded in the eye where he had been shot and suffered
impaired motor skills.162 The Lillelid murders became a salient
incident that sparked a growing outcry for execution of convicted
killers.163 Third Judicial District Attorney General, Berkeley Bell
(General Bell), filed notice that the State would seek the death penalty
for the four of the six defendants who were adults.164 The defendants
later agreed to enter guilty pleas after the State agreed not to seek the
death penalty but life in prison without the chance of parole
instead.165 A newspaper reporter related General Bell’s rationale:
While many have said justice in the case could be
obtained only through executing the killers, prosecutor
Robert Moore, Court Rejects Lillelid Killer’s Appeal, CITIZEN TRIBUNE, March
15, 2013, at A1.
160Id.
161 Id. at A1, A6.
162 10 Years Ago Today…An Unforgettable Tragedy, GREENEVILLE SUN, April 6,
2007, available at http://www.greenevillesun.com/Local_News/article/10Years-Ago-Today--An-Unforgettable-Tragedy-id-276122.
163 Outcry For Death Penalty, WGRV 1340 LOCAL NEWS, April 20, 1997, available
at http://www.greeneville.com/trial/, (scroll down menu at left by date).
164 Grand Jury Indicts-Death Penalty Sought, WGRV 1340 LOCAL NEWS, Sept. 3,
1997, available at http://www.greeneville.com/trial/, (scroll down menu at
left by date).
165 Lillelid Murder Suspects Plead Guilty, WGRV 1340 LOCAL NEWS, Feb. 20,
1998, available at http://www.greeneville.com/trial/, (scroll down menu at
left by date).
159
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Bell said after the six entered guilty pleas . . . that
Tennessee's death penalty is “in name only.” With
almost 40 years elapsed since an execution, Bell said a
death sentence in Tennessee is an effective sentence of
“life in prison without parole.” Bell said he had
concerns a jury would be torn at sentencing because an
alleged shooter—Bryant—would be ineligible for
execution because of juvenile status, yet the four adults
would face execution regardless of their shooting a
victim or not. “Credibility problems” for two key
prosecution witnesses—one with an existing criminal
history, the other with a just-discovered felony
record—also helped swing a decision to offer the six
removal of the death penalty from sentencing
consideration in exchange for their complete
admissions of guilt.166
Scattered appeals continue into 2013 as the defendants protest their
plea deals.167
The second case involved the line-of-duty murder of Hawkins
County Deputy Gerald Monroe Gibson in 2000.168 Deputy Gibson had
been part of the team effort to serve an arrest warrant for attempted
burglary on a suspect who barricaded himself in his home.169 Deputy
Gibson stepped from cover to attempt to shoot a teargas canister into
the suspect’s home and was shot in the head by the suspect.170
General Bell also sought the death penalty in this case.171 A similar
ensuing plea bargain was struck, the defendant entered a guilty plea,
and he received a sentence of life without parole.172 General Bell
stated:

Gina Stafford, Innocence Lost—Chance Encounter Led to Unthinkable Tragedy,
KNOXVILLE NEWS SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 1998, available at
http://www.angelfire.com/tn/finagen/web.html.
167 Moore, supra note 159, at A1, A6.
168 Wlodarz Pleads Guilty to Slaying Deputy Gibson, Receives Life in Prison
Without Parole, THE ROGERSVILLE REVIEW, Sept. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.therogersvillereview.com/news/article_b208d7d9-8634-59cd8bdf-7b670c4c52c2.html.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
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All in all with the factors involved in the case,
particularly for closure for the family [so] they can
leave all of this behind and not have to relive it again,
[w]e felt that the second alternative, that is death in the
penitentiary by natural causes, was the appropriate
course to take. It is very important for these types of
cases to be over . . . . [A]fter our discussions with the
family, we felt that putting it all behind us was very
important and that is the basic reason that we decided
to end it this way. [W]e reached an agreement . . . and
proceeded as expeditiously as possible to close the
matter out.173

These two cases evince the typical effectiveness of having the
death penalty as a tool to sculpt a plea bargain to the mutual benefit
of each party to the adversarial process. For my part, retention of
capital punishment is preferred for the worst-of-the-worst to choose
between the plea bargain or the gamble of a trial. Whether a
defendant rolls the dice for trial and loses or takes the deal, the
punishment fits the crime: death by execution or death by
imprisonment.

IX. WHAT IF IT WERE YOUR FRIEND?
Most people have not personally known a murder victim or
the members of the victim’s immediate or impacted family, and it is
my prayer that such remains a constant in as many lives as possible.
Hawkins County Deputy Gerald Monroe Gibson was a colleague I
considered a friend. We were acquainted as agents in the “war on
drugs” who worked together on a few joint cases and who coattended some advanced training. “Bubba,” as Deputy Gibson was
affectionately known, was a gifted conversationalist who made
friends easily and who treated adversary criminals with respect. He
was someone I looked up to as a mentor. I will always remember
something that Bubba told me. During a war story swapping session,
he was bemoaning the many hours spent building probable cause for
a barely successful drug search warrant case. During the search, he
had located only a few marijuana roaches from an ashtray. Not to be
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dissuaded for too long, he commented, “At least, by God, they knew
we were there!”174
I distinctly remember the gut-wrenching feeling I experienced
in reaction to Bubba’s murder. I was called out to travel to Hawkins
County to offer critical incident stress peer support the night of his
death, and the knot in my stomach was not from motion sickness due
to traveling the winding rural roads to the top of the fog-covered
mountain near where he died. The nausea did not leave for days after
attending his funeral and honors burial. Yet I was many gradients
away from the immense impact this line-of-duty murder inflicted
onto his wife, his two daughters, his fellow team member in whose
arms Bubba died, his other co-workers, his immediate family, friends,
and community.
Aside from basal humanity, the defendant who executed
Deputy Gibson exhibited no known redeeming qualities. A valuable
life was sacrificed, and a likely remorseless, unrepentant life carries
on at the taxpayers’ expense. Such a murderer even gains royalty-like
“cred” in prison ranks as a cop killer. A 2007 survey showed 68% of
Tennessee voters endorse the death penalty for murder.175 As a
distant residual victim of this crime due to the loss of a friend, and
even from that distance or more, something would be missing if the
death penalty was always off the table as a potential term in the
contract for proper treatment of each other we have as humans in a
civilized society.

X. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is my hope that we carry on utilizing a
variation of Deputy Gibson’s sage words: with God’s help, let others
know in a positive way that we are here. As for Tennessee’s death
penalty, today it remains a vital part of constitutional justice and an
effective tool that merits reprieve.

Conversation with Gerald Monroe Gibson, Deputy, Hawkins Cnty.
Sheriff’s Dep’t, in Morristown, Tenn. (Nov. 12, 1999).
175 Mem. from Roy Occhiogrosso, James Delorey, & Gretchen Wagner, Global
Strategy Group to Deborah T. Fleischaker, Dir., Death Penalty Moratorium
Implementation Project, Am. Bar Ass’n 2 (Feb. 21, 2007), available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/moratorium/as
sessmentproject/tennessee/survey.authcheckdam.pdf.
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TABLE 1: RACE OF UNITED STATES MURDER OFFENDERS BASED ON
CRIME REPORT DATA, 2001-2011
YEAR
2011176
2010177
2009178
2008179
2007180
2006181

TOTAL
14548
15094
15760
16277
17040
17399

WHITE
4729
4849
5286
5334
5278
5339

%
32.5
32.1
33.5
32.8
31
30.7

BLACK
5486
5770
5890
5943
6463
6843

%
37.7
38.2
37.4
36.5
37.9
39.3

OTHER
256
251
245
273
245
295

%
1.8
1.7
1.6
1.7
1.4
1.7

UNKN
4077
4224
4339
4727
5054
4922

%
28
28
27.5
29
29.7
28.3

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2011, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2011 (2012), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/expanded-homicide-datatable-3.
177 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2010, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2010 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crimein-the-u.s/2010/crime-in-the-u.s.-2010/tables/10shrtbl03.xls.
178 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2009, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2009 (2010), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2009/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html.
179 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2008, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2008 (2009), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2008/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html.
180 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2007, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2007 (2008), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html.
181 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2006, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2006 (2007), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/offenses/expanded_information/data/
shrtable_03.html.
176

TENNESSEE’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
2005182
2004183
2003184
2002185
2001186
TOTAL

17029
15935
16043
15813
15488
176426

5452
5339
5132
5356
5174
57268

32
33.5
32
33.9
33.4
32.5

6379
5608
5729
5579
5521
65211

151
37.6
35.2
35.7
35.3
35.6
37

299
271
308
274
273
2990

2
1.7
1.9
1.7
1.8
1.7

4899
4717
4874
4604
4520
50957

28.8
29.6
30.4
29.1
29.2
28.9

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2005, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 3, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX, &
RACE, 2005 (2006), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/offenses/expanded_information/data/sh
rtable_03.html.
183 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2004, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 2.5, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX,
& RACE, 2004 (2005), available at
http://www2.fbi.gov/ucr/cius_04/documents/04tbl2-5a.xls.
184 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 2003, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 2.5, MURDER OFFENDERS BY AGE, SEX,
& RACE, 2003 (2004), available at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2003/table2-5_offenders03.xls
185 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2002, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 2.6, MURDER OFFENDERS BY
AGE, SEX, & RACE, 2002 (2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2002/table2-6_offendersage02.xls.
186 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES 2001, EXPANDED HOMICIDE DATA TABLE 2.6, MURDER OFFENDERS BY
AGE, SEX, & RACE, 2001 (2002), available at http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2001/table2-6_offendersage01.xls.
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TABLE 2: RACE OF TENNESSEE MURDER ARRESTEES BASED ON ARREST
DATA, 2002-2011
YEAR TOTAL WHITE
2011187 295
128
2010188 272
114
189
2009
368
141
2008190 327
119
191
2007
313
110
192
2006
342
113
2005193 358
140
194
2004
329
132

%
43.4
41.9
38.3
36.4
35.1
33
39.1
40.1

BLACK
164
154
222
201
202
224
210
192

%
55.6
56.6
60.3
61.5
64.5
65.5
58.7
58.4

OTHER
3
4
5
7
1
5
8
5

%
1
1.5
1.4
2.1
0.3
1.5
2.2
1.5

TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2011, 24,
(2012), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20Te
nnessee%202011.pdf.
188 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2010, 26,
(2011), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/documents/2010CIT.pdf.
189 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2009, 24,
(2010), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/documents/CrimeinTN2009.pdf.
190 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2008, 26,
(2009), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2008%20Crime%20
in%20Tennessee.pdf.
191 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2007, 24,
(2008), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202007.pdf.
192 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2006, 26,
(2007), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2006%20All%20Ag
encies%20Combined.pdf.
193 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2005, 27,
(2006), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202005%20Complete.pdf.
194 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2004, 25,
(2005), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20Te
nnessee%202004.pdf.
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2003195 316
2002196 353
TOTAL 3273

137
146
1280

43.4
41.4
39.1

153
177
207
1953

56
58.6
59.7

2
0
40

0.6
0
1.2

TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2003, 25,
(2004), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/2003_CIT_Complet
e.pdf.
196 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, CRIME IN TENN. 2002, 22,
(2003), available at
http://www.tbi.state.tn.us/tn_crime_stats/publications/Crime%20in%20T
N%202002.pdf.
195
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TABLE 3: SEX OF UNITED STATES MURDER OFFENDERS BASED ON
CRIME REPORT DATA, 2001-2011
YEAR
2011197
2010198
2009199
2008200
2007201
2006202
2005203
2004204
2003205
2002206
2001207
TOTAL

TOTAL
14548
15094
15760
16277
17040
17399
17029
15935
16043
15813
15488
176426

MALE
9458
9972
10391
10568
10975
11508
11117
10262
10218
10285
10126
114880

See supra note 176.
See supra note 177.
199 See supra note 178.
200 See supra note 179.
201 See supra note 180.
202 See supra note 181.
203 See supra note 182.
204 See supra note 183.
205 See supra note 184.
206 See supra note 185.
207 See supra note 186.
197
198

%
65.2
66.1
65.9
64.9
64.4
66.1
65.3
64.4
63.7
65
65.4
65.1

FEMALE
1138
1075
1197
1176
1206
1151
1246
1130
1123
1108
1086
12636

%
7.8
7.1
7.6
7.2
7.1
6.6
7.3
7.1
7
7
7
7.2

UNKN.
3925
4047
4172
4533
4859
4740
4666
4543
4702
4420
4276
48883

%
27
26.8
26.5
27.8
28.5
27.2
27.4
28.5
29.3
28
27.6
27.7
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TABLE 4: SEX OF TENNESSEE MURDER ARRESTEES BASED ON ARREST
DATA, 2002-2011
YEAR
2011208
2010209
2009210
2008211
2007212
2006213
2005214
2004215
2003216
2002217
TOTAL

TOTAL
295
272
368
327
313
342
358
329
316
353
3273

See supra note 187.
See supra note 188.
210 See supra note 189.
211 See supra note 190.
212 See supra note 191.
213 See supra note 192.
214 See supra note 193.
215 See supra note 194.
216 See supra note 195.
217 See supra note 196.
208
209

MALE
263
241
325
299
282
302
314
290
276
317
2909

%
89.2
88.6
88.3
91.4
90.1
88.3
87.7
88.1
87.3
89.8
88.9

FEMALE
32
31
43
28
31
40
44
39
40
36
364

%
10.8
11.4
11.7
8.6
9.9
11.7
12.3
11.9
12.7
10.2
11.1

